Pandemic Recession: L- or V-Shaped?

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Abstract

We develop and calibrate a search-theoretic model of the labor market in order to forecast the evolution of the aggregate US labor market during and after the coronavirus pandemic. The model is designed to capture the heterogeneity of the transitions of individual workers across states of unemployment and employment and across different employers. The model is designed also to capture the trade-offs in the choice between temporary and permanent layoffs. Under reasonable parameterizations of the model, the lockdown instituted to prevent the spread of the novel coronavirus is shown to have long-lasting negative effects on unemployment. This is because the lockdown disproportionately disrupts the employment of workers who need years to find stable jobs.

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Introduction

In March 2020, the US entered a “lockdown” so as to prevent the spread of the novel coronavirus. The vast majority of residents of the United States have been ordered to stay at home. Most retail businesses have been ordered to shut down. Most workers have been ordered to stay away from their place of work. Not surprisingly, during March and April of 2020, the number of claims for unemployment benefits has skyrocketed, exceeding in only two months the total from the Great Recession. Is the enormous number of workers entering unemployment going to flow back into the ranks of the employed once the lockdown restrictions are lifted? Or are these workers going to remain unemployed long after the lockdown is removed? In this paper, we develop and quantify a framework to analyze and forecast the evolution of the labor market during and after the coronavirus pandemic. We find that, under reasonable parametrizations of the model, even a three-month-long lockdown is going to have long-lasting negative effects on unemployment.

Our framework is a search-theoretic model of the labor market in the spirit of Pissarides (1985) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). Workers endogenously transition across states of employment and unemployment, as well as from one employer to another. Workers search for jobs when they are unemployed. Workers search for more productive jobs when they are employed, albeit with a lower intensity. When their productivity falls below some threshold, workers move from employment into unemployment. If the productivity is low for transitory reasons, some workers and firms may suspend production but maintain the option of resuming it, albeit at some cost and imperfectly. As in Gregory, Menzio, and Wiczer (2020), workers are ex ante heterogeneous with respect to their baseline productivity, the distribution of the component of productivity that is idiosyncratic to their match with a particular employer, and their ability to search the labor market. The search process that brings workers and vacant jobs into contact is directed by wages, as in Moen (1997) and Menzio and Shi (2011).

According to our model, the lockdown—which we describe as a temporary decline in labor productivity—causes some employment relationships to be terminated, some to be suspended, and others to continue. Intuitively, terminated relationships are those in which the surplus becomes negative because of the lockdown. Continuing and suspended relationships are those in which the surplus remains positive in spite of the lockdown. A relationship is suspended rather than continued if its productivity during the lockdown is low enough that the firm and the worker prefer collecting unemployment benefits rather than continuing production and maintain-
ing strong ties.

Once the lockdown is lifted, the speed of the recovery depends on three factors: (i) the fraction of workers who, at the beginning of the lockdown, enter unemployment while maintaining a relationship with their employer; (ii) the rate at which inactive relationships dissolve during the lockdown; (iii) the rate at which workers who are not recalled at the end of the lockdown by their previous employer can find new, stable jobs. Factors (i) and (ii) depend, in turn, on the costs associated with maintaining and reactivating a temporarily inactive relationship, on the ability of the employer to survive the lockdown without revenues, and on the rate of decay in the quality of a temporarily inactive relationship. Factor (iii) depends on the job-finding rate of the non-randomly selected group of workers who are permanently laid off during the lockdown.

Depending on parameters, the model can generate either a V-shaped recession—one in which the unemployment rate quickly returns to its baseline level once the lockdown restrictions are lifted—or an L-shaped recession—one in which the unemployment rate takes several years to return to its pre-lockdown level. As a matter of theory, a V-shaped recession occurs if (a) workers who enter unemployment are in a suspended relationship with their previous employer and maintain it throughout the lockdown; or (b) workers who, by the end of the lockdown, have no relationship to their previous employer can quickly find a new, stable job. In contrast, an L-shaped recession occurs if (a) many workers flow into unemployment without maintaining ties to their previous employer; and (b) these workers cannot quickly find a new, stable job.

We calibrate the model using data from the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) program and the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) to capture three features of the labor market: (i) the fact that workers systematically differ with respect to the duration of their unemployment spells and the tenure length of their jobs; (ii) the prevalence of different types of workers in different industries; (iii) unemployment insurance claims across industries in March and April 2020. We find three distinct types of workers. At one extreme, there are “stable” workers with high productivity, short unemployment spells, and a high probability of staying on a job for more than two years. At the other extreme, there are “fickle” workers with low productivity, long unemployment spells, and a low probability of staying on a job for more than two years. We find that the prevalence of “fickle” workers varies a lot across industries, and they happen to be concentrated in some of the industries hit hardest by the lockdown.
Using the calibrated framework, we measure the shape of the pandemic recession. We model the recession as three-month lockdown—which affects differently the productivity of workers in different industries—followed by a 12-month period of uncertainty—during which productivity is back to normal, but there is a risk of a second lockdown. Throughout the lockdown and uncertainty phases, unemployment benefits are augmented by special federal programs. We find that the recession has an L shape. The finding is easy to explain. First, even when the cost of maintaining and reactivating a suspended employment relationship is fairly small—in the order of less than a month of the worker’s value added—the fraction of workers whose employment relationship is permanently terminated is about 35%. This is consistent with survey evidence, which finds that between 40% and 50% of the workers who have entered unemployment during the first month of the lockdown have no expectation of being recalled to their previous job (see, Adams-Prassl et al. 2020 and Bick and Blandin 2020). Second, the workers who are permanently laid-off are disproportionately of the “fickle” type, who need to search for several years in order to find a long-lasting job. Interestingly, increasing the length of the lockdown from three to six months does not significantly affect the behavior of unemployment four years out.

We believe that our simulation represents a lower bound on the effect of the pandemic on unemployment. Indeed, we abstract from several important channels that are likely to slow down the recovery of unemployment. First, it is unlikely that the lockdown will be entirely lifted after 3 months and that, once lifted, productivity will immediately return to its normal level. Second, even employment relationships that are kept active throughout the lockdown are likely to break down at a rate higher than normal because businesses shut down. Third, contractual frictions may cause some viable employment relationships to break down during the lockdown. Some examples of contractual frictions are rigid wages (see, e.g., Hall 2005, Gertler and Trigari 2009, or Menzio and Moen 2010), minimum wages, or costs to renegotiate contracts in the face of unforeseen contingencies.

