Creator: Smith, Bruce D. (Bruce David), 1954-2002 Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 234 Abstract:
Current approaches to monetary theory and policy owe much to the "quantity theory of money." However, recent theoretical developments suggest that the manner in which money is introduced is more important, even for price level movements, than the quantity of money. Colonial American experience provides a laboratory for discriminating between these views. It is shown here that the nature of backing, rather than the quantity of money, determined its value. Large secular inflations were ended by changing the nature of backing despite the continuance of large note issues (and despite the absence of a metallic standard). Extremely large note issues and note withdrawals are shown not to have produced inflation (currency depreciation) or deflation (currency appreciation).
Keyword: Fiat money, Quantity theory, Currency, and Colonial America Subject (JEL): N11 - Economic History: Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations: U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913, E52 - Monetary Policy, and E42 - Monetary Systems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System; Payment Systems
Creator: Liu, Zheng, Waggoner, Daniel F., and Zha, Tao Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 653 Abstract:
The possibility of regime shifts in monetary policy can have important effects on rational agents’ expectation formation and equilibrium dynamics. In a DSGE model where the monetary policy rule switches between a dovish regime that accommodates inflation and a hawkish regime that stabilizes inflation, the expectation effect is asymmetric across regimes. Such an asymmetric effect makes it difficult, but still possible, to generate substantial reductions in the volatilities of inflation and output as the monetary policy switches from the dovish regime to the hawkish regime.
Keyword: Macroeconomic volatility, Monetary policy regime, Lucas critique, Expectations formation, and Structural breaks Subject (JEL): E52 - Monetary Policy, E42 - Monetary Systems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System; Payment Systems, and E32 - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
Creator: Chari, V. V. and Kehoe, Patrick J. Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 308 Abstract:
We analyze the setting of monetary and nonmonetary policies in monetary unions. We show that in these unions a time inconsistency problem in monetary policy leads to a novel type of free-rider problem in the setting of nonmonetary policies, such as labor market policy, fiscal policy, and bank regulation. The free-rider problem leads the union’s members to pursue lax nonmonetary policies that induce the monetary authority to generate high inflation. The free-rider problem can be mitigated by imposing constraints on the nonmonetary policies, like unionwide rules on labor market policy, debt constraints on members’ fiscal policy, and unionwide regulation of banks. When there is no time inconsistency problem, there is no free-rider problem, and constraints on nonmonetary policies are unnecessary and possibly harmful.
Keyword: Fixed exchange rates, European Union, Maastricht Treaty, Monetary regime, and Dollarization Subject (JEL): F30 - International Finance: General, E63 - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy, E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies, E42 - Monetary Systems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System; Payment Systems, F41 - Open Economy Macroeconomics, F33 - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions, F42 - International Policy Coordination and Transmission, and E61 - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
Creator: Chin, Daniel M. and Miller, Preston J. Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 194 Abstract:
In this study we contrast fixed and floating exchange rate regimes in a dynamic general equilibrium model. We find that the fundamental difference in the regimes is in the courses they imply for monetary policies. Because of policy coordination requirements, a tighter monetary policy needed to maintain a fixed exchange rate may necessitate a tightening in budget policy as well. We show that under some initial conditions voters or a social planner will favor one regime, but under other conditions they will favor the other. However, the choices of voters and a social planner are almost diametrically opposed.
Keyword: Monetary policy, Dynamic general equilibrium, and Exchange rate regimes Subject (JEL): E50 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General, F41 - Open Economy Macroeconomics, and C60 - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling: General
Creator: Lacker, Jeffrey Malcolm and Schreft, Stacey Lee Series: Monetary theory and financial intermediation Abstract:
We describe a stochastic economic environment in which the mix of money and trade credit used as means of payment is endogenous. The economy has an infinite horizon, spatial separation and a credit-related transaction cost, but no capital. We find that the equilibrium prices of arbitrary contingent claims to future currency differ from those from one-good cash-in-advance models. This anomaly is directly related to the endogeneity of the mix of media of exchange used. In particular, nominal interest rates affect the risk-free real rate of return. The model also has implications for some long-standing issues in monetary policy and for time series analysis using money and trade credit.
