; ; ; "ActiveFedora::Aggregation::ListSource" . a , ; "International Lending with Moral Hazard and Risk of Repudiation"; ; "batchuser@example.com"; "Atkeson, Andrew"; "Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis"; "International loans", "Optimal debt contract", "International capital", "Credit market", "Debt crisis", "Risk", "International debt", "Foreign lending", "Moral hazard"; "F34 - International Lending and Debt Problems"; "This paper examines the optimal debt contract between lenders and a sovereign borrower when the borrower is free to repudiate the debt and when his decision to invest or consume borrowed funds is unobservable. We show that recurrent debt crises are a necessary part of the incentive structure which supports the optimal pattern of lending."^^; "1987-11"; "2018-03-13T20:10:23.921411092+00:00"^^; "https://doi.org/10.21034/wp.381"; ; "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/"; "2020-05-08T16:17:54.368311262+00:00"^^; "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/"; "Research Paper"; "39"; "Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department)"; "381"; "Optimal debt contract", "International loans", "International debt", "Debt crisis", "Credit market", "Moral hazard", "Risk", "Foreign lending", "International capital"; ; ; ; ; "Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department"; """Published in _Econometrica_ (vol. 59, no. 4, July 1991, pp. 1069-1089) https://doi.org/10.2307/2938174. """^^; ; "Publication" . ; .