Creator: Arellano, Cristina and Heathcote, Jonathan Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 385 Abstract:
How does a country’s choice of exchange rate regime impact its ability to borrow from abroad? We build a small open economy model in which the government can potentially respond to shocks via domestic monetary policy and by international borrowing. We assume that debt repayment must be incentive compatible when the default punishment is equivalent to permanent exclusion from debt markets. We compare a floating regime to full dollarization.
We find that dollarization is potentially beneficial, even though it means the loss of the monetary instrument, precisely because this loss can strengthen incentives to maintain access to debt markets. Given stronger repayment incentives, more borrowing can be supported, and thus dollarization can increase international financial integration. This prediction of theory is consistent with the experiences of El Salvador and Ecuador, which recently dollarized, as well as with that of highly-indebted countries like Italy which adopted the Euro as part of Economic and Monetary Union: in each case, around the time of regime change, spreads on foreign currency government debt declined substantially.
Keyword: Debt policy, Exchange rate regime, Dollarization, and Borrowing limits Subject (JEL): F30 - International Finance: General and E40 - Money and Interest Rates: General
Creator: Cooper, Russell and Kempf, Hubert Series: Quarterly review (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: Vol. 25, No. 3 Abstract:
This study argues that the delegation of monetary policy control by one country to another can reduce inflation in the delegating country. Hyperinflation is common in a divided society, one in which special interest groups can pressure a weak central government to issue money to finance their own demands while neglecting the country’s overall welfare. A commitment device like dollarization or a currency board, which gives control of the divided country’s money supply to another country, can eliminate this inflation bias. This is illustrated by Argentina’s experience with inflation and a currency board which, in effect, gave control of Argentina’s money supply to the United States. This argument is made precise using a two-country overlapping generations model to study the effects of delegation. The study also finds that a dollarization treaty between the two countries can be welfare-improving for both.
Creator: Bocola, Luigi and Lorenzoni, Guido Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 557 Abstract:
We study financial panics in a small open economy with floating exchange rates. In our model, bank runs trigger a decline in domestic wealth and a currency depreciation. Runs are more likely when banks have dollar debt. Dollar debt emerges endogenously in response to the precautionary motive of domestic savers: dollar savings provide insurance against crises; so when crises are possible it becomes relatively more expensive for banks to borrow in local currency, which gives them an incentive to issue dollar debt. This feedback between aggregate risk and savers’ behavior can generate multiple equilibria, with the bad equilibrium characterized by financial dollarization and the possibility of bank runs. A domestic lender of last resort can eliminate the bad equilibrium, but interventions need to be fiscally credible. Holding foreign currency reserves hedges the fiscal position of the government and enhances its credibility, thus improving financial stability.
Keyword: Financial crises, Foreign reserves, Lending of last resort, and Dollarization Subject (JEL): E44 - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy, G11 - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions, F34 - International Lending and Debt Problems, and G15 - International Financial Markets
Creator: Chari, V. V. and Kehoe, Patrick J. Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 308 Abstract:
We analyze the setting of monetary and nonmonetary policies in monetary unions. We show that in these unions a time inconsistency problem in monetary policy leads to a novel type of free-rider problem in the setting of nonmonetary policies, such as labor market policy, fiscal policy, and bank regulation. The free-rider problem leads the union’s members to pursue lax nonmonetary policies that induce the monetary authority to generate high inflation. The free-rider problem can be mitigated by imposing constraints on the nonmonetary policies, like unionwide rules on labor market policy, debt constraints on members’ fiscal policy, and unionwide regulation of banks. When there is no time inconsistency problem, there is no free-rider problem, and constraints on nonmonetary policies are unnecessary and possibly harmful.
Keyword: Fixed exchange rates, European Union, Maastricht Treaty, Monetary regime, and Dollarization Subject (JEL): F30 - International Finance: General, E63 - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy, E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies, E42 - Monetary Systems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System; Payment Systems, F41 - Open Economy Macroeconomics, F33 - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions, F42 - International Policy Coordination and Transmission, and E61 - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
Creator: Mendoza, Enrique G., 1963- and Smith, Katherine A. Series: Advances in dynamic economics Abstract:
"Sudden Stops " experienced during emerging markets crises are characterized by large reversals of capital inflows and the current account, deep recessions, and collapses in asset prices. This paper proposes an open-economy equilibrium asset pricing model in which financial frictions cause Sudden Stops. Margin requirements impose a collateral constraint on foreign borrowing by domestic agents and trading costs distort asset trading by foreign securities firms. At equilibrium, margin constraints may or may not bind depending on portfolio decisions and equilibrium asset prices. If margin constraints do not bind, productivity shocks cause a moderate fall in consumption and a widening current account deficit. If debt is high relative to asset holdings, the same productivity shocks trigger margin calls forcing domestic agents to fire-sell equity to foreign traders. This sets off a Fisherian asset-price deflation and subsequent rounds of margin calls. A current account reversal and a collapse in consumption occur when equity sales cannot prevent a sharp rise in net foreign assets.