The paper contributes to recent work on the economic consequences of the pandemic. A non-exhaustive list of this line of work includes Alvarez, Argente and Lippi (2020); Atkeson (2020); Berger, Herkenhoff, and Mongey (2020); Eichenbaum et al. (2020); Fernandez-Villaverde and Jones (2020); Garibaldi, Moen, and Pissarides (2020); Glover et al. (2020); Guerrieri et al. (2020); Jones et al. (2020); Kapicka, and Rupert (2020); Kaplan, Moll and Violante (2020). Compared with this literature, the focus of our paper is on forecasting the aggregate dynamics of the labor market, starting from the disaggregate and heterogeneous dynamics of in-
dividual workers. Compared with this literature, we are also silent about optimal policy. We believe that a derivation of the “optimal” unemployment rate during a pandemic would require calculations that, while surely important, fall well outside the scope of our expertise.

**Environment and Equilibrium**

In this section, we present our model of the labor market. The basic structure of the model is the same as in Menzio and Shi (2010, 2011). Firms and workers come together in the labor market through a search process directed by the terms of employment contracts. Firms search the market by posting employment contracts for their vacancies. Workers search the market by seeking vacancies offering the desired employment contract. Matches between firms and workers are heterogeneous with respect to their quality, which gives employed workers a motive for searching not only off but also on the job. We add two new ingredients to this basic structure. First, we allow for the possibility that workers are ex-ante heterogeneous. In particular, different types of workers are heterogeneous with respect to their productivity, the distribution of match quality from which they sample, and their ability to search. As documented in Ahn and Hamilton (2019), Morchio (2020), Kudlyak and Hall (2019) and Gregory, Menzio and Wiczer (2020), there are systematic differences across workers in their UE (unemployment to employment), EU (employment to unemployment), and EE (employer to employer) rates. Second, we allow for the possibility that workers and firms may temporarily deactivate their match, while retaining the option of resuming production at a later date. As documented in Fujita and Moscarini (2017), workers frequently return to their previous job after a spell of unemployment. As we shall see, these two new ingredients are critical to understand the aggregate dynamics of the labor market.

**Environment**

The labor market is populated by a positive measure of workers and firms. Workers are ex ante heterogeneous with respect to their type $i = 1, 2, ... I$, which affects their productivity, unemployment income, and their search and learning processes. A worker of type $i$ maximizes the present value of income, discounted at the factor $\beta \in (0, 1)$. A worker of type $i$ earns some income $b_i$ when he is unemployed and some income $w_i$ when he is employed. The unemployment income $b_i$ is a combination of unemployment benefits, transfers, and income value of leisure. The
employment income $w_i$ is determined by the worker’s employment contract. The measure of workers of type $i$ is $\mu_i \geq 0$, and the total measure of workers is 1.

Firms are ex ante homogeneous. A firm maximizes the present value of profits, discounted at the factor $\beta$. A firm operates a constant returns to scale technology that turns the labor supply of a worker of type $i$ into $y_i z$ units of output, where $y_i$ is a component that is common to all pairs of firms and workers of type $i$, and $z \in Z$ is a component that is specific to a particular firm-worker pair. The first component is the source of persistent differences in the productivity of different types of workers. The second component is the source of worker’s job mobility. We refer to the second component of productivity as the quality of a firm-worker match.

The labor market is organized into a continuum of submarkets indexed by the vector $x = \{v, i\}$, where $v \in \mathbb{R}$ denotes the lifetime utility promised by firms to workers hired in submarket $x$, and $i \in \{1, 2, \ldots I\}$ denotes the type of workers hired by firms in submarket $x$.\footnote{Associated with each submarket, there is an endogenous vacancy-to-applicant ratio $\theta_i(v) \in \mathbb{R}^+$. If a worker searches in submarket $x = \{v, i\}$, he finds a vacancy with probability $p(\theta_i(v))$, where $p$ is a strictly increasing, strictly concave function with $p(0) = 0$ and $p(\infty) = 1$. A vacancy in submarket $x = \{v, i\}$ meets an applicant with probability $q(\theta_i(v))$, where $q$ is a strictly decreasing function with $q(0) = 1$ and $q(\infty) = 0$.}

The state of the economy is described by some exogenous state $s \in S$ and by the endogenous distribution of workers across employment states. The exogenous state $s$ evolves stochastically, and its realization may affect the type-specific productivity $y_i$ and the type-specific unemployment income $b_i$. To understand the endogenous distribution of workers across employment states, note that a worker may be unemployed without the option to recall his old job, unemployed with the option to recall a match of unknown quality, employed in a match of unknown quality, or employed in a match of known quality. Let $u_i$ be the measure of unemployed workers without the option to recall their old job, $m_i$ be the measure of unemployed workers with the option to recall a job with unknown quality, $q_i(z)$ be the measure of unemployed workers with the option to recall a job with known quality $z$, $n_i$ be the measure of employed workers in a match of unknown quality, and $g_i(z)$ be the measure of employed workers in a match of known quality $z$. Overall, the state of the economy is described by $\psi \equiv \{s, u_i, m_i, q_i, n_i, g_i\}$.

Every period comprises six stages: learning, separation, recall, search, matching
and production. In the first stage, a worker of type $i$ who is employed in a match with an unknown idiosyncratic component of productivity discovers the quality of the match with probability $\phi_i \in [0, 1]$. The idiosyncratic component of productivity $z$ is a random draw from a probability density function $f_z : \mathbb{Z} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$ with a mean normalized to 1.

In the second stage, an employed worker of type $i$ becomes unemployed with probability $d_e \in [\delta, 1]$. The probability $d_e$ is specified by the worker’s employment contract. The lower bound $\delta$ represents the probability that the worker has to leave the match for exogenous reasons (e.g., worker relocation). Similarly, an unemployed worker with a recall option loses contact from his old employer with probability $d_q \in [\delta_q, 1]$, where $d_q$ is specified by the worker’s employment contract. The lower bound $\delta_q$ represents the probability that the worker and the firm lose contact for exogenous reasons (e.g., firm bankruptcy, decline in the quality of the match while inactive, loss of contact while physically separated, etc.).

