; ; ; "ActiveFedora::Aggregation::ListSource" . a , ; "Reviving Reputation Models of International Debt"; ; "jannelle.ruswick@mpls.frb.org"; "Cole, Harold Linh, 1957-", "Kehoe, Patrick J."; "Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis"; "A traditional explanation for why sovereign countries repay debt is that they want to keep a good reputation so they can easily borrow more. This explanation does not hold if a country has access to an adequate means of savings regardless of the country's past actions. With such access, a country gets only transient benefits from maintaining a good relationship with bankers, and such benefits cannot support borrowing. However, if a country is involved in a myriad of trust relationships, the country's reputation can spill over to a nondebt relationship which has enduring benefits. Such a spillover can allow a country's reputation to support a large amount of borrowing."^^; "1997 Winter"; "2019-12-11T18:41:34.575560854+00:00"^^; "https://doi.org/10.21034/qr.2112"; ; "Mon Dec 16 17:29:37 2019"; "Article"; "393", "145"; "Quarterly review (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department)"; "Vol. 21, No. 1"; ; ; ; ; "Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department"; ; "Publication" . ; .