An Equilibrium Model of Quits under Optimal Contracting Public Deposited

Creator Series Issue number
  • 266
Date Created
  • 1984-09
Abstract
  • In this article we use the techniques developed in examining optimal contracting with imperfect information to build a simple equilibrium model of a labor market with imperfect information. We then use the model to examine the effects that imperfect information imposes on labor markets, particularly when compared with full information and noncontractual base lines. We demonstrate that quits increase in periods of high output, without postulating exogenous price rigidity.

Subject (JEL) Mot-clé Date Modified
  • 07/12/2019
Corporate Author
  • Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department
Publisher
  • Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
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