Creator

• Allen, Beth

Series

• Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department)

Issue number

• 226

Date created

• 1996-12

Abstract

• This paper surveys implementation theory when players have incomplete or asymmetric information, especially in economic environments. After the basic problem is introduced, the theory of implementation is summarized. Some coalitional considerations for implementation problems are discussed. For economies with asymmetric information, cooperative games based on incentive compatibility constraints or Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms are derived and examined.

Subject (JEL)

• D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
• D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• C71 - Cooperative Games
• D51 - Exchange and Production Economies
• C72 - Noncooperative Games

Keyword

• Mechanisms
• Bayesian-Nash Revelation Principle
• Core
• Asymmetric Information
• Nontransferable Utility
• Implementation
• Cooperative Games
• Incomplete Information
• Incentive Compatibility

Corporate Author

• Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department

Publisher

• Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

Resource type

• Research Paper

DOI

•  https://doi.org/10.21034/sr.226

License

• Creative Commons BY-NC Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

In Collection:

• Staff Reports

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