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Creator: Smith, Bruce D., d. 2002. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept.) Number: 232 Abstract:
A model of a "real" business cycle is produced in which labor market participants possess private information. A class of economies is considered in which interesting cycles cannot arise without private information. A methodology adapted from Kydland and Prescott (1982) is then employed to show that models based on private information can empirically confront salient features of postwar U.S. business cycles. Moreover, this can be done in a way which is consistent with existing microeconomic evidence on wages and labor supply. Finally, it is shown that the important features of the model related to private information are fairly general.
Palavra-chave: Unemployment, Labor markets, Assymetric information, and Labor contracts Sujeito: D82 - Information, knowledge, and uncertainty - Asymmetric and private information and E32 - Prices, business fluctuations, and cycles - Business fluctuations ; Cycles
Creator: Smith, Bruce D., d. 2002. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept.) Number: 202 Abstract:
A model of credit rationing based on asymmetrically informed borrowers and lenders is developed. In this context, sufficient conditions are derived for an appropriate government policy response to credit rationing to be a continuously open discount window. It is also demonstrated that such a policy can be deflationary, and that given a commitment to operate in this way, the monopoly issue of liabilities can Pareto dominate their competitive issuance.
Palavra-chave: Government loans, Assymetric information, Jaffee-Russel model, Credit limit, and Federal lending Sujeito: D82 - Information, knowledge, and uncertainty - Asymmetric and private information, H81 - Miscellaneous issues - Governmental loans, loan guarantees, credits, and grants, and E51 - Monetary policy, central banking, and the supply of money and credit - Money supply ; Credit ; Money multipliers
Creator: Atkeson, Andrew. and Kehoe, Patrick J. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept.) Number: 513 Abstract:
In this paper, we build a model of the transition following large-scale economic reforms that predicts both a substantial drop in output and a prolonged pause in physical investment as the initial phase of the optimal transition following the reform. We model reform as a change in policy which induces agents to close existing enterprises using old technologies of production and to open up new enterprises adopting new technologies of production. The central idea of our paper is that it is costly to close old enterprises and open new enterprises because, in doing so, information capital built up about old enterprises is lost and time must pass before information capital about new enterprises can be acquired. Thus, an acceleration of the pace of industry evolution leads in the short run to a net loss of information capital, a drop in productivity, a recession, and a fall in physical investment. We calibrate our model of industry evolution, information capital, and transition to match micro data on industry evolution in the United States and macro data from the United States, Japan, and the former communist countries of Europe. We find that the loss of information capital that accompanies a major acceleration in the pace of industry evolution in an economy leads initially to a decade of recession and a five year pause in physical investment before the benefits of reform are realized.
Palavra-chave: Economic reform, Technological evolution, Policy change, Transition, Recession, Technology change, Information capital, and Industrial evolution Sujeito: O33 - Technological change ; Research and development - Technological change : Choices and consequences ; Diffusion processes and O25 - Development planning and policy - Industrial policy
Creator: Austen-Smith, David. Series: Conference on economics and politics Abstract:
This paper explores the extent and character of interest group influence on legislative policy in a model of decision making under incomplete information. A committee may propose an alternative to a given status quo under closed rule. Policies are related to consequences with ex ante uncertainty. An interest group is able to acquire policy—relevant information at a price, and has access to legislators at both the agenda setting stage and the vote stage. Lobbying is modeled as a game of strategic information transmission. The price of information is itself a private datum to the group, and legislators cannot observe whether the group elects to become informed. If the group is informed, then its information is likewise private. Among the results are: that not all informed lobbyists choose to try and influence the agenda directly; that there can coexist influential lobbying at both stages of the process; and that while informative agenda stage lobbying is genetically influential, the same is not true of voting stage lobbying.
Sujeito: D72 - Analysis of collective decision-making - Models of political processes : Rent-seeking, elections, legislatures, and voting behavior and D83 - Information, knowledge, and uncertainty - Search ; Learning ; Information and knowledge ; Communication ; Belief
Creator: Prescott, Edward C. and Townsend, Robert M., 1948- Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept.) Number: 203 Abstract:
General competitive analysis is extended to cover a dynamic, pure-exchange economy with privately observed shocks to preferences. In the linear, infinite-dimensional space containing lotteries we establish the existence of optima, the existence of competitive equilibria, and that every competitive equilibrium is an optimum. An example illustrates that rationing and securities with contrived risk have an equilibrium interpretation.
Palavra-chave: Pure exchange, Lotteries, and Competitive equilibria Sujeito: D82 - Information, knowledge, and uncertainty - Asymmetric and private information and D51 - General equilibrium and disequilibrium - Exchange and production economies
Creator: Platt, Glenn J. Series: Law and economics of federalism Abstract:
This paper develops a model of firm location where communities differ by exogenous endowments of a factor of production. Firms choose to locate based on local subsidies to production. Community and firm optimal strategies are then examined. Through the introduction of information asymmetries about the communities' endowments, equilibrium bidding strategies for communities are found. The results show that auction institutions used by firms may in fact be signaling on the part of communities. These results also indicate that community bids reveal information, and restrictions on this bidding may do more harm than good.
Palavra-chave: Tax breaks, Subsidies, Plant location, Tax competition, and Asymmetric information Sujeito: H70 - State and local government ; Intergovernmental relations - General, R30 - Production analysis and firm location - General, and D80 - Information, knowledge, and uncertainty - General