In the third stage, an employed worker of type $i$ becomes unemployed with a recall option with probability $\ell \in [0, 1]$, where $\ell$ is specified by the worker’s contract. Similarly, an unemployed worker with a recall option returns to his old job with probability $h \in [0, 1]$, where $h$ is again a prescription of the employment contract. When a worker recalls his old job, he and his employer have to pay a fixed cost $C_i \geq 0$, which captures the physical costs of resuming production.

In the fourth stage, a worker gets the opportunity to search the labor market with a probability that depends on his type and on his employment status. If a worker of type $i$ is unemployed without a recall option, he gets to search with probability $\lambda^i_u \in [0, 1]$. If the worker is unemployed with a recall option, he gets to search with probability $\lambda^i_q \in [0, \lambda^i_u]$. If the worker is employed, he gets to search with probability $\lambda^i_e \in [0, \lambda^i_u]$. Whenever the worker gets to search, he chooses which submarket $x$ to visit. In the same stage, firms choose how many vacancies to open in submarket $x = \{v, i\}$ at the unit cost $k_i > 0$.

In the fifth stage, workers and firms searching in submarket $x = \{v, i\}$ meet bilaterally. When a firm and a worker of type $i$ meet in submarket $x$, the firm offers the worker an employment contract that is worth $v$ in lifetime utility. If the worker accepts the offer, he becomes employed by the firm under the rules of the contract. If the worker rejects the offer—which is an off-equilibrium event—he returns to his previous employment status. When a firm and a worker of type different from $i$ meet in submarket $x$, the firm does not offer an employment contract to the worker.

In the last stage, an unemployed worker without a recall option enjoys an in-
come of $b_i$ units of output. An unemployed worker with a recall option enjoys an income of $b_i$ units of output, while the worker’s old employer pays a cost $c_i$ to maintain the recall option. The flow cost $c_i$ is meant to capture the overhead expenditures that the firm has to incur in order to keep the job available to the worker. A worker of type $i$ employed in a match of unknown quality produces, in expectation, $y_i$ units of output. A worker of type $i$ employed in a match of known quality $z$ produces $y_iz$ units of output. The worker’s consumption is $w_i$, which is determined by the employment contract. After production and consumption take place, next period’s state, $\hat{s}$, is drawn from the probability density function $h : S \times S \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$, with $h(\hat{s}, s)$ denoting the probability density of $\hat{s}$ conditional on $s$.

We assume that employment contracts maximize the joint value of a firm-worker match, that is, the sum of the worker’s lifetime utility and the firm’s present value of profits generated by the worker. We assume also that the domain of the employment contract includes not only the employment relationship proper but also the time during which a worker is unemployed with the option of reactivating the relationship. As discussed in Menzio and Shi (2011), there are many contractual environments where the contract that maximizes the profit of the firm subject to providing the worker any given lifetime utility also maximizes the joint value of the match. We abstract from contractual incompleteness caused by either wage rigidities or missing contingencies.

**Equilibrium**

To define equilibrium, we need to introduce some additional pieces of notation. Let $U_i(\psi)$ denote the value of unemployment without recall for a worker of type $i$. Let $\tilde{Q}_i(\psi)$ denote the joint value to the worker and the firm from a temporarily inactive match (i.e., the worker is unemployed with the option to recall). Similarly, $Q_i(z, \psi)$ denotes the joint value to the worker and the firm from a temporarily inactive match of known quality $z$. Lastly, let $\tilde{V}_i(\psi)$ and $V_i(z, \psi)$ denote the joint value of an active match of unknown quality and quality $z$, respectively. All value functions are evaluated at the beginning of the production stage.

In what follows, we will suppress the dependence of the value functions from $i$ and $\psi$ in order to keep the notation light. The value for an unemployed worker without a recall option is

$$U = b(s) + \beta E_{\psi} \left\{ U + \lambda^i_u \max_v \left\{ p(\theta(v))(v-U) \right\} \right\}. \quad (1)$$
In the current period, the worker’s income is $b(s)$. In the next period, the worker gets an opportunity to search with probability $\lambda_u$. If the worker searches in submarket $v$, he meets a firm with probability $p(\theta(v))$, in which case his continuation lifetime utility is $v$. If the worker does not get the opportunity to search, or if the search is unsuccessful, his continuation value is $U$.

The joint value of an active match of quality $z$ between a worker and a firm is

$$V(z) = y(s)z + \beta E_{\psi} \left\{ \max_d \{dU + (1 - d) \max_{\ell} \{\ell Q(z) + (1 - \ell) \left[ V(z) + \lambda_v \max_v p(\theta(v))(v - V(z)) \right] \} \} \right\}$$

(2)

In the current period, the sum of the worker’s income and firm’s profit is $y(s)z$. In the next separation stage, the worker moves into unemployment with probability $d$. In this case, the worker’s continuation value is $U$, and the firm’s continuation profit is zero. In the next recall stage, the worker and the firm deactivate the match with probability $\ell$, in which case their joint continuation value is $Q(z)$. The worker and the firm keep the match active with probability $1 - \ell$. In this case, the worker gets an opportunity to search with probability $\lambda_e$. If the worker searches in submarket $v$, he meets a new employer with probability $p(\theta(v))$. In this case, the worker’s continuation value is $v$, and the firm’s continuation value is $0$. If the worker does not get to search, or if the search is unsuccessful, the joint continuation value is $V(z)$. Note that, because employment contracts are bilaterally efficient, $d$, $\ell$, and $v$ are chosen so as to maximize the joint value of the match.

The joint value of an active match of unknown quality is

$$\tilde{V} = y(s) + \beta(1 - \phi)E_{\psi} \left\{ \max_d \{dU + (1 - d) \max_{\ell} \{\ell \tilde{Q} + (1 - \ell) \left[ \tilde{V} + \lambda_v \max_v p(\theta(v))(v - \tilde{V}) \right] \} \} \right\}$$

$$+ \beta \phi E_{\psi} \left\{ \sum_z f(z) \max_d \{dU + (1 - d) \max_{\ell} \{\ell Q(z) + (1 - \ell) \left[ V(z) + \lambda_v \max_v p(\theta(v))(v - V(z)) \right] \} \} \right\}.$$  

(3)

In the current period, the joint income of the match is $y(s)$ (in expectation). With probability $1 - \phi$, the firm and the worker do not discover the quality of the match.
With probability $\phi$, the firm and the worker discover the quality $z$ of the match, where $z$ is drawn from the $f$ distribution. Conditional on discovering or not discovering the match quality, the firm and the worker choose $d, \ell$, and $v$ to maximize the joint value.

