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Creator: Duprey, James N. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 071 Abstract:
This paper briefly recounts several of the key financial developments of 1974, describes the contingency planning exercise developed by the Minneapolis Federal Reserve Bank to encourage planning by large member banks, and then discusses some of the comments received in a trial run. The Appendix contains a copy of the exercise together with an illustrative example.
Palavra-chave: Banking, Contingency planning, Loss of confidence, 1974 banking crisis, and Emergency lending program Sujeito: G28 - Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation, G21 - Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages, and E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies
Creator: Cole, Harold Linh, 1957-, Dow, James, 1961 -, and English, William B. (William Berkeley), 1960- Series: International perspectives on debt, growth, and business cycles Abstract:
We consider a model of international sovereign debt where repayment is enforced because defaulting nations lose their reputation and consequently, are excluded from international capital markets. Underlying the analysis of reputation is the hypothesis that borrowing countries have different, unobservable, attitudes towards the future. Some regimes are relatively myopic, while others are willing to make sacrifices to preserve their access to debt markets. Nations' preferences, while unobservable, are not fixed but evolve over time according to a Markov process. We make two main points. First we argue that in models of sovereign debt the length of the punishment interval that follows a default should be based on economic factors rather than being chosen arbitrarily. In our model, the length of the most natural punishment interval depends primarily on the preference parameters. Second, we point out that there is a more direct way for governments to regain their reputation. By offering to partially repay loans in default, a government can signal its reliability. This type of signaling can cause punishment interval equilibria to break down. We examine the historical record on lending resumption to argue that in almost all cases, some kind of partial repayment was made.
Sujeito: H63 - National budget, deficit, and debt - Debt ; Debt management and F34 - International finance - International lending and debt problems
Creator: Rivera-Batiz, Luis. and Romer, Paul Michael, 1955- Series: Modeling North American economic integration Abstract:
In a world with two similar, developed economies, economic integration can cause a permanent increase in the worldwide rate of growth. Starting from a position of isolations, closer integration can be achieved by increasing trade in goods or by increasing flows of ideas. We consider two models with different specifications of the research and development sector that is the source of growth. Either form of integration can increase the long-run rate of growth if it encourages the worldwide exploitation of increasing returns to scale in the research and development sector.
Sujeito: F43 - Economic Growth of Open Economies, O41 - One, Two, and Multisector Growth Models, and F15 - Economic Integration
Series: System committee on agriculture and rural development Abstract:
Handout for "Policy Concerning Water Markets": Using Water Better: A Market-Based Approach to California's Water Crisis, by Ronald H. Schmidt and Frederick Cannon. Published 1991 by Bay Area Economic Forum (Calif.), Association of Bay Area Governments, Bay Area Council (Calif.). Handout for "Environmental Issues and Ag Lending": Land Values and Environmental Regulation by Michael D. Boehlge, Philip M. Raup and Kent D. Olson. University of Minnesota Department of Agricutural and Applied Economics Staff Paper P91-3, January 1991.
Creator: Benhabib, Jess, 1948- and Rustichini, Aldo. Series: Economic growth and development Abstract:
In this paper we study the relationship between wealth, income distribution and growth in a game-theoretic context in which property rights are not completely enforcable. We consider equilibrium paths of accumulation which yield players utilities that are at least as high as those that they could obtain by appropriating higher consumption at the present and suffering retaliation later on. We focus on those subgame perfect equilibria which are constrained Pareto-efficient (second best). In this set of equilibria we study how the level of wealth affects growth. In particular we consider cases which produce classical traps (with standard concave technologies): growth may not be possible from low levels of wealth because of incentive constraints while policies (sometimes even first-best policies) that lead to growth are sustainable as equilibria from high levels of wealth. We also study cases which we classify as the "Mancur Olson" type: first best policies are used at low levels of wealth along these constrained Pareto efficient equilibria, but first best policies are not sustainable at higher levels of wealth where growth slows down. We also consider the unequal weighting of players to ace the subgame perfect equiliria on the constrained Pareto frontier. We explore the relation between sustainable growth rates and the level of inequality in the distribution of income.
Palavra-chave: Economic growth, Conflict, and Equilibria Sujeito: O41 - One, Two, and Multisector Growth Models and D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
Creator: Todd, Richard M. Series: Business analysis committee meeting Descrição:
Version without Software Appendix appears on the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Web site at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=571
Palavra-chave: BVAR, Vector autoregression, and Bayesian analysis Sujeito: C53 - Econometric modeling - Forecasting and other model applications