Research Database

The Federal Reserve Act erected a unique structure of government decisionmaking, independent with elaborate rules balancing internal power. Historical evidence suggests that this outcome was a response to public conflict over inflation's redistributive powers. This paper documents and formalizes this argument: in the face of conflict over redistributive inflation, policy by majority can lead to policy that is worse, even fo the majority, than obvious alternatives. The bargaining solution of an independent board with properly balanced interests leads to a better outcome. Technically, this paper extends earlier work in making policy preferences endogenous and in extending the notion of equilibirum policy to such a world. Substantively, this work provides a simple grounding of policy preferences-largely missing heretofore-linking game theoretic models of policy to historical evidence about the formation of an independent monetary authority.

This paper analyzes the political economy of growth as an issue of intergenerational distribution. The first part of the paper develops a model of endogenous growth via human capital accumulation in an overlapping generations setting. Equilibrium growth is inefficient due to the presence of an intergenerational externality. We characterize the set of Pareto efficient paths for physical and human capital accumulation, and find that there is a continuum of efficient growth rate-interest rate combinations. The preferred combination for an infinitely-lived planner will depend on the social discount rate. Competitive equilibrium with subsidized or mandated human capital accumulation may give rise to a Pareto efficient steady state, though for some parameters efficiency requires some intergenerational redistribution. We then argue that a social planner or government with an infinite horizon is incongruous in an OG model when the agents all have finite horizons. Hence the second part of the paper addresses the question of how a government whose decisionmakers reflect the finite horizons of their constituents would choose policies that affect physical and human capital accumulation. Specifically we assume that each government maximizes a weighted sum of utilities of those currently alive. Each period the government selects a policy that takes into account the effect (through state variables) on subsequent policy decisions (and hence on the welfare of the current young generation). Numerical methods involving polynomial approximations are used to compute equilibria under specific parametric assumptions. Equilibrium growth rates turn out to be substantially below efficient rates.

Inspired by the current European developments, we study equilibrium fiscal policy under alternative constitutional arrangements in a "federation" of countries. There are two levels of government: local and federal. Local policy redistributes across individuals and affects the probability of aggregate shocks, while federal policy shares international risk. Policies are chosen under majority rule. There is a moral hazard problem: federal risk-sharing can induce the local governments to enact policies that increase local risk. We investigate this incentive problem under alternative fiscal constitutions. In particular, we contrast a vertically ordered system like the EC with a horizontally ordered federal system like the US. These alternative arrangements are not neutral, in the sense that they create different incentives for policymakers and voters, and give rise to different political equilibria. A general conclusion is that, centralization of functions and power can be welfare improving under appropriate institutions. However, this conclusion only applies to the moral hazard problem and a federation where the countries are not too dissimilar.

This paper explores the extent and character of interest group influence on legislative policy in a model of decision making under incomplete information. A committee may propose an alternative to a given status quo under closed rule. Policies are related to consequences with ex ante uncertainty. An interest group is able to acquire policy—relevant information at a price, and has access to legislators at both the agenda setting stage and the vote stage. Lobbying is modeled as a game of strategic information transmission. The price of information is itself a private datum to the group, and legislators cannot observe whether the group elects to become informed. If the group is informed, then its information is likewise private. Among the results are: that not all informed lobbyists choose to try and influence the agenda directly; that there can coexist influential lobbying at both stages of the process; and that while informative agenda stage lobbying is genetically influential, the same is not true of voting stage lobbying.

This paper examines the determination of the rate of growth in an economy in which two political parties, each representing a different social class, negotiate the magnitude and allocation of taxes. Taxes may increase growth if they finance public services, but reduce growth when used to redistribute income between classes. The different social classes have different preferences about growth and redistribution. The resulting conflict is resolved through the tax negotiations between the political parties. I use the model to obtain empirical predictions and policy lessons about the relationship between economic growth and income inequality. In particular, I show that, although differences in growth rates across countries may be negatively related to income inequality, redistributing wealth does not enhance growth.

Some economic policies and regulations seem to have only one purpose: to prevent technological development and economic growth from occurring. In this paper, we attempt to rationalize such policies as outcomes of voting equilibria. In our environment, some agents will be worse off if the economy grows, since their skills are complementary to resources that can be allocated to growth-stimulating activities. In the absence of arrangements where votes are traded, we show that for some initial skill distributions, the economy may stagnate due to growth-preventing policies. Different initial skill distributions, however, lead to voting outcomes and policies in support of technological development, and to persistent economic growth. In making our argument formally, we use a dynamic model with induced heterogeneity in agents' skills. In their voting decisions, agents compare how they will be affected under each policy alternative, and then vote for the policy that maximizes their welfare.