The joint value of a temporarily inactive match of quality $z$ between a worker and a firm is

$$Q(z) = b(s) - c + \beta E_{\psi} \left\{ \max_d \{dU + (1 - d) \max_h \{ h \left[ V(z) - c \right] + (1 - h) \left[ Q(z) + \lambda_q \max_v p(\theta(v))(v - Q(z)) \right] \} \} \right\}.$$

(4)

In the current period, the sum of the worker’s income and firm’s profit is $b(s) - c$. In the next separation stage, the worker moves into permanent unemployment with probability $d$. In this case, the worker’s continuation value is $U$, and the firm’s continuation profit is zero. In the next recall stage, the worker and the firm reactivate the match with probability $h$, in which case their joint continuation value is $V(z) - c$. The worker and the firm keep the match inactive with probability $1 - h$. In this case, the worker gets an opportunity to search with probability $\lambda_q$. If the worker searches in submarket $v$, he meets a new employer with probability $p(\theta(v))$. In this case, the worker’s continuation value is $v$, and the firm’s continuation value is $0$. If the worker does not get to search, or if the search is unsuccessful, the joint continuation value is $Q(z)$.

The joint value of a temporarily inactive match of unknown quality is

$$\tilde{Q} = b(s) - c + \beta E_{\psi} \left\{ \max_d \{dU + (1 - d) \max_h \{ h \left[ \tilde{V} - c \right] + (1 - h) \left[ \tilde{Q} + \lambda_q \max_v p(\theta(v))(v - \tilde{Q}) \right] \} \} \right\}.$$

(5)

The expression above is analogous to (4) and requires no comment.

The tightness $\theta(v)$ of submarket $v$ is such that

$$k \geq q(\theta(v)) \left[ \tilde{V} - v \right],$$

(6)

and $\theta(v) \geq 0$, with the two inequalities holding with complementary slackness. The
left-hand side of (6) is the cost to a firm from opening a vacancy in submarket \( v \). The right-hand side is the benefit to the firm from opening a vacancy in submarket \( v \). The benefit is the probability that the firm fills its vacancy, \( q(\theta(v)) \), times the firm’s value from filling a vacancy, \( \tilde{V} - v \), that is, the joint value of a match between the firm and a worker net of the lifetime utility promised by the firm to the worker.

We can easily characterize the solution of the search problems in (1)-(5). These problems have the common structure

\[
\max_v p(\theta(v))(v - r),
\]

where \( r \) denotes the value of the worker’s current employment status. For any \( v \) such that \( \theta(v) > 0 \), (6) implies that \( v \) is equal to \( -k\theta(v) + p(\theta(v))\tilde{V} \). For any \( v \) such that \( \theta(v) = 0 \), \( p(\theta(v)) \) is equal to zero. From these observations, it follows that (7) can be written as

\[
\max_v -k\theta(v) + p(\theta(v))(\tilde{V} - r).
\]

Now, notice that for all \( \theta \geq 0 \), there exists a \( v \) such that \( \theta(v) = \theta \). Thus, by changing the choice variable from \( v \) to \( \theta \) in (8), we do not enlarge the choice set. Conversely, for all \( v \), there exists a \( \theta \geq 0 \) such that \( \theta = \theta(v) \). Thus, by changing the choice variable from \( v \) to \( \theta \) in (8), we do not shrink the choice set. From these observations, it follows that (8) can be written as

\[
\max_{\theta \geq 0} -k\theta + p(\theta)(\tilde{V} - r).
\]

From the above formulation, it immediately follows that a worker employed in a match of unknown quality has no reason to actively search.

To formulate the laws of motion for the distribution of workers across employment states, we need some notation describing the policy functions. We denote as \( d_e(z) \) and \( d_q(z) \) the optimal probability that a worker employed in an active or inactive match of quality \( z \) moves into unemployment. We denote as \( d_e(\emptyset) \) and \( d_q(\emptyset) \) that probability for a worker employed in an active or inactive match of unknown quality. We denote as \( \ell(z) \) and \( \ell(\emptyset) \) the optimal probability that an active match of known or unknown quality becomes inactive. We denote as \( h(z) \) and \( h(\emptyset) \) the optimal probability that an inactive match of known or unknown quality becomes active. We denote as \( \theta_u, \theta_q(z), \theta_e(z) \) the optimal search strategy for an unemployed worker without a recall option, an unemployed worker with an option to recall a match of quality \( z \), and an employed worker in a match of quality \( z \).
The law of motion for the measure of unemployed workers without recall is
\[ \hat{u} = u(1 - \lambda_u p(\theta_u)) + \sum_z d_e(z) [g(z) + n\phi f(z)] + \sum_z d_q(z)q(z) + n(1 - \phi)d_e(\emptyset) + md_q(\emptyset). \] (10)

The law of motion for the measure of workers employed in an active match of unknown quality is
\[ \hat{n} = u\lambda_u p(\theta_u) + \sum_z (1 - d_e(z))(1 - \ell(z))\lambda_e p(\theta_e(z)) [g(z) + n\phi f(z)] + \sum_z (1 - d_q(z))(1 - h(z))\lambda_q p(\theta_q(z))q(z) + n(1 - \phi)(1 - d_e(\emptyset))(1 - \ell(\emptyset)) + m(1 - d_q(\emptyset)) [h(\emptyset) + (1 - h(\emptyset))\lambda_q p(\theta_q(\emptyset))]. \] (11)

The law of motion for the measure of workers employed in an active match of known quality \(z\) is
\[ \hat{g}(z) = [g(z) + n\phi f(z)](1 - d_e(z))(1 - \ell(z))(1 - \lambda_e p(\theta_e(z))) + q(z)(1 - d_q(z))h(z). \] (12)

The law of motion for the measure of unemployed workers with the option to recall a match of quality \(z\) is
\[ \hat{q}(z) = q(z)(1 - d_q(z))(1 - h(z))(1 - \lambda_q p(\theta_q(z))) + [g(z) + n\phi f(z)](1 - d_e(z))\ell(z). \] (13)

Lastly, the law of motion for the measure of unemployed workers with the option to recall a match of unknown quality is
\[ \hat{m} = m(1 - d_q(\emptyset))(1 - h(\emptyset))(1 - \lambda_q p(\theta_q(\emptyset))) + n(1 - \phi)(1 - d_e(\emptyset))\ell(\emptyset). \] (14)

All of the above expressions are easy to understand.

