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  <http://purl.org/dc/terms/title> "Coordination and Crisis in Monetary Unions";
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  <http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/creator> "Amador, Manuel",
    "Gopinath, Gita, 1971-",
    "Aguiar, Mark",
    "Farhi, Emmanuel";
  <http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/publisher> "Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis";
  <http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/relation> "Fiscal policy ",
    "Debt crisis",
    "Coordination failures",
    "Monetary union";
  <http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/subject> "F30 - International Finance: General",
    "E40 - Money and Interest Rates: General",
    "F40 - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance: General",
    "E50 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General";
  <http://purl.org/dc/terms/abstract> "We study fiscal and monetary policy in a monetary union with the potential for rollover crises in sovereign debt markets. Member-country fiscal authorities lack commitment to repay their debt and choose fiscal policy independently. A common monetary authority chooses inflation for the union, also without commitment. We first describe the existence of a fiscal externality that arises in the presence of limited commitment and leads countries to over-borrow; this externality rationalizes the imposition of debt ceilings in a monetary union. We then investigate the impact of the composition of debt in a monetary union, that is the fraction of high-debt versus low-debt members, on the occurrence of self-fulfilling debt crises. We demonstrate that a high-debt country may be less vulnerable to crises and have higher welfare when it belongs to a union with an intermediate mix of high- and low-debt members, than one where all other members are low-debt. This contrasts with the conventional wisdom that all countries should prefer a union with low-debt members, as such a union can credibly deliver low inflation. These findings shed new light on the criteria for an optimal currency area in the presence of rollover crises."^^<http://ns.ontowiki.net/SysOnt/Markdown>;
  <http://purl.org/dc/terms/created> "2015-05-11";
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  <http://schema.org/keywords> "Monetary union",
    "Coordination failures",
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