Creator: Aiyagari, S. Rao and McGrattan, Ellen R. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 538 Abstract:
We describe a model for calculating the optimal quantity of debt and then apply it to the U.S. economy. The model consists of a large number of infinitely-lived households whose saving behavior is influenced by precautionary saving motives and borrowing constraints. This model incorporates a different role for government debt than the standard representative agent growth model and captures different trade-offs between the benefits and costs of varying its level. Government debt enhances the liquidity of households by providing additional assets for smoothing consumption (in addition to claims to capital) and effectively loosening borrowing constraints. By raising the interest rate, government debt makes assets less costly to hold and more effective in smoothing consumption. However, the implied taxes have wealth distribution, incentive, and insurance effects. Further, government debt crowds out capital (via higher interest rates) and lowers per capita consumption. Our quantitative analysis suggests that the crowding out effect is decisive for welfare. We also describe variations of the model which permit endogenous growth. It turns out that even with lump sum taxes and inelastic labor, government debt as well as government consumption have growth rate effects, thereby implying large welfare gains from reducing the level of debt.
关键词: Government debt, Borrowing constraints, and Precautionary saving 学科: E60 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook: General and H60 - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt: General
Creator: Cole, Harold Linh, 1957-, Dow, James, 1961-, and English, William B. (William Berkeley), 1960- Series: International perspectives on debt, growth, and business cycles Abstract:
We consider a model of international sovereign debt where repayment is enforced because defaulting nations lose their reputation and consequently, are excluded from international capital markets. Underlying the analysis of reputation is the hypothesis that borrowing countries have different, unobservable, attitudes towards the future. Some regimes are relatively myopic, while others are willing to make sacrifices to preserve their access to debt markets. Nations' preferences, while unobservable, are not fixed but evolve over time according to a Markov process. We make two main points. First we argue that in models of sovereign debt the length of the punishment interval that follows a default should be based on economic factors rather than being chosen arbitrarily. In our model, the length of the most natural punishment interval depends primarily on the preference parameters. Second, we point out that there is a more direct way for governments to regain their reputation. By offering to partially repay loans in default, a government can signal its reliability. This type of signaling can cause punishment interval equilibria to break down. We examine the historical record on lending resumption to argue that in almost all cases, some kind of partial repayment was made.
学科: H63 - National budget, deficit, and debt - Debt ; Debt management and F34 - International finance - International lending and debt problems
Creator: Miller, Preston J. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 220 描述:
Working paper 220 was presented at The Economic Consequences of Government Deficits: an Economic Policy Conference, cosponsored by the Center for the Study of American Business and the Institute of Banking and Financial Markets at Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri, October 29-30, 1982.
关键词: Tax policy, Federal debt, Deficit, Inflation, and Budget policy 学科: H62 - National Deficit; Surplus, E52 - Monetary Policy, H63 - National Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt, and E42 - Monetary Systems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System; Payment Systems
Creator: Ayres, João, Garcia, Márcio Gomes Pinto, Guillen, Diogo, and Kehoe, Patrick J. Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 575 Abstract:
Brazil has had a long period of high inflation. It peaked around 100 percent per year in 1964, decreased until the first oil shock (1973), but accelerated again afterward, reaching levels above 100 percent on average between 1980 and 1994. This last period coincided with severe balance of payments problems and economic stagnation that followed the external debt crisis in the early 1980s. We show that the high-inflation period (1960-1994) was characterized by a combination of fiscal deficits, passive monetary policy, and constraints on debt financing. The transition to the low-inflation period (1995-2016) was characterized by improvements in all of these features, but it did not lead to significant improvements in economic growth. In addition, we document a strong positive correlation between inflation rates and seigniorage revenues, although inflation rates are relatively high for modest levels of seigniorage revenues. Finally, we discuss the role of the weak institutional framework surrounding the fiscal and monetary authorities and the role of monetary passiveness and inflation indexation in accounting for the unique features of inflation dynamics in Brazil.
关键词: Stabilization plans, Brazil's hyperinflation, Debt accounting, Brazil's stagnation, and Fiscal deficit 学科: H63 - National Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt, E63 - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy, H62 - National Deficit; Surplus, and E42 - Monetary Systems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System; Payment Systems
Creator: Kehoe, Timothy Jerome, 1953-, Machicado, Carlos Gustavo, and Peres Cajías, José Alejandro, 1982- Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 579 Abstract:
After the economic reforms that followed the National Revolution of the 1950s, Bolivia seemed positioned for sustained growth. Indeed, it achieved unprecedented growth from 1960 to 1977. Mistakes in economic policies, especially the rapid accumulation of debt due to persistent deficits and a fixed exchange rate policy during the 1970s, led to a debt crisis that began in 1977. From 1977 to 1986, Bolivia lost almost all the gains in GDP per capita that it had achieved since 1960. In 1986, Bolivia started to grow again, interrupted only by the financial crisis of 1998–2002, which was the result of a drop in the availability of external financing. Bolivia has grown since 2002, but government policies since 2006 are reminiscent of the policies of the 1970s that led to the debt crisis, in particular, the accumulation of external debt and the drop in international reserves due to a de facto fixed exchange rate since 2012.
关键词: Fiscal policy, Public enterprises, Bolivia, Hyperinflation, and Monetary policy 学科: H63 - National Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt, E52 - Monetary Policy, E63 - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy, and N16 - Economic History: Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations: Latin America; Caribbean