A Recursive Equilibrium (RE) is such that: (i) the value functions \(\{U, \tilde{V}, V, \tilde{Q}, Q\}\) satisfy the Bellman Equations (1)-(5); (ii) the policy functions \(\{d_e, d_q, \theta_u, \theta_e, \theta_q, \ell, h\}\) satisfy the optimality conditions in (1)-(5); the distribution of workers across employment states \(\{u, m, n, q, g\}\) follows the laws of motion (10)-(14). A Block Recursive Equilibrium (BRE) is an RE such that the value and policy functions depend on the aggregate state of the economy \(\psi\) only through the exogenous state \(s\) and not through the endogenous distribution of workers across employment states. A Block
Recursive Equilibrium is much easier to solve, as it requires solving a system of functional equations with the one-dimensional state $s$ as an aggregate state variable. As Menzio and Shi (2011) proved in the context of a similar model, there exists a BRE, the BRE is unique, and there exists no other equilibrium that is not block recursive.

**Calibration**

Using data from the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) program over the period 1997-2014, we apply a $k$-means algorithm to group workers based on their similarity with respect to the frequency and duration of unemployment spells and the number and length of jobs. The algorithm identifies three types of workers, which we shall refer to as $\alpha$, $\beta$, and $\gamma$. About 55% of workers are of type $\alpha$. For a worker of type $\alpha$, the duration of a job is less than a year with probability 30% and more than two years with probability 50%. For a worker of type $\alpha$, unemployment spells are short. About 25% of workers are of type $\beta$. For a worker of type $\beta$, the duration of a job is less than a year with probability 40% and more than two years with probability 40%. For a worker of type $\beta$, unemployment spells are longer than for $\alpha$-workers. About 20% of the workers are type $\gamma$. For a worker of type $\gamma$, the duration of a job is less than a year with probability 65% and more than two years with probability 15%. These workers have the longest spells of unemployment. Workers of different types also have different average earnings. Specifically, the average earnings for $\beta$-workers are 70% compared with the average earnings for $\alpha$-workers. The average earnings for $\gamma$-workers are about 50% compared with the earnings for $\alpha$-workers. The worker type characteristics described above are the key calibration targets.

Let us review the parameters that describe the non-stochastic steady state of the model. These parameters are summarized in Table 1. Preferences are described by the discount factor, $\beta$, and by the flow unemployment income, $b_i$. Production is described by the type-specific component of productivity, $y_i$, and by the distribution of the match-specific component of productivity, $f_i$. We specialize the distribution $f_i$ to be a Weibull distribution with shape $\alpha_i$ and scale $\sigma_i$, shifted to have a mean of 1. Learning is described by the probability $\phi_i$ with which a worker and a firm discover the component of productivity that is idiosyncratic to their match.

Search is described by the probability that a worker can search the labor market when unemployed without a recall option, $\lambda_i^u$, and when employed, $\lambda_i^e$. Further, search depends on the vacancy cost, $k_i$, and on the job-finding probability function,
Table 1
Model parameters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\beta$</td>
<td>0.996</td>
<td>discount factor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$b_i$</td>
<td>(0.661, 0.563, 0.458)</td>
<td>flow unemployment income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$y_i$</td>
<td>(1, 0.623, 0.459)</td>
<td>type-specific productivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha_i$</td>
<td>(4, 4, 1)</td>
<td>shape of $f_i$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_i$</td>
<td>(0.117, 0.203, 0.08)</td>
<td>standard deviation of $f_i$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_i$</td>
<td>(0.25, 0.225, 0.25)</td>
<td>probability match quality is discovered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda_q^i$, $\lambda_u^i$</td>
<td>(0.344, 0.763, 0.70)</td>
<td>probability an employed worker searches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$k_i$</td>
<td>(12.54, 25.92, 5.37)</td>
<td>vacancy posting cost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma$</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>elasticity of job-finding rate wrt tightness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\delta$</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>exogenous separation probability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\delta_q$</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>probability recall option is lost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$c_i$</td>
<td>(0.05, 0.031, 0.023)</td>
<td>cost of maintaining recall option</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C_i$</td>
<td>(0.25, 0.156, 0.115)</td>
<td>cost of reactivating a match</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$p(\theta)$. We normalize $\lambda_u^i$ to 1. We specialize $p(\theta)$ to have the form $\min\{\theta\gamma, 1\}$, where $\gamma$ is the elasticity of the job-finding probability with respect to tightness.

The recall process is characterized by the parameters $\lambda_q^i$, the probability that an unemployed worker with a recall option can search the labor market, $\delta_q$, the probability that an unemployed worker loses his recall option, and by $c_i$ and $C_i$, the flow cost of maintaining the recall option and the fixed cost of exercising the recall option. None of these parameters affect the non-stochastic steady state, because absent aggregate shocks, there are no firm-worker matches that are temporarily inactive. In a few pages, we shall discuss our choice of the parameters describing the recall process.

Now, let us describe our calibration strategy in broad strokes. We use the empirical duration of unemployment spells to calibrate $k_i$. We use the empirical distribution of job durations to calibrate $\alpha_i$, $\sigma_i$, and $\phi_i$. We normalize $y_\alpha = 1$ and choose $y_{\beta}$ and $y_\gamma$ to match the difference in average earnings between different types of workers. As suggested by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) and Hall and Milgrom (2008), the proper interpretation of $b_i$ is the sum of an unemployment benefit, $\zeta_i$, and the income value of leisure, $\ell$. We choose the unemployment benefit for workers of type $i$ to be equal to 40% of this type of worker’s average labor income, which is the typical replacement rate of unemployment insurance in the US. We choose the value of leisure, $\ell$, so that in the average of the whole population of workers, the flow value of unemployment is equal to 65% of labor income, a percentage that Hall and Milgrom (2008) argue is reasonable for the US economy. We tentatively
set $\delta$ to 0.5% per month. We tentatively set $\gamma$ to 0.5. Neither of these parameters has much of an effect on our simulation results.

