; ; ; "ActiveFedora::Aggregation::ListSource" . a , ; "Equilibrium and Government Commitment"; ; "batchuser@example.com"; "Bassetto, Marco"; "Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis"; "Commitment", "Government strategy", "Competitive equilibrium", "Implementation"; "E61 - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination", "C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games", "F34 - International Lending and Debt Problems"; "How should a government use the power to commit to ensure a desirable equilibrium outcome? In this paper, I show a misleading aspect of what has become a standard approach to this question, and I propose an alternative. I show that the complete description of an optimal (indeed, of any) policy scheme requires outlining the consequences of paths that are often neglected. The specification of policy along those paths is crucial in determining which schemes implement a unique equilibrium and which ones leave room for multiple equilibria that depend on the expectations of the private sector. "^^; "2002-09"; "2019-06-25T14:06:45.21417159+00:00"^^; "https://doi.org/10.21034/wp.624"; ; "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/"; "Wed Oct 23 17:52:52 2019"; "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/"; "Research Paper"; "56"; "Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department)"; "624"; "Implementation", "Government strategy", "Commitment", "Competitive equilibrium"; ; ; ; ; "Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department"; "Published in _Journal of Economic Theory_ (Vol. 124, No. 1, September 2005, pp. 79-105), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.06.001."^^; ; "Publication" . ; .