Keyword: Collateral constraints, Fisherian deflation, Emerging markets, Margin calls, Open economy asset pricing, Asset pricing, Sudden stops, Nonlinear dynamics, and Trading costs Subject (JEL): F32 - International finance - Current account adjustment ; Short-term capital movements, D52 - General equilibrium and disequilibrium - Incomplete markets, E44 - Money and interest rates - Financial markets and the macroeconomy, and F41 - Macroeconomic aspects of international trade and finance - Open economy macroeconomics
Creator: Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro, Matsui, Akihiko, and Matsuyama, Kiminori Series: Monetary theory and financial intermediation Abstract:
Our goal is to provide a theoretical framework in which both positive and normative aspects of international currency can be addressed in a systematic way. To this end, we use the framework of random matching games and develop a two country model of the world economy, in which two national fiat currencies compete and may be circulated as media of exchange. There are multiple equilibria, which differ in the areas of circulation of the two currencies. In one equilibrium, the two national currencies are circulated only locally. In another, one of the national currencies is circulated as an international currency. There is also an equilibrium in which both currencies are accepted internationally. We also find an equilibrium in which the two currencies are directly exchanged. The existence conditions of these equilibria are characterized, using the relative country size and the degree of economic integration as the key parameters. In order to generate sharper predictions in the presence of multiple equilibria, we discuss an evolutionary approach to equilibrium selection, which is used to explain the evolution of the international currency as the two economies become more integrated. Some welfare implications are also discussed. For example, a country can improve its national welfare by letting its own currency circulated internationally, provided the domestic circulation is controlled for. When the total supply is fixed, however, a resulting currency shortage may reduce the national welfare.
Keyword: Money as a medium of exchange, Random matching games, Multiple currencies, Best response dynamics, and Evolution of international currency Subject (JEL): F31 - Foreign Exchange, D51 - Exchange and Production Economies, E42 - Monetary Systems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System; Payment Systems, and C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Creator: Arce, Fernando, Bengui, Julien, and Bianchi, Javier Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 761 Abstract:
This paper proposes a theory of foreign reserves as macroprudential policy. We study an open economy model of financial crises, in which pecuniary externalities lead to over-borrowing, and show that by accumulating international reserves, the government can achieve the constrained-efficient allocation. The optimal reserve accumulation policy leans against the wind and significantly reduces the exposure to financial crises. The theory is consistent with the joint dynamics of private and official capital flows, both over time and in the cross section, and can quantitatively account for the recent upward trend in international reserves.
Keyword: Macroprudential policy, Financial crises, and International reserves Subject (JEL): E00 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics: General, F00 - International Economics: General, and G00 - Financial Economics: General
Creator: Kehoe, Timothy Jerome, 1953-, Machicado, Carlos Gustavo, and Peres Cajías, José Alejandro, 1982- Series: Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 579 Abstract:
After the economic reforms that followed the National Revolution of the 1950s, Bolivia seemed positioned for sustained growth. Indeed, it achieved unprecedented growth from 1960 to 1977. Mistakes in economic policies, especially the rapid accumulation of debt due to persistent deficits and a fixed exchange rate policy during the 1970s, led to a debt crisis that began in 1977. From 1977 to 1986, Bolivia lost almost all the gains in GDP per capita that it had achieved since 1960. In 1986, Bolivia started to grow again, interrupted only by the financial crisis of 1998–2002, which was the result of a drop in the availability of external financing. Bolivia has grown since 2002, but government policies since 2006 are reminiscent of the policies of the 1970s that led to the debt crisis, in particular, the accumulation of external debt and the drop in international reserves due to a de facto fixed exchange rate since 2012.
Keyword: Hyperinflation, Fiscal policy, Bolivia, Public enterprises, and Monetary policy Subject (JEL): E52 - Monetary Policy, E63 - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy, N16 - Economic History: Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations: Latin America; Caribbean, and H63 - National Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt