; ; ; "ActiveFedora::Aggregation::ListSource" . a , ; "On the Optimality of Transparent Monetary Policy"; ; "batchuser@example.com"; "Atkeson, Andrew", "Kehoe, Patrick J.", "Athey, Susan"; "Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis"; "E61 - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination", "F33 - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions", "E50 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General", "E52 - Monetary Policy", "F41 - Open Economy Macroeconomics"; "We analyze the optimal design of monetary rules. We suppose there is an agreed upon social welfare function that depends on the randomly fluctuating state of the economy and that the monetary authority has private information about that state. We suppose the government can constrain the policies of the monetary authority by legislating a rule. In general, well-designed rules trade-off the need to constrain policymakers from the standard time consistency problem arising from the temptation for unexpected inflation with the desire to give them flexibility to react to their private information. Surprisingly, we show that for a wide variety of circumstances the optimal rule gives the monetary authority no flexibility. This rule can be interpreted as a strict inflation targeting rule where the target is a prespecified function of publicly observed data. In this sense, optimal monetary policy is transparent."^^; "2001-04"; "2019-06-25T14:34:50.266444469+00:00"^^; "https://doi.org/10.21034/wp.613"; ; "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/"; "Wed Oct 23 17:56:00 2019"; "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/"; "Research Paper"; "393", "38", "39"; "Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department)"; "613"; ; ; ; ; "Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department"; ; "Publication" . ; .