Creator

• Ordonez, Guillermo

Series

• Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department)

Issue number

• 431

Date created

• 2009-07-09

Abstract

• Concerns about constructing and maintaining good reputations are known to reduce borrowers’ excessive risk-taking. However, I find that the self-discipline induced by these concerns is fragile, and can break down without obvious changes in economic fundamentals. Furthermore, in the aggregate, breakdowns are clustered among borrowers with intermediate and good reputations, which can exacerbate an economy’s weakness and contribute to a broad economic crisis. These results come from an aggregate dynamic global game analysis of reputation formation in credit markets. The selection of a unique equilibrium is accomplished by assuming that borrowers have incomplete information about economic fundamentals.

Subject (JEL)

• G32 - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
• G01 - Financial Crises
• D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• E44 - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy

关键词

• Reputation
• Global games
• Fragility
• Risk-taking

Corporate Author

• Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department

Publisher

• Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

Resource type

• Research Paper

DOI

•  https://doi.org/10.21034/sr.431

License

• Creative Commons BY-NC Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

属于 Collection:

• Staff Reports

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