Sustainable Plans

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Creator Series Issue number
  • 377
Date Created
  • 1988-05
Abstract
  • We propose a definition of time consistent policy for infinite horizon economies with competitive private agents. Allocations and policies are defined as functions of the history of past policies. A sustainable equilibrium is a sequence of history-contingent policies and allocations that satisfy certain sequential rationality conditions for the government and for private agent3. We provide a complete characterization of the sustainable equilibrium outcomes for a variant of Fischer's (1980) model of capital taxation. We also relate our work to recent developments in the theory of repeated games.

Subject (JEL) 关键词 Related information Alternative title
  • Sustainable plans and mututal default / V. V. Chari, Patrick J. Kehoe.
  • New sustainable plans / V. V. Chari, Patrick J. Kehoe.
  • Sustainable plans and debt / V. V. Chari, Patrick J. Kehoe.
Date Modified
  • 07/15/2019
Corporate Author
  • Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department
Publisher
  • Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
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