### Simulating the Pandemic Recession

To describe and simulate the pandemic recession, we stratify the model by two-digit industry. Using data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation, we compute the distribution of job durations industry by industry. We choose the fraction of workers of type $\alpha$, $\beta$, and $\gamma$ in industry $j$ to minimize the distance between the distribution of job durations in industry $j$ in the data and in the model. We carry out the minimization subject to a constraint requiring that the sum of workers of type $\alpha$, $\beta$, and $\gamma$ across all industries equal the fraction of workers of type $\alpha$, $\beta$, and $\gamma$ in the LEHD. Figure 1 shows the distribution of types by industry.

![Figure 1: Proportion of workers of type $\alpha$ (pink), $\beta$ (green), and $\gamma$ (yellow)](image)

To describe the pandemic recession, we assume that the economy can be in one of three states: lockdown ($s_L$), uncertainty ($s_U$), or recovery ($s_R$). Intuitively, the lockdown state is meant to capture the current phase of severe restrictions on economic activity. The uncertainty state is meant to capture a phase in which restrictions on economic activities are lifted, but there is a risk of returning to the lockdown state (because of, say, a second wave of infections). The recovery state is meant to capture a permanent return to normalcy (because of, say, the discovery of an effective vaccine). The three states differ with respect to productivity and unemployment income. In the lockdown state, the productivity $y_i$ of $i$-workers employed in industry $j$ is multiplied by some factor $A_{L,j}$, which is typically smaller than 1.
and captures the (industry-specific) effect of restrictions on economic activity. The unemployment income is multiplied by some factor $B_L > 1$, which captures the increase in unemployment benefits granted by the CARES Act. In the uncertainty state, the productivity of $i$-workers employed in industry $j$ returns to its normal value, that is, $A_{U,j} = 1$. The unemployment income, however, is still multiplied by some factor $B_U > 1$ to capture the idea that the increase in the generosity of unemployment benefits may outlast the lockdown. In the recovery state, both productivity and unemployment income return to their normal values, that is, $A_{R,j} = 1$ and $B_R = 1$. When the aggregate state is $s_L$, the probability of moving to $s_U$ is $75\%$ per month and the probability of moving to $s_R$ is zero. When the aggregate state is $s_U$, the probability of returning to $s_L$ is $13\%$ per month, and the probability of moving to $s_R$ is $6.5\%$. The $s_R$ state is absorbing.

There are several parameters for the simulation of the recession that have yet to be chosen. We calibrate the vector of productivity shocks $A_{L,j}$ so that (a) the aggregate unemployment rate increases by 19 percentage points during the lockdown—which we take to be a sensible guess, based on the number of unemployment insurance claims during March and April 2020; and (b) the relative increase in the unemployment rate across industries matches the relative flow of new unemployment claims across industries—which we measure for the states of Washington, Texas, Ohio, and Nebraska. We set the unemployment income shock $B_L$ to 1.3 or, equivalently, 1,000 US$ per month. This is less than what is offered by the CARES Act because we want to capture, albeit crudely, the fact that not all unemployed workers will be awarded the additional benefits. In the baseline, we set $B_U$ to 1.3, but we present results for other values as well.

The parameters describing the process of recall require some guesswork. We assume that unemployed workers with the option to recall their old job have the same probability of searching the labor market as unemployed workers without such an option, that is, $\lambda_q^i = \lambda_u^i$. We assume that the rate at which a firm-worker match exogenously breaks down when it is temporarily inactive is $10\%$ per month, that is, $\delta_q = 0.1$. The particular values chosen for $\lambda_q$ and $\delta_q$ do not have a significant impact on the simulation of the pandemic. In contrast, the cost of maintaining the option of recall, $c_s$, and the cost of exercising the recall option, $C_i$, play an important role. Intuitively, both costs affect the trade-off between permanently terminating or temporarily deactivating a firm-worker match when its productivity is depressed by the lockdown. The relative magnitude of the two costs affects the trade-off between recalling a temporarily deactivated match as soon as the lockdown is lifted or doing so only when the risk of a lockdown is eliminated. Indeed, if $C_i = 0$, the match can be
activated and deactivated at no cost, and thus the decision will be determined essentially by a static comparison between $b(s) - c$ and $y(s)z$. If, in contrast, $C_i > 0$, the firm and the worker are discouraged from frequently deactivating and reactivating their match.

Figure 2 illustrates the simulation of the pandemic recession under our baseline calibration. For the purposes of the simulation, we assume that the economy is in the lockdown state for three months, in the uncertainty state for 12 months, and in the recovery state afterward. The left panel plots the unemployment rate, measured in deviation from the steady state. The center panel plots the fraction of workers who are unemployed without a recall option (permanently laid off), measured in deviation from the steady state. The right panel plots the fraction of workers who are unemployed with a recall option (temporarily laid off), measured in deviation from the steady state. The dashed lines in the three panels show the decomposition of the aggregates by type of worker.

As the economy enters the lockdown, the unemployment rate increases by 19 percentage points. About 13 percentage points of the increase are due to temporary separations between workers and firms, the remaining 6 percentage points are due to permanent separations. As the economy exits the lockdown, approximately half of the workers on temporary layoff are recalled by their previous employer. Moreover, the UE rate increases, and the unemployed workers on permanent layoff start flowing back into employment. Overall, during the 12 months between the exit from the lockdown state and the entry into the recovery state, the unemployment rate falls by about 5 percentage points. As the economy enters the recovery state, all remaining workers on temporary layoffs are recalled. Moreover, the UE rate returns to its pre-lockdown level. Thus, the unemployment rate starts its descent
toward its old steady-state level.

Even though the lockdown lasts for as little as three months, 30 months after the beginning of the pandemic, the unemployment rate is still about 5 percentage points above its steady-state level. Similarly, 30 months after the beginning of the pandemic, the unemployment rate is still about 2.5 percentage points above its steady-state level. A recession with this kind of slow recovery is sometimes dubbed an “L-shaped” recession. The slow pace of the recovery is caused by the ex ante heterogeneity of workers. As can be seen from the left panel of Figure 2, the excess unemployment for $\alpha$-workers subsides fairly quickly. This is because $\alpha$-workers have a high UE rate, and once they find a job, they are likely to keep it for a long time. The excess unemployment for the $\gamma$-workers, however, subsides much more slowly. This is because $\gamma$-workers have a low UE rate, and once they find a job, they are unlikely to keep it for a long time. Thus, the increase in unemployment among $\gamma$-workers takes years to be reabsorbed, as many of them go through multiple cycles of unemployment and short-term employment.