This paper analyzes how political stability depends on economic factors. Fluctuations in groups' economic capacities and in their abilities to engage in rent-seeking or predatory behavior create periodic incentives for those groups to renege on their social obligations. A constitution remains in force so long as no party wishes to defect to the noncooperative situation, and it is reinstituted as soon as each party finds it to its advantage to revert to cooperation. Partnerships of equals are easier to sustain than are arrangements in which one party is more powerful in some economic or noneconomic trait. In this sense, inequality is bad for social welfare. Surprisingly, perhaps, it is the rich, and not the poor segments of society who in our model pose the greater threat to the stability of the social order. Using cross-country data, we test and confirm the prediction that most constitutional disruptions should be accompanied by increases in income inequality.

In this paper we present a consistent estimator for a linear filter (distributed lag) when the independent variable is subject to observational error. Unlike the standard errors-in-variables estimator which uses instrumental variables, our estimator works directly with observed data. It is based on the Hilbert transform relationship between the phase and the log gain of a minimum phase-lag linear filter. The results of using our method to estimate a known filter and to estimate the relationship between consumption and income demonstrate that the method performs quite well even when the noise-to-signal ratio for the observed independent variable is large. We also develop a criterion for determining whether an estimated phase function is minimum phase-lag.

In this paper we develop a computable general equilibrium economy that models the banking sector explicitly. Banks intermediate between households and between the household sector and the government sector. Households borrow from banks to finance their purchases of houses and they lend to banks to save for retirement. Banks pool households’ savings and they purchase interest-bearing government debt and non-interest bearing reserves. We use this structure to answer two sets of questions: one normative in nature that evaluates the welfare costs of alternative monetary and tax policies, and one positive in nature that studies the real effects of following a procyclical interest-rate policy rule.

We look for the scale effects predicted by some theories of trade and growth based on the dynamic returns to scale that arise from learning by doing, investment in human capital, or development of new products. We find little empirical evidence of a relation between the growth rate of GDP per capita and the measures of scale implied by the theory. Restricting attention to the manufacturing sector, however, we find a significant relation between the growth rate of output per worker and the relevant scale variables. We also find that growth rates are significantly related to measures of intra-industry trade.

Several recent papers provide strong empirical support for the view that an expansionary monetary policy disturbance generates a persistent decrease in interest rates and a persistent increase in output and employment. Existing quantitative general equilibrium models, which allow for capital accumulation, are inconsistent with this view. There does exist a recently developed class of general equilibrium models which can rationalize the contemporaneous response of interest rates, output, and employment to a money supply shock. However, a key shortcoming of these models is that they cannot rationalize persistent liquidity effects. This paper discusses the basic frictions and mechanisms underlying this new class of models and investigates one avenue for generating persistence. We argue that once a simplified version of the model in Christiano and Eichenbaum (1991) is modified to allow for extremely small costs of adjusting sectoral flow of funds, positive money shocks generate long-lasting, quantitatively significant liquidity effects, as well as persistent increases in aggregate economic activity.

Following are the technical appendixes for “Banking in Computable Equilibrium Economies” by Javier Díaz-Giménez, Edward C. Prescott, Terry Fitzgerald, and Fernando Alvarez, in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 16 (1992), 533–59. Technical Appendix I, by Fernando Alvarez, describes the procedures used to construct the balance sheets reported in Tables 1 and 2 in page 536 and 537 of the paper. Technical Appendix II, by Terry Fitzgerald, describes the computational procedures used in this paper.

We present a 2-country model with heterogeneous agents in which changes in a country’s monetary policy affect real interest rates, relative prices of traded and nontraded goods and real exchange rates. Nontransitory real effects of monetary policy stem solely from a friction (country-specific reserve requirements) that generates separate demands for a country’s money and bonds. Without violating the classical assumptions of individual rationality and flexible prices, the model’s implications seem qualitatively in accord with the U.S. experience of the 1980s: a monetary policy tightening leading to a rise in the real interest rate and to an initial rise in the real value of the dollar which is subsequently reversed. In the model a monetary policy change leads to different welfare effects for agents born at different times, living in different countries, or participating on different sides of a market. The welfare of some agents can be affected more by relative price changes than by real interest rate changes.

The question of the existence and uniqueness of a stationary equilibrium for distorted versions of the standard neoclassical growth model is addressed in this paper. The conditions presented guaranteeing the existence and uniqueness of nontrivial equilibrium for the class of economies under study are simple and intuitively appealing, while the existence and uniqueness proof developed is elementary. Examples are presented illustrating that economies with distortional taxation, endogenous growth with externalities, and monopolistic competition can all fit into the framework developed.

