, ; ; ; "ActiveFedora::Aggregation::ListSource" . a , ; "Dollarization and the Conquest of Hyperinflation in Divided Societies"; ; "jannelle.ruswick@mpls.frb.org"; "Kempf, Hubert", "Cooper, Russell"; "Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis"; "This study argues that the delegation of monetary policy control by one country to another can reduce inflation in the delegating country. Hyperinflation is common in a divided society, one in which special interest groups can pressure a weak central government to issue money to finance their own demands while neglecting the country’s overall welfare. A commitment device like dollarization or a currency board, which gives control of the divided country’s money supply to another country, can eliminate this inflation bias. This is illustrated by Argentina’s experience with inflation and a currency board which, in effect, gave control of Argentina’s money supply to the United States. This argument is made precise using a two-country overlapping generations model to study the effects of delegation. The study also finds that a dollarization treaty between the two countries can be welfare-improving for both."^^; "2001 Summer"; "2019-12-12T17:56:54.953326627+00:00"^^; "https://doi.org/10.21034/qr.2531"; ; "Mon Dec 16 17:36:46 2019"; "Article"; "151", "396"; "Quarterly review (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department)"; "Vol. 25, No. 3"; ; ; ; ; "Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department"; ; "Publication" . ; ; . ; ; .