It is worth noting that $\gamma$-workers are the largest contributor to the initial increase in aggregate unemployment, even though they are the smallest group in the overall population. In contrast, $\alpha$-workers are the smallest contributor to the initial increase in aggregate unemployment, even though they are the largest group in the overall population. Intuitively, $\gamma$-workers have the smallest gains from trade in the labor market, and hence their employment is most susceptible to a negative productivity shock and to an increase in the generosity of unemployment benefits. In contrast, $\alpha$-workers have the largest gains from trade in the labor market, and hence their employment is least susceptible to the lockdown. Moreover, as one can see from Figure 1 and Table 2, $\gamma$-workers are overrepresented in some of the industries that are hit hardest by the lockdown. Indeed, the average productivity shock for a $\gamma$-worker is 10% larger than the one for $\alpha$-workers.

It is also worth pointing out that the share of temporary layoffs is highest for $\gamma$-workers (approximately 75%) and lowest for $\alpha$-workers (approximately 35%). There is a clear intuition behind this result. It takes a long time for an unemployed $\gamma$-worker to find a “stable” match, that is, a match with an idiosyncratic component of productivity that is high enough to make the worker stop searching for something better. Thus, a firm and a $\gamma$-worker in a “stable” match prefer to remain in contact (at the costs $c$ and $C$) rather than to permanently separate. In contrast, it takes a relatively short time for an unemployed $\alpha$-worker to find a new “stable” match. Thus, a firm and an $\alpha$-worker prefer to permanently terminate their relationship rather than to remain in contact.
The role played by the ex ante heterogeneity of workers in shaping the recovery can be seen in the dynamics of the unemployment rate in different industries. The left panel in Figure 3 shows the excess unemployment rate in construction—an industry with a large fraction of $\gamma$-workers. The right panel shows the excess unemployment rate in manufacturing—an industry with a large fraction of $\alpha$-workers. Even though the initial increase in unemployment is higher in manufacturing, the recovery is much faster because $\alpha$-workers are more likely to find stable employment after the lockdown is lifted. In the Appendix, we present the behavior of the unemployment rate in every industry.

Table 2 shows the industry-specific productivity shocks that we infer from our calibration. The calibrated shocks depend on the composition of workers in the industry—which we estimate from the SIPP—and on the magnitude of the increase in unemployment benefit claims—which we observe for March and April 2020 for several states. As a sanity check, we compare our calibrated productivity shocks with two measures of the exposure of an industry to the lockdown. The first measure is the fraction of workers in industry $j$ who can work remotely. This measure is constructed from the occupational index of “teleworkability” constructed by Dingel and Neiman (2020) using the O*NET, which we then project onto industry $j$ based on its occupational composition. The second measure is a definition of “essential work” for the state of Pennsylvania, where essential workers are those exempted from the lockdown.\(^5\)
Table 2
Industry-level unemployment increases and calibrated productivity shocks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>( \Delta u_j ) (%)</th>
<th>( A_j )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting</td>
<td>3.85</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas Extraction</td>
<td>12.29</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilities</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>18.06</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale Trade</td>
<td>11.82</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail Trade</td>
<td>26.25</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation and Warehousing</td>
<td>12.37</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance and Insurance</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>1.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Estate and Rental and Leasing</td>
<td>18.51</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services</td>
<td>9.17</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management of Companies and Enterprises</td>
<td>5.58</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative/Support/Waste Management/Remediation</td>
<td>18.57</td>
<td>1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Services</td>
<td>8.12</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Care and Social Assistance</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accommodation and Food Services</td>
<td>49.06</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Services (except Public Administration)</td>
<td>47.62</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Administration</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4 contains a scatter plot of the calibrated productivity shock and the fraction of “teleworkable” labor (left panel) and the scatter plot of the calibrated productivity shock and the fraction of “essential” labor (right panel) across two-digit industries. As one would have hoped, both relationships are negative. Also note that the employment-weighted average productivity shock in the model is about 35%. The employment-weighted average of the fraction of labor that cannot be done remotely is 45%. The employment-weighted average of the fraction of labor that is non-essential and cannot be done remotely is 27%. We find it reassuring that our model generates an average shock that is of the same order of magnitude as the fraction of labor that is susceptible to the lockdown.

As mentioned earlier, the recall costs \( c_i \) and \( C_i \) determine the fraction of workers in permanent and temporary layoffs. Thus, for a given increase in the unemployment rate, the recall costs affect the speed of the recovery. Specifically, the higher the recall costs are, the lower the fraction of temporary layoffs is and the slower the recovery is. It is then important to build some confidence in our choice of \( c_i \) and \( C_i \). In our baseline calibration, we set \( c_i = 0.05 \cdot y_i \) and \( C_i = 0.25 \cdot y_i \) and found that 65% of the increase in unemployment during the lockdown was due to temporary layoffs and 35% to permanent layoffs. This finding is in line with the
survey evidence on layoffs during the early stages of the pandemic. Adams-Prassl et al. (2020) survey a representative sample of individuals in the US, conducting multiple waves of interviews during the first weeks of the pandemic. Individuals could report whether they had lost their job in a permanent way or been furloughed, implying the expectation of being called back. As of the April 23 data, the ratio of temporary to permanent layoffs was 3:2. Bick and Blandin (2020) conduct a similar survey, again asking individuals who separated from their employer whether they expected the layoff to be temporary. Their first wave reported approximately 50\% of separations were expected to be temporary. Overall, our calibration of $c_i$ and $C_i$ is conservative, in the sense that our model generates more temporary layoffs than were found in these surveys.

The ratio between the cost of exercising the recall option, $C_i$, and the cost of maintaining the recall option, $c_i$, affects the time at which temporarily deactivated relationships are recalled. Figure 5 shows the simulation of the recession for $c_i = 0.15 \cdot y_i$ and $C_i = 0$, rather than for $c_i = 0.05 \cdot y_i$ and $C_i = 0.25 \cdot y_i$. By lowering the cost of exercising the recall option while increasing the cost of maintaining the recall option, the fraction of layoffs that are temporary relative to the fraction that are permanent does not change by much (it goes from 65 : 35\% to about 50 : 50\%). For this reason, the medium-term effects of the lockdown do not change by much either (the excess unemployment rate 50 months out is still about 2.5\%). However, the timing of recalls does change. In particular, most temporarily laid-off workers
are recalled as soon as the lockdown is lifted.

