; ; ; "ActiveFedora::Aggregation::ListSource" . a , ; "Social Insurance and Taxation Under Sequential Majority Voting and Utilitarian Regimes"; ; "batchuser@example.com"; "Peled, Dan", "Aiyagari, S. Rao"; "Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis"; "Proportional taxes", "Sequential majority voting", "Utilitarian government"; "C68 - Computable General Equilibrium Models", "E62 - Fiscal Policy", "H23 - Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies"; "It is often argued that with a positively skewed income distribution (median less than mean) majority voting would result in higher tax rates than maximizing average welfare and, hence, lower aggregate savings. We reexamine this view in a capital accumulation model, in which distorting redistributive taxes provide insurance against idiosyncratic shocks and income distributions evolve endogenously. We find small differences of either sign between the tax rates set by a majority voting and a utilitarian government, for reasonable parametric specifications, despite the fact that model simulations produce positively skewed distributions of total income across agents."^^; "1995-08"; "2019-09-13T20:12:32.096728401+00:00"^^; "https://doi.org/10.21034/sr.197"; ; "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/"; "2020-10-06T21:53:13.454515745+00:00"^^; "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/"; "Research Paper"; "7", "598"; "Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department)"; "197"; "Sequential majority voting", "Utilitarian government", "Proportional taxes"; ; ; ; ; "Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department"; """Published in: _Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control_ (Vol. 19, No. 8, November 1995, pp. 1511-1528) https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1889(94)00840-E. An earlier version of this Staff Report circulated as [Working Paper 503](https://doi.org/10.21034/wp.503)."""^^; ; "Publication" . ; .