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Creator: Aiyagari, S. Rao and McGrattan, Ellen R. Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 203a Abstract: In this appendix, we describe the numerical methods used to compute an equilibrium in the economy with an inelastic labor supply and in the economy with an elastic labor supply (i.e., our benchmark economy). Although the economy with inelastically supplied labor is a special case of the benchmark economy, the equilibrium in the inelastic labor supply case is much easier to compute and is therefore treated separately. In each case, we start with the consumer's problem, assuming the consumer takes prices as given. We then show how the equilibrium prices are determined. To verify that the methods work well with our problem, we apply them to some related test problems that have known solutions.
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Creator: Cavalcanti, Ricardo de Oliveira and Wallace, Neil Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 581 Abstract: A random-matching model (of money) is formulated in which there is complete public knowledge of the trading histories of a subset of the population, called banks, and no public knowledge of the trading histories of the complement of that subset, called nonbanks. Each person, whether a banker or a non banker, is assumed to have the technological capability to create indivisible, distinct and durable objects called notes. If outside money is indivisible and sufficiently scarce, then an optimal mechanism is shown to have note issue and destruction (redemption) by banks.
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Creator: Bednar, Jenna Series: Law and economics of federalism Abstract: Federal systems are crippled by power grabbing between central and regional governments, as well as burden-shifting schemes between regions. Existing models of federalisms assume regional diversity to account for inter-regional tension. However, these models set aside entirely the problem of inter-level competition. This paper presents a unified framework for understanding threats to federal stability. The model's n + 1 structure accomodates both dimensions of federal instability. Furthermore, this paper is able to offer a theoretical alternative to explanations of instability that rely upon regional diversity or citizen patriotism; identically selfish preferences, in the decentralized setting, can generate instability. Additionally, under certain institutional conditions, the paper offers an equilibrium that embraces the persistence of competition in a stable federation.
Keyword: Federalism, Decentralization, and Federal instability Subject (JEL): H77 - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession and H11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government -
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