Cooperative Theory with Incomplete Information

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Creator Series Issue number
  • 225
Date Created
  • 1996-12
Abstract
  • This paper surveys cooperative game theory when players have incomplete or asymmetric information, especially when the TU and NTU games are derived from economic models. First some results relating balanced games and markets are summarized, including theorems guaranteeing that the core is nonempty. Then the basic pure exchange economy is extended to include asymmetric information. The possibilities for such models to generate cooperative games are examined. Here the core is emphasized as a solution, and criteria are given for its nonemptiness. Finally, an alternative approach is explored based on Harsanyi’s formulation of games with incomplete information.

Subject (JEL) Palabra Clave Corporate Author
  • Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department
Publisher
  • Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
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