From the perspective of policy, it is interesting to see the effect of extending the lockdown. Figure 6 below illustrates the results of the simulated recession when the economy is kept under lockdown for six months rather than three, and the period of uncertainty lasts nine rather than 12 months. Because of the extended lockdown, the unemployment rate remains close to its peak for a longer period of time. Yet once the economy enters the recovery state, the unemployment rate is essentially the same as in the baseline calibration. In this sense, extending the lockdown does not seem to have detrimental effects on unemployment in the medium run. We urge our readers, however, to take this finding with a grain of salt, as it may depend on our conservative assumptions about the effect of the lockdown on the survival rate of temporarily deactivated relationships.

Lastly, we want to point out that the model can also generate a “V-shaped” recession, that is, a recession in which the initial increase in unemployment is quickly
reabsorbed after the end of the lockdown. The model generates a V-shaped recession when the initial increase in unemployment is driven almost entirely by temporary layoffs, and as soon as the lockdown is over, firms find it optimal to recall all of the temporarily laid-off workers.\(^6\) Hence, the model generates a V-shaped recession when \(c_i\) and \(C_i\) are small and \(B_U\) is close to 1.

Figure 7 illustrates the simulation of the pandemic recession with \(c_i = C_i = 0\) and \(B_U = 1\). As the economy enters the lockdown, the unemployment rate increases by 19 percentage points. About 18 percentage points of this increase are due to temporary separations between workers and firms, while the remaining percentage point is due to permanent separations. As the economy exits the lockdown, nearly all of the workers on temporary layoff are recalled by their employers, and the unemployment rate returns within 1 percentage point of its steady-state level.

While the model can generate a V-shaped recession, it does so by producing some implausible outcomes. First, 95\% of the initial increase in the unemployment rate is due to temporary layoffs and only 5\% is due to permanent layoffs. In the recent surveys of Adams-Prassl et al. (2020) and Bick and Blandin (2020), at least 40\% of workers who became unemployed at the beginning of the recession state they have no expectation of being recalled by their previous employer. Second, when the costs associated with temporary layoffs are low, it takes a smaller productivity shock to generate the same increase in unemployment during the lockdown. Indeed, the employment-weighted productivity shock required to generate a 19 percentage point increase in unemployment is only 1.4\%. This is an order of magnitude lower than the employment-weighted average of work that cannot be done remotely (45\%) and much lower than the employment-weighted average of the fraction of work that is non-essential and cannot be done remotely (27\%).
Let us conclude by pointing out that underneath the results presented in this section—results that are aggregated either at the economy level or at the industry level—there is a wealth of additional results about individual workers, including the size of their earnings losses during the lockdown and the speed at which these losses are recouped. We decided not to report these disaggregated results not because we deem them uninteresting but for the sake of conciseness.

**Post Scriptum**

As time unfolds, the predictions in this paper will be confronted with reality. During the publication process, the BLS released the official numbers on unemployment for the month of April 2020, reporting an official unemployment rate of 14.7%. We believe this represents a lower bound on the proportion of workers who want a job but do not have one. In normal times, individuals would have to state that they have searched for a job in order to be counted among the unemployed, but this requirement is essentially meaningless during a lockdown. The official figure does not include workers who are out of the labor force but want a job. The number of these marginally attached workers increased by 60% between March and April. The BLS also categorized workers who were absent from their jobs “for other reasons” as employed. There was a large increase in this category of workers (8.1 million people, up from its average of 620,000), who could have plausibly been counted as unemployed. If these marginally attached and absent workers were counted in the unemployment pool, the unemployment rate would be 21.1%. This is an increase of 17.5% compared to April 2019 and is close to the 19% increase we have in the model.

Moreover, we believe the proportion of permanently unemployed workers, reported by the BLS as 21.7%, is also a lower bound. In response to the pandemic, the BLS counted workers who responded “don’t know” to the question “Have you been given any indication that you will be recalled to work within the next 6 months?” as temporarily unemployed. If just 10% of both these workers and the absent workers were instead classified as permanently unemployed, and counting marginally attached workers among the permanently unemployed, the proportion of permanent layoffs would rise to 29.6%. If instead 25% of these workers were reclassified as permanently laid off, this proportion would be 41.3%.
Notes

1 We assume that a worker knows his own type and so does the market. The second part of the assumption may appear unrealistic to some readers, but it does greatly simplify the model. In particular, the assumption allows us to abstract from issues of signaling—the worker distorting his behavior so as to convince the market that his type is better than what it actually is—as well as from issues of inference—the firms trying to assess the probability distribution of a worker’s type by examining his employment history and performance on the job.

2 It is straightforward to develop a version of the model in which the firm and the worker do not act cooperatively during a temporary separation. In keeping with the “contractual efficient” spirit of the paper, though, we decided to assume that an employment contract regulates also this phase of the firm-worker relationship.

3 In the LEHD, we cannot distinguish between unemployment and non-employment. We identify unemployment as a spell without earnings that lasts less than two years. In the LEHD, we have only quarterly observations, and thus we cannot directly measure short unemployment spells. We impute an unemployment spell between two jobs by comparing earnings in the first job and earnings in the second job. If, during the transition from the first to the second job, there is a quarter in which earnings are lower than the minimum of the typical earnings in the two jobs, we impute an unemployment spell.

4 Details about the calibration algorithm are available upon request.

5 There is nothing special about Pennsylvania except that its list very transparently maps to NAICS codes. In other states, the list is quite similar.

6 In principle, the model could also generate a V-shaped recession if the vast majority of workers entering unemployment during the lockdown were of type $\alpha$. However, our calibration of the type distribution across industries and of the shock distribution across industries rules out this possibility.

7 Let us just say that our model does an excellent job at reproducing the size of earnings losses documented in Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993) and Davis and von Wachter (2011).

References


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Pandemic Recession: L- or V-Shaped?
Gregory, Menzio, and Wiczer

Manuscript, Oxford University.


Pandemic Recession: L- or V-Shaped?
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Unemployment rate IRFs by industry

Figure 8
Pandemic simulation by industry