Subject (JEL): E42 - Money and interest rates - Monetary systems ; Standards ; Regimes ; Government and the monetary system ; Payment systems and G12 - General financial markets - Asset pricing ; Trading volume ; Bond interest rates
Creator: Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro, Matsui, Akihiko, and Matsuyama, Kiminori Series: Monetary theory and financial intermediation Abstract:
Our goal is to provide a theoretical framework in which both positive and normative aspects of international currency can be addressed in a systematic way. To this end, we use the framework of random matching games and develop a two country model of the world economy, in which two national fiat currencies compete and may be circulated as media of exchange. There are multiple equilibria, which differ in the areas of circulation of the two currencies. In one equilibrium, the two national currencies are circulated only locally. In another, one of the national currencies is circulated as an international currency. There is also an equilibrium in which both currencies are accepted internationally. We also find an equilibrium in which the two currencies are directly exchanged. The existence conditions of these equilibria are characterized, using the relative country size and the degree of economic integration as the key parameters. In order to generate sharper predictions in the presence of multiple equilibria, we discuss an evolutionary approach to equilibrium selection, which is used to explain the evolution of the international currency as the two economies become more integrated. Some welfare implications are also discussed. For example, a country can improve its national welfare by letting its own currency circulated internationally, provided the domestic circulation is controlled for. When the total supply is fixed, however, a resulting currency shortage may reduce the national welfare.
Keyword: Money as a medium of exchange, Random matching games, Multiple currencies, Best response dynamics, and Evolution of international currency Subject (JEL): F31 - Foreign Exchange, D51 - Exchange and Production Economies, E42 - Monetary Systems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System; Payment Systems, and C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Creator: Atkeson, Andrew and Kehoe, Patrick J. Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 297 Abstract:
Monetary policy instruments differ in tightness—how closely they are linked to inflation—and transparency—how easily they can be monitored. Tightness is always desirable in a monetary policy instrument; when is transparency? When a government cannot commit to follow a given policy. We apply this argument to a classic question: Is the exchange rate or the money growth rate the better monetary policy instrument? We show that if the instruments are equally tight and a government cannot commit to a policy, then the exchange rate’s greater transparency gives it an advantage as a monetary policy instrument.
Keyword: Exchange Rate Regime, Monetary Instrument, Time Consistency, Nominal Anchor, and Fixed Exchange Rates Subject (JEL): E52 - Monetary Policy, E50 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General, F41 - Open Economy Macroeconomics, E61 - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination, and F33 - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
Creator: Azariadis, Costas and Smith, Bruce D. (Bruce David), 1954-2002 Series: Finance, fluctuations, and development Abstract:
We study a variant of the one-sector neoclassical growth model of Diamond in which capital investment must be credit financed, and an adverse selection problem appears in loan markets. The result is that the unfettered operation of credit markets leads to a one-dimensional indeterminacy of equilibrium. Many equilibria display economic fluctuations which do not vanish asymptotically; such equilibria are characterized by transitions between a Walrasian regime in which the adverse selection problem does not matter, and a regime of credit rationing in which it does. Moreover, for some configurations of parameters, all equilibria display such transitions for two reasons. One, the banking system imposes ceilings on credit when the economy expands and floors when it contracts because the quality of public information about the applicant pool of potential borrowers is negatively correlated with the demand for credit. Two, depositors believe that returns on bank deposits will be low (or high): these beliefs lead them to transfer savings out of (into) the banking system and into less (more) productive uses. The associated disintermediation (or its opposite) causes banks to contract (expand) credit. The result is a set of equilibrium interest rates on loans that validate depositors' original beliefs. We investigate the existence of perfect foresight equilibria displaying periodic (possibly asymmetric) cycles that consist of m periods of expansion followed by n periods of contraction, and propose an algorithm that detects all such cycles.
Keyword: Equilibrium, Business cycles, Credit markets, and Interest rates Subject (JEL): E51 - Monetary policy, central banking, and the supply of money and credit - Money supply ; Credit ; Money multipliers, E32 - Prices, business fluctuations, and cycles - Business fluctuations ; Cycles, O41 - One, Two, and Multisector Growth Models, and E44 - Money and interest rates - Financial markets and the macroeconomy
Creator: Atkeson, Andrew, Chari, V. V., and Kehoe, Patrick J. Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 419 Abstract:
In standard approaches to monetary policy, interest rate rules often lead to indeterminacy. Sophisticated policies, which depend on the history of private actions and can differ on and off the equilibrium path, can eliminate indeterminacy and uniquely implement any desired competitive equilibrium. Two types of sophisticated policies illustrate our approach. Both use interest rates as the policy instrument along the equilibrium path. But when agents deviate from that path, the regime switches, in one example to money; in the other, to a hybrid rule. Both lead to unique implementation, while pure interest rate rules do not. We argue that adherence to the Taylor principle is neither necessary nor sufficient for unique implementation with pure interest rate rules but is sufficient with hybrid rules. Our results are robust to imperfect information and may provide a rationale for empirical work on monetary policy rules and determinacy.
Subject (JEL): E52 - Monetary Policy, E50 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General, E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies, E60 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook: General, and E61 - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination