Creator

• Green, Edward J.

Series

• Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department)

Issue number

• 144

Date created

• 1991-08

Abstract

• Intuitively, a patient trader should be able to make his trading partners compete to reveal whatever information is relevant to their transactions with him. This possibility is examined in the context of a model resembling that of Gale (1986). The main result is that, under assumptions having to do with asset structure and spanning, incentive-compatible elicitation of trading partners’ knowledge is feasible.

Corporate Author

• Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department

Publisher

• Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

Resource type

• Research Paper

DOI

•  https://doi.org/10.21034/sr.144

License

• Creative Commons BY-NC Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

In Collection:

• Staff Reports

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