; ; ; "ActiveFedora::Aggregation::ListSource" . a , ; "Public Trust and Government Betrayal"; ; "batchuser@example.com"; "Phelan, Christopher"; "Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis"; "Government reputation"; "H20 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General", "C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games"; "This paper presents a simple model of government reputation which captures two characteristics of policy outcomes in less developed countries: governments which betray public trust do so erratically, and, after a betrayal, public trust is regained only gradually."^^; "2001-01"; "2019-08-19T16:12:47.781495575+00:00"^^; "https://doi.org/10.21034/sr.283"; ; "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/"; "Thu Nov 7 21:57:19 2019"; "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/"; "Research Paper"; "608"; "Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department)"; "283"; "Government reputation"; ; ; ; ; "Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department"; "Published in: _Journal of Economic Theory_ (Vol. 130, Issue 1, September 2006, pp. 27-43) https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.03.003."^^; ; "Publication" . ; .