Resultados da Busca
Creator: Klette, Tor Jakob and Kortum, Samuel Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 300 Abstract:
We develop a parsimonious model of innovating firms rich enough to confront firm-level evidence. It captures the dynamic behavior of individual heterogenous firms, describes the evolution of an industry with simultaneous entry and exit, and delivers a general equilibrium model of technological change. While unifying the theoretical analysis of firms, industries, and the aggregate economy, the model yields insights into empirical work on innovating firms. It accounts for the persistence over time of firms’ R&D investment, the concentration of R&D among incumbent firms, and the link between R&D and patenting. Furthermore, it explains why R&D as a fraction of revenues is strongly related to firm productivity yet largely unrelated to firm size or growth.
Palavra-chave: Birth and death processes, Firm growth, Productivity, R&D, Market structure, and Endogenous growth theory Sujeito: L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms and O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
Creator: Bergoeing, Raphael, Hernando, Andrés, and Repetto, Andrea Series: Advances in dynamic economics Abstract:
We estimate the effects of policy distortions on aggregate productivity. Based on a model of plant production and productivity uncertainty and heterogeneity, and using Chilean manufacturing data, we focus on the effect of taxation on the exit behavior of plants. We find that taxes do distort the liquidation decisions of firms, suggesting that policy distortions reduce the extent to which factors are reallocated towards the most productive plants. Our results have important consequences for growth and development, as policies that alter the measure of plants that operate in equilibrium change the short-run response of output to exogenous shocks and the long run level of aggregate TFP. In particular, we find that the amount of productivity lost due to excessive plant shutdowns are very large.
Palavra-chave: Total factor productivity, Latin America, Exit behavior of firms, South America, Taxation policy, and Chile Sujeito: H25 - Taxation, subsidies and revenue - Business taxes and subsidies and E23 - Macroeconomics : Consumption, saving, production, employment, and investment - Production
Creator: Crouzet, Nicolas and Mehrotra, Neil R. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 741 Abstract:
Drawing from confidential firm-level data of US manufacturing firms, we provide new evidence on the cyclicality of small and large firms. We show that the cyclicality of sales and investment declines with firm size. The effect is primarily driven by differences between the top 0.5% of firms and the rest. Moreover, we show that, due to the skewness of sales and investment, the higher cyclicality of small firms has a negligible influence on the behavior of aggregates. We argue that the size asymmetry is unlikely to be driven by financial frictions given 1) the absence of statistically significant differences in the behavior of production inputs or debt in recessions, 2) the survival of the size effect after directly controlling for proxies of financial strength, and 3) the predictions of a simple financial frictions model, in which unconstrained (large) firms contract more in recessions than constrained (small) firms.
Palavra-chave: Financial accelerator, Firm size, and Business cycles Sujeito: E32 - Business Fluctuations; Cycles, G30 - Corporate Finance and Governance: General, and E23 - Macroeconomics: Production
Creator: Pastorino, Elena Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 469 Abstract:
This paper develops and structurally estimates a labor market model that integrates job assignment, learning, and human capital acquisition to account for the main patterns of careers in firms. A key innovation is that the model incorporates workers’ job mobility within and between firms, and the possibility that, through job assignment, firms affect the rate at which they acquire information about workers. The model is estimated using longitudinal administrative data on managers from one U.S. firm in a service industry (the data of Baker, Gibbs, and Holmström (1994a,b)) and fits the data remarkably well. The estimated model is used to assess both the direct effect of learning on wages and its indirect effect through its impact on the dynamics of job assignment. Consistent with the evidence in the literature on comparative advantage and learning, the estimated direct effect of learning on wages is found to be small. Unlike in previous work, by jointly estimating the dynamics of beliefs, jobs, and wages imposing all of the model restrictions, the impact of learning on job assignment can be uncovered and the indirect effect of learning on wages explicitly assessed. The key finding of the paper is that the indirect effect of learning on wages is substantial: overall learning accounts for one quarter of the cumulative wage growth on the job during the first seven years of tenure. Nearly all of the remaining growth is from human capital acquisition. A related novel finding is that the experimentation component of learning is a primary determinant of the timing of promotions and wage increases. Along with persistent uncertainty about ability, experimentation is responsible for substantially compressing wage growth at low tenures.
Palavra-chave: Experimentation, Job Mobility, Bandit, Careers, Wage Growth, and Human Capital Sujeito: J62 - Job, Occupational, and Intergenerational Mobility; Promotion, J24 - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity, J44 - Professional Labor Markets; Occupational Licensing, D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness, D22 - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis, and J31 - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
Creator: Blume, Andreas and Franco, April Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 299 Abstract:
We study decentralized learning in organizations. Decentralization is captured through a symmetry constraint on agents’ strategies. Among such attainable strategies, we solve for optimal and equilibrium strategies. We model the organization as a repeated game with imperfectly observable actions. A fixed but unknown subset of action profiles are successes and all other action profiles are failures. The game is played until either there is a success or the time horizon is reached. For any time horizon, including infinity, we demonstrate existence of optimal attainable strategies and show that they are Nash equilibria. For some time horizons, we can solve explicitly for the optimal attainable strategies and show uniqueness. The solution connects the learning behavior of agents to the fundamentals that characterize the organization: Agents in the organization respond more slowly to failure as the future becomes more important, the size of the organization increases and the probability of success decreases.
Palavra-chave: Decentralized Learning, Organizations, and Game Theory Sujeito: D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory and C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
Creator: Holmes, Thomas J. and Mitchell, Matt Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 325 Abstract:
In this paper we develop a theory of how factors interact at the plant level. The theory has implications for (1) the micro foundations for capital-skill complementarity, (2) the relationship between factor allocation and plant size, and (3) the effects of trade and growth on the skill premium. The theory is consistent with certain facts about factor allocation and factor price changes in the 19th and 20th centuries.
Sujeito: J30 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General, F10 - Trade: General, and L20 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior: General
Creator: Camargo, Braz and Pastorino, Elena Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 475 Abstract:
We analyze commitment to employment in an environment in which an infinitely lived firm faces a sequence of finitely lived workers who differ in their ability to produce output. A worker’s ability is initially unknown to both the worker and the firm. A worker’s effort affects the information on ability conveyed by his performance. We characterize equilibria and show that they display commitment to employment only when effort has a persistent but delayed impact on output. In this case, by providing insurance against early termination, commitment to employment encourages workers to exert effort, thus improving the firm’s ability to identify workers’ talent. The incentive value of commitment to retention helps explain the use of probationary appointments in environments in which there is uncertainty about individual ability.
Palavra-chave: Commitment, Learning, Career concerns, and Retention Sujeito: D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory, C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games, D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness, and J41 - Labor Contracts