Research Database

Greece experienced a boom until 2007, followed by a collapse of unprecedented magnitude and persistence. We assess the sources of the boom and the bust, using a rich estimated dynamic general equilibrium model. External demand and government consumption fueled the boom in production, whereas transfers fueled the boom in consumption. Different from the standard narrative, wages and prices declined substantially during the bust. Tax policy accounts for the largest fraction of the bust in production, whereas uninsurable risk accounts for the bust in consumption and wages. We assess how the composition of fiscal adjustment and bailouts affected the crisis.

We use panel data from the Italian Survey of Household Income and Wealth from 1991 to 2016 to document empirically what components of the household budget constraint change in response to shocks to household labor income, both over shorter and over longer horizons. We show that shocks to labor income are associated with negligible changes in transfers and non-labor income components, modest changes in consumption expenditures, and large changes in wealth. We then split the sample in households which do not own business or real estate wealth, and households who do. For the first group, we find that consumption responses are more substantial (and increasing with the horizon of the income shock) and wealth responses are much smaller. We show that, for this group, a version of the standard PIH framework that allows for partial insurance against even permanent income shocks can explain well the consumption and wealth responses, both at short and long horizons. For the second group the standard framework cannot explain the large changes in wealth associated with income shocks. We conclude that models which include shocks to the value of household wealth are necessary to fully evaluate the sources and the consequences of household resource risk.

The return on government debt is lower than that of asset with similar payoffs. We study optimal debt management and taxation when the government cannot directly redistribute towards the agents in need of liquidity but otherwise has access to a complete set of linear tax instruments. Optimal government debt provision calls for gradually closing the wedge between the returns as much as possible, but tax policy may work as a countervailing force: as long as financial frictions bind, it can be optimal to tax capital even if this magnifies the discrepancy in returns.

The Frisch labor supply elasticity plays a key role in many economic policy debates, but its magnitude remains controversial. Many studies estimate the Frisch elasticity using 2SLS regressions of hours changes on wage changes. But a little appreciated power asymmetry property of 2SLS causes estimates to appear spuriously imprecise when they are shifted away from the OLS bias. This makes it difficult for a 2SLS t-test to detect a true positive Frisch elasticity. We illustrate this problem in an application to NLSY97 data. We obtain an estimate of 0.60 for young men, but the t-test indicates it is insignificant. In contrast, the Anderson-Rubin (AR) test – which avoids the power asymmetry problem – implies the estimate is highly significant. The same power asymmetry issue that afflicts the t-test here will arise in many IV applications. Thus, we argue the AR test should be widely adopted in lieu of the t-test.

We build a scenario for inflation in the United States in the years to come. Following Gao, Kulish, and Nicolini (2021), we use the quantity theory of money as a conceptual framework and confront the theory with evidence from both the United States and other OECD countries. We argue that a) the quantity theory of money works very well in the medium term, which we define to be close to four years; b) deviations from the inflation rate predicted by the quantity theory tend to disappear in the medium term; c) the burst in inflation that started in 2012 in the United States is a deviation from the inflation rate predicted by the quantity theory; and d) if the policy framework does not change, we expect inflation to be back close to its 2% target no later than 2025.

We formulate a framework showing that differences in capital returns and capital intensity between groups of firms can identify relative differences in consumer demand and credit constraints. Using micro-data on Black- and White-owned startups, we find robust evidence that Black-owned startups have lower capital returns, implying that Black-owned startups face lower consumer demand due to race. In contrast, we find mixed evidence of tighter credit constraints due to race. We further show that differences in capital returns are persistent over time, whereas capital intensity differences are transitory. This suggests that lower demand, rather than credit constraints, might be the main barrier to growth for Black-owned startups.

Using linked employer-employee data from Brazil, we document a large gender pay gap due to women working at lower-paying employers with better amenities. To interpret these facts, we develop an equilibrium search model with endogenous firm pay, amenities, and employment. We provide a constructive proof of identification of all model parameters. The estimated model suggests that amenities are important for men and women, that compensating differentials explain half of the gender pay gap, and that there are significant output and welfare gains from eliminating gender differences. However, equal-treatment policies fail to achieve those gains.

In the U.S, after age 65, households face income and health risks and a large fraction of these risks are transitory. While consumption significantly responds to transitory income shocks, out-of-pocket medical expenses do not. In contrast, both consumption and out-of-pocket medical expenses respond to transitory health shocks. Thus, most U.S. elderly keep their out-of-pocket medical expenses close to a satiation point that varies with health. Consumption responds to health shocks mostly because adverse health shocks reduce the marginal utility of consumption. The effect of health on marginal utility changes the optimal transfers due to health shocks.

We characterize the little wage information contained in online job posts. Wage information is rare: only 14% of posts contain any information. Of these, wage ranges are more common than point wages, and are wide on average, spanning 28% of the midpoint (e.g. $32,000-$42,000/yr). Posted wages are highly selected in low income occupations: 40% higher than wages of employed workers. High wage firms are more opaque, with more and wider ranges. We find zero correlation between wage information and local labor market tightness. We provide an example of bias in econometric inference that worsens as wage information falls.

In the 1960 cohort, American men and women graduated from college at the same rate, and this was true for Whites, Blacks and Hispanics. But in more recent cohorts, women graduate at much higher rates than men. To understand the emerging gender education gap, we formulate and estimate a model of individual and family decision-making where education, labor supply, marriage and fertility are all endogenous. Assuming preferences that are common across ethnic groups and fixed over cohorts, our model explains differences in all endogenous variables by gender/ethnicity for the ‘60-‘80 cohorts based on three exogenous factors: family background, labor market and marriage market constraints. Changes in parental background are a key factor driving the growing gender education gap: Women with college educated mothers get greater utility from college, and are much more likely to graduate themselves. The marriage market also contributes: Women’s chance of getting marriage offers at older ages has increased, enabling them to defer marriage. The labor market is the largest factor: Improvement in women’s labor market return to college in recent cohorts accounts for 50% of the increase in their graduation rate. But the labor market returns to college are still greater for men. Women go to college more because their overall return is greater, after factoring in marriage market returns and their greater utility from college attendance. We predict the recent large increases in women’s graduation rates will cause their children’s graduation rates to increase further. But growth in the aggregate graduation rate will slow substantially, due to significant increases in the share of Hispanics – a group with a low graduation rate – in recent birth cohorts.