; ; ; "ActiveFedora::Aggregation::ListSource" . a , ; "Repeated Moral Hazard and One-Sided Commitment"; ; "batchuser@example.com"; "Phelan, Christopher"; "D31 - Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions", "D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design"; "This paper considers the unobserved endowment economy of Green (1987) with a restriction that agents can walk away from insurance contracts at the beginning of any period and contract with another insurer (one-sided commitment). An equilibrium is derived characterized by a unique, market determined insurance contract with the property that agents never want to walk away from it. I show that trade (or insurance) still occurs and that a non-degenerate long-ran distribution of consumption exists."^^; "1993-09"; "2018-03-29T18:43:36.015859576+00:00"^^; ; "2021-02-02T18:20:56.652839456+00:00"^^; "Conference Proceeding"; "608"; "Macroeconomics with heterogenous agents, incomplete markets, liquidity constraints, and transaction costs"; ; ; ; ; "Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department."; ; "ConferenceProceeding" . ; .