On the equilibirium concept for overlapping generations organizations Pubblico Deposited

Creator Series Date Created
  • 2000-11
Abstract
  • A necessary feature for equilibrium is that beliefs about the behavior of other agents are rational. We argue that in stationary OLG environments this implies that any future generation in the same situation as the initial generation must do as well as the initial generation did in that situation. We conclude that the existing equilibrium concepts in the literature do not satisfy this condition. We then propose an alternative equilibrium concept, organizational equilibrium, that satisfies this condition. We show that equilibrium exists, it is unique, and it improves over autarky without achieving optimality. Moreover, the equilibrium can be readily found by solving a maximization program.

Subject (JEL) Parola chiave Date Modified
  • 04/10/2018
Corporate Author
  • Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department.
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