This file contains a listing of all banks that existed in the United States between 1784 and 1860 along with their opening and closing dates. Further, if a bank went out of existence, its disposition – whether it closed, failed, or other – is given. For the methodology to obtain beginning and ending dates see Weber, Warren E., “Early State Banks in the United States: How Many Were There and When Did They Exist?” Journal of Economic History, 433–455, June 2006.
This spreadsheet contains the disaggregated national bank call reports by state and reserve city for each call report date. These data appear as compiled by the Comptroller of the Currency. These data are a “cleaned” version of the data published in the Annual Reports of the Comptroller of the Currency. Where assets and liabilities were not equal for a state or reserve city in the original, they have been corrected to be equal in this data set. This was done by comparing for each asset and liability category differences between totals as reported by the Comptroller and totals category obtained by aggregating the individual state and reserve city data. It should also be noted that aggregates for the entire National Banking System should be based on the individual data in this dataset and not those reported by the Comptroller. After 1900 the dates for the data for Alaska and Hawaii that the Comptroller used in his totals do not match the dates given in the individual state reports.
Interbank payment data for Pennsylvania, 1842-1859. Data accompanies Warren Weber's 2003 Journal of Monetary Economics article "Interbank payments relationships in the antebellum United States : evidence from Pennsylvania."
Some of the downloadable Excel files that follow use Pre-1900 dates that Excel does not natively handle. We wrote an Add-In to overcome this limitation. Download the Pre-1900 Date Functions Add-In, copy it to C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office10\Library (for Microsoft Office XP). Then open Excel, go to Tools Add-Ins and check the corresponding box.
In a world with two similar, developed economies, economic integration can cause a permanent increase in the worldwide rate of growth. Starting from a position of isolations, closer integration can be achieved by increasing trade in goods or by increasing flows of ideas. We consider two models with different specifications of the research and development sector that is the source of growth. Either form of integration can increase the long-run rate of growth if it encourages the worldwide exploitation of increasing returns to scale in the research and development sector.
Handout for "Policy Concerning Water Markets": Using Water Better: A Market-Based Approach to California's Water Crisis, by Ronald H. Schmidt and Frederick Cannon. Published 1991 by Bay Area Economic Forum (Calif.), Association of Bay Area Governments, Bay Area Council (Calif.). Handout for "Environmental Issues and Ag Lending": Land Values and Environmental Regulation by Michael D. Boehlge, Philip M. Raup and Kent D. Olson. University of Minnesota Department of Agricutural and Applied Economics Staff Paper P91-3, January 1991.
The paper proposes a theory of ambiguous financial contracts. Leaving contractual contingencies unspecified may be optimal, even when stipulating them is costless. We show that an ambiguous contract has two advantages. First, it permits the guarantor to sacrifice reputational capital in order to preserve financial capital as well as information reusability in states where such tradeoff is optimal. Second, it fosters the development of reputation. This theory is then used to explain ambiguity in mutual fund contracts, bank loan commitments, bank holding company relationships, the investment banker's "highly confident" letter, non-recourse debt contracts in project financing, and other financial contracts.
In this paper we study the relationship between wealth, income distribution and growth in a game-theoretic context in which property rights are not completely enforcable. We consider equilibrium paths of accumulation which yield players utilities that are at least as high as those that they could obtain by appropriating higher consumption at the present and suffering retaliation later on. We focus on those subgame perfect equilibria which are constrained Pareto-efficient (second best). In this set of equilibria we study how the level of wealth affects growth. In particular we consider cases which produce classical traps (with standard concave technologies): growth may not be possible from low levels of wealth because of incentive constraints while policies (sometimes even first-best policies) that lead to growth are sustainable as equilibria from high levels of wealth. We also study cases which we classify as the "Mancur Olson" type: first best policies are used at low levels of wealth along these constrained Pareto efficient equilibria, but first best policies are not sustainable at higher levels of wealth where growth slows down. We also consider the unequal weighting of players to ace the subgame perfect equiliria on the constrained Pareto frontier. We explore the relation between sustainable growth rates and the level of inequality in the distribution of income.