; ; ; "ActiveFedora::Aggregation::ListSource" . a , ; "The Economics of Split-Ticket Voting in Representative Democracies"; ; "batchuser@example.com"; "Chari, V. V.", "Marimon, Ramon, 1953-", "Jones, Larry E."; "Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis"; "H00 - Public Economics: General", "H40 - Publicly Provided Goods: General", "H30 - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: General"; "In U.S. elections, voters often vote for candidates from different parties for president and Congress. Voters also express dissatisfaction with the performance of Congress as a whole and satisfaction with their own representative. We develop a model of split-ticket voting in which government spending is financed by uniform taxes but the benefits from this spending are concentrated. While the model generates split-ticket voting, overall spending is too high only if the president’s powers are limited. Overall spending is too high in a parliamentary system, and our model can be used as the basis of an argument for term limits. "^^; "1997-06"; "2019-07-30T14:43:35.66407883+00:00"^^; "https://doi.org/10.21034/wp.582"; ; "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/"; "Wed Oct 23 17:58:09 2019"; "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/"; "Research Paper"; "129", "489", "374"; "Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department)"; "582"; ; ; ; ; "Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department"; "Published in: _The American Economic Review_ (Vol. 87, No. 5, December 1997, pp. 957-976), https://www.jstor.org/stable/2951335."^^; ; "Publication" . ; .