The Consumption Process Implied by an Efficient Credit Contract Public Deposited

Creator Series Issue number
  • 499
Date Created
  • 1992-06
Description
  • Paper prepared for the 'Debt and Credit' Conference at the LSE.

Abstract
  • In this paper we explain why markets in noncontingent debt securities might be a stable form of market organization for intermediation to households. Efficient-contract allocation might be supported by these markets because households' relationships with their intermediaries do not exactly parallel the explicit form of the noncontingent contracts that they explicitly sign with one another. Also we show that the efficient-contract model can be distinguished from alternative models within the time-series framework that has been widely used to study households' consumption patterns.

Subject (JEL) Mot-clé Date Modified
  • 08/30/2019
Corporate Author
  • Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department
Publisher
  • Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Resource type DOI
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