Creator: Bryant, John B. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 092 Keyword: Competition and Price setting Subject (JEL): D41 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Perfect Competition
Creator: Bryant, John B. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 110 Keyword: Demand uncertainty, Market price, Perfect competitors, and Inventory Subject (JEL): D42 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Monopoly and D41 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Perfect Competition
Creator: Gomme, Paul, 1961- Series: Economic growth and development Abstract:
Results in Lucas (1987) suggest that if public policy can affect the growth rate of the economy, the welfare implications of alternative policies will be large. In this paper, a stochastic, dynamic general equilibrium model with endogenous growth and money is examined. In this setting, inflation lowers growth through its effect on the return to work. However, the welfare costs of higher inflation are extremely modest.
Subject (JEL): E31 - Prices, business fluctuations, and cycles - Price level ; Inflation ; Deflation and O42 - Economic growth and aggregate productivity - Monetary growth models
Creator: Bryant, John B. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 099 Abstract:
This paper presents a monetarist model of the business cycle with price-setting firms. The model is estimated, and the point estimates used in simulations to illustrate the properties of the model. The real goods market is found to be stable, although subject to sharp changes in output. This model is consistent with rational expectations. Nevertheless, monetary policy can have a lasting impact, and the simulations show this to be the case. Fiscal policy too is found to influence the business cycle, but its short-run effects are substantially smaller than its impact effects. The possibility of an activist government policy in this model does not imply the efficiency of an activist policy.
Keyword: Real goods market, Inventory cycle, Rational expectations, and Disequilibrium Subject (JEL): G31 - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies; Capacity and E30 - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles: General (includes Measurement and Data)
Creator: Smith, Bruce D. (Bruce David), 1954-2002 Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 221 Abstract:
This paper considers a view commonly associated with the "quantity theory of money": that banks should face 100 percent reserve requirements. It argues first that the objectives of the quantity theorists' proposals were more than merely price level stability, and that in fact, price level stability was at most a secondary objective of their proposals. Second, it argues that these theorists had a world with distortions in mind with respect to their proposals. These are present in a special setting examined that (a) supports the imposition of 100 percent reserve requirements (on the basis of an unconstrained Pareto criterion), and (b) supports the view that these restrictions stabilize the price level and make its movements more "predictable."
Keyword: Price level stability, Lending, Quantity theory, Loans, and Banks Subject (JEL): G28 - Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation and E31 - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
Creator: Austen-Smith, David. Series: Conference on economics and politics Abstract:
This paper explores the extent and character of interest group influence on legislative policy in a model of decision making under incomplete information. A committee may propose an alternative to a given status quo under closed rule. Policies are related to consequences with ex ante uncertainty. An interest group is able to acquire policy—relevant information at a price, and has access to legislators at both the agenda setting stage and the vote stage. Lobbying is modeled as a game of strategic information transmission. The price of information is itself a private datum to the group, and legislators cannot observe whether the group elects to become informed. If the group is informed, then its information is likewise private. Among the results are: that not all informed lobbyists choose to try and influence the agenda directly; that there can coexist influential lobbying at both stages of the process; and that while informative agenda stage lobbying is genetically influential, the same is not true of voting stage lobbying.
Subject (JEL): D72 - Analysis of collective decision-making - Models of political processes : Rent-seeking, elections, legislatures, and voting behavior and D83 - Information, knowledge, and uncertainty - Search ; Learning ; Information and knowledge ; Communication ; Belief
Creator: Boot, Arnoud W. A. (Willem Alexander), 1960-, Greenbaum, Stuart I., and Thakor, Anjan V. Series: Economic growth and development Abstract:
The paper proposes a theory of ambiguous financial contracts. Leaving contractual contingencies unspecified may be optimal, even when stipulating them is costless. We show that an ambiguous contract has two advantages. First, it permits the guarantor to sacrifice reputational capital in order to preserve financial capital as well as information reusability in states where such tradeoff is optimal. Second, it fosters the development of reputation. This theory is then used to explain ambiguity in mutual fund contracts, bank loan commitments, bank holding company relationships, the investment banker's "highly confident" letter, non-recourse debt contracts in project financing, and other financial contracts.
Subject (JEL): G20 - Financial Institutions and Services: General and K12 - Contract Law
Creator: Todd, Richard M. Series: Business analysis committee meeting Description:
Version without Software Appendix appears on the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Web site at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=571
Keyword: BVAR, Vector autoregression, and Bayesian analysis Subject (JEL): C53 - Econometric modeling - Forecasting and other model applications
Creator: Benhabib, Jess, 1948- and Farmer, Roger E. A. Series: Lucas expectations anniversary conference Abstract:
We introduce, into a version of the Real Business Cycle model, mild increasing returns-to-scale. These increasing returns-to-scale occur as a consequence of sector specific externalities, that is externalities where the output of the consumption and investment sectors have external effects on the output of firms within their own sector. Keeping the production technologies for both sectors identical for expositional simplicity, we show that indeterminacy can easily occur for parameter values typically used in the real business cycle literature, and in contrast to some earlier literature on indeterminacies, for externalities mild enough so that labor demand curves are downward sloping.
Keyword: Cycle, Real business cycle, Business fluctuations, Indeterminacy, Sunspots, and Business cycles Subject (JEL): E00 - Macroeconomics and monetary economics - General - General, E32 - Prices, business fluctuations, and cycles - Business fluctuations ; Cycles, and E40 - Money and interest rates - General