Creator: Aiyagari, S. Rao and Wallace, Neil Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 226 Abstract:
This note presents a model whose competitive equilibrium can be consistent with the observation that current labor market conditions affect the well-being of new entrants more than they do that of senior workers. The model uses the notion that new entrants are not around soon enough to participate in risk-sharing contingent on the shocks that determine the equilibrium marginal products of first-period employment. This timing notion is formalized using a stochastic overlapping generations model.
A version of this paper was presented at the Econometric Society Summer Meeting, Cornell University, June 16-19, 1982.
学科: J21 - Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure and E30 - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles: General (includes Measurement and Data)
Creator: Bryant, John B. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 155 Abstract:
A new approach to market behavior is suggested. This approach has a coherent game theoretic foundaton, addresses such anomalous economic behaviors as strikes, rigid wages and unemployment, regulation of financial markets, depresssion, and nonmarket allocation, and, more generally, provides insights for Finance, Oligopoly Theory, Industrial Organization, and Macroeconomics. The central theme of the approach is that exchange technologies are a basic building block in a model, as are tastes, endowments, and production technologies. Moreover, the key feature of an institution of exchange is that it allows the making of a binding final offer.
关键词: Competitive allocation, Market behavior, and Bargaining problem 学科: C72 - Noncooperative Games and D51 - Exchange and Production Economies
Creator: Kehoe, Patrick J. and Perri, Fabrizio Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 307 Abstract:
We show how to decentralize constrained efficient allocations that arise from enforcement constraints between sovereign nations. In a pure exchange economy, these allocations can be decentralized with private agents acting competitively and taking as given government default decisions on foreign debt. In an economy with capital, these allocations can be decentralized if the government can tax capital income as well as default on foreign debt. The tax on capital income is needed to make private agents internalize a subtle externality. The decisions of the government can arise as an equilibrium of a dynamic game between governments.
关键词: Sovereign debt, Risk-sharing, Default, Incomplete markets, Enforcement constraints, Sustainable equilibrium, and Decentralization 学科: E21 - Macroeconomics: Consumption; Saving; Wealth, F30 - International Finance: General, F34 - International Lending and Debt Problems, E32 - Business Fluctuations; Cycles, D50 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium: General, and E44 - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
Creator: Kehoe, Patrick J. and Perri, Fabrizio Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 621 Abstract:
Previous literature has shown that the study and characterization of constrained efficient allocations in economies with limited enforcement is useful to understand the limited risk sharing observed in many contexts, in particular between sovereign countries. In this paper we show that these constrained efficient allocations arise as equilibria in an economy in which private agents behave competitively, taking as given a set of taxes. We then show that these taxes, which end up limiting risk sharing, arise as an equilibrium of a dynamic game between governments. Our decentralization is different from the existing ones proposed in the literature. We find it intuitively appealing and we think it goes farther than the existing literature in endogenizing the primitive forces that lead to a lack of risk sharing in equilibrium.
关键词: Sustainable equilibrium, Decentralization, Incomplete markets, Default, Enforcement constraints, Sovereign debt, and Risk-sharing 学科: E44 - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy, D50 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium: General, E32 - Business Fluctuations; Cycles, F34 - International Lending and Debt Problems, E21 - Macroeconomics: Consumption; Saving; Wealth, and F30 - International Finance: General
Creator: Cole, Harold Linh, 1957- and Kocherlakota, Narayana Rao, 1963- Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 238 Abstract:
We consider an environment in which individuals receive income shocks that are unobservable to others and can privately store resources. We provide a simple characterization of the efficient allocation in cases in which the rate of return on storage is sufficiently high or, alternatively, in which the worst possible outcome is sufficiently dire. We show that, unlike in environments without unobservable storage, the symmetric efficient allocation is decentralizable through a competitive asset market in which individuals trade risk-free bonds among themselves.
Creator: Boldrin, Michele and Montes, Ana Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 336 Abstract:
When credit markets to finance investment in human capital are missing, the competitive equilibrium allocation is inefficient. When generations overlap, this failure can be mitigated by properly designed social arrangements. We show that public financing of education and public pensions can be designed to implement an intergenerational transfer scheme supporting the complete market allocation. Neither the public financing of education nor the pension scheme we consider resemble standard ones. In our mechanism, via the public education system, the young borrow from the middle aged to invest in human capital. They pay back the debt via a social security tax, the proceedings of which finance pension payments. When the complete market allocation is achieved, the rate of return implicit in this borrowing-lending scheme should equal the market rate of return.
关键词: Efficient intergenerational arrangements, Public education, and Public pensions 学科: O11 - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development, I20 - Education and Research Institutions: General, H11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government, H42 - Publicly Provided Private Goods, and H30 - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: General
Creator: Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro and Lagos, Ricardo Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 358 Abstract:
We develop a model of gross job and worker flows and use it to study how the wages, permanent incomes, and employment status of individual workers evolve over time. Our model helps explain various features of labor markets, such as the amount of worker turnover in excess of job reallocation, the length of job tenures and unemployment duration, and the size and persistence of the changes in income that workers experience due to displacements or job-to-job transitions. We also examine the effects that labor market institutions and public policy have on the gross flows, as well as on the resulting wage distribution and employment in the equilibrium. From a theoretical standpoint, we propose a notion of competitive equilibrium for random matching environments, and study the extent to which it achieves an efficient allocation of resources.
Creator: Lagos, Ricardo and Rocheteau, Guillaume Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 342 Abstract:
This paper studies the effects of anticipated inflation on aggregate output and welfare within a search-theoretic framework. We allow money-holders to choose the intensities with which they search for trading partners, so inflation affects the frequency of trade as well as the quantity of output produced in each trade. We consider the standard pricing mechanism for search models, i.e., ex post bargaining, as well as a notion of competitive pricing. If prices are bargained over, the equilibrium is generically inefficient and an increase in inflation reduces buyers’ search intensities, output and welfare. If prices are posted and buyers can direct their search, search intensities are increasing with inflation for low inflation rates and decreasing for high inflation rates. The Friedman Rule achieves the first-best allocation and inflation always reduces welfare even though it can have a positive effect on output for low inflation rates.
关键词: Trade surplus, Velocity of money, Inflation rates, Terms of trade, Prices, Trade gains, and Cash 学科: E40 - Money and Interest Rates: General and E50 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General