The current tool of choice for analyzing the impact of a potential North American Free Trade Agreement on the economies of Canada, Mexico, and the United States is the static applied general equilibrium model. Although this type of model can do a good job in analyzing, and even in predicting, the impact of trade liberalization or tax reform on relative prices and resource allocation over a short time horizon, it does not attempt to capture the impact of government policy on growth rates. For this we need a dynamic model. This paper outlines some of the issues that confront a researcher interested in building a dynamic general equilibrium model to assess the potential economic impact of a NAFTA, including the impact on growth rates. Simple calculations based on preliminary empirical work indicate that the dynamic benefits of increased openness could dwarf the static benefits found by more conventional applied general equilibrium models.

The paper considers a model in which private foreign investors make direct long-lived capital investments in a small developing country that is subject to stochastic shocks to production. Depending upon the preferences of the host country, we find that expropriation can occur because of either desperation or opportunism. We show that under reasonable assumptions, increased investment makes expropriation less likely to occur and that the level of investment chosen by atomistic foreign investors may be nonoptimal.

This paper investigates the macroeconomic and welfare effects of a particular public finance decision. That decision was to use debt rather than current taxation to finance deposit insurance payments related to the savings and loan debacle. We find that this decision could have significantly raised real interest rates and affected welfare. The analysis is conducted in a dynamic, open-economy, monetary general equilibrium model in which parameters are set based on empirical observations.

Earlier researchers have found either no relation or a positive relation between the conditional expected return and the conditional variance of the monthly excess return on stocks when they used the standard GARCH-M model. This is in contrast to the negative relation found when other approaches were used to model conditional variance. We show that the difference in the estimated relation arises because the standard GARCH-M model is misspecified. When the standard model is modified allow for (i) the presence for seasonal patterns in volatility, (ii) positive and negative innovations to returns to having different impacts on conditional volatility, and (iii) nominal interest rates to affect conditional variance, we once again find support for a negative relation. Using the modified GARCH-M model, we also show that there is little evidence to support the traditional view that conditional volatility is highly persistent. Also, positive unanticipated returns result in a downward revision of the conditional volatility whereas negative unanticipated returns result in an upward revision of conditional volatility of a similar magnitude. Hence the time series properties of the monthly excess return on stocks appear to be substantially different from that of the daily excess return on stocks.

I consider two theories of the determination of political institutions. One of these theories stresses effects of changes in the balance of military power between the ruler and subjects on the distribution of property rights which the political system enforces. The other theory emphasizes the effect of changing informational constraints which require institutional changes to be made in order to maintain efficiency. I examine how each of these theories would apply to explaining the development of parliamentary government in thirteenth-century England. My general conclusion is that both theories are required to understand fully the process by which liberal political institutions emerge.

In this paper we explain why markets in noncontingent debt securities might be a stable form of market organization for intermediation to households. Efficient-contract allocation might be supported by these markets because households' relationships with their intermediaries do not exactly parallel the explicit form of the noncontingent contracts that they explicitly sign with one another. Also we show that the efficient-contract model can be distinguished from alternative models within the time-series framework that has been widely used to study households' consumption patterns.

This paper investigates the macroeconomic effects of cyclical fluctuations in marginal tax rates. It finds that systematically including tax variables in a standard real business cycle model substantially improves the model's ability to reproduce basic facts about postwar U.S. business cycle fluctuations. In particular, modeling fluctuations in personal and corporate income tax rates increases the model's predicted relative variability of hours and decreases its predicted correlation between hours and average productivity. Fluctuations in tax rates produce large substitution effects that alter the leisure/labor supply decision.

This paper examines the extent to which the equity premium puzzle can be resolved by taking account of the fact that stockholders bear a disproportionate share of output uncertainty. We do this in the context of a non-Walrasian RBC model where risk reallocation is justified by borrowing restrictions. The risk shifting mechanism we propose has the same effect as would arise from a substantial increase in the risk aversion parameter of the representative agent. As with more standard RBC models, it remains that our model is unable to replicate key financial statistics. In particular, the observation that the equity return is more variable than national product cannot be accounted for under standard technology assumptions.

We develop a theory of general equilibrium with endogenous debt limits in the form of individual rationality constraints similar to those in the dynamic consistency literature. If an agent defaults on a contract, he can be excluded from future contingent claims markets trading and can have his assets seized. He cannot be excluded from spot markets trading, however, and he has some private endowments that cannot be seized. All information is publicly held and common knowledge, and there is a complete set of contingent claims markets. Since there is complete information, an agent cannot enter into a contract in which he would have an incentive to default in some state. In general there is only partial insurance: variations in consumption may be imperfectly correlated across agents; interest rates may be lower than they would be without constraints; and equilibria may be Pareto ranked.

Using the well-known dynamic fiscal policy framework pioneered by Auerbach and Kotlikoff, we examine the efficiency and welfare implications of shifting from a linear marginal