; ; ; "ActiveFedora::Aggregation::ListSource" . a , ; "Equilibrium with Mutual Organizations in Adverse Selection Economies"; ; "jannelle.ruswick@mpls.frb.org"; "Blandin, Adam", "Prescott, Edward C.", "Boyd, John H."; "Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis"; "Insurance", "Adverse selection equilibrium", "Theory of value", "Signaling", "The core", "Mutual organization"; "D46 - Value Theory", "C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium", "G29 - Financial Institutions and Services: Other", "D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design", "G22 - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies"; "We develop an equilibrium concept in the Debreu (1954) theory of value tradition for a class of adverse selection economies which includes the Spence (1973) signaling and Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976) insurance environments. The equilibrium exists and is optimal. Further, all equilibria have the same individual type utility vector. The economies are large with a finite number of types that maximize expected utility on an underlying commodity space. An implication of the analysis is that the invisible hand works for this class of adverse selection economies."^^; "2015-09-01"; "2019-06-17T20:26:48.077532369+00:00"^^; "https://doi.org/10.21034/wp.717"; ; "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/"; "Wed Oct 23 17:45:05 2019"; "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/"; "Research Paper"; "86", "96", "628"; "Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department)"; "717"; "Adverse selection equilibrium", "Mutual organization", "The core", "Theory of value", "Signaling", "Insurance"; ; ; ; ; "Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department"; "Published in: _Economic Theory_ (Vol. 62, No. 1, June 2016, pp. 3-13), https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0918-3."^^; ; "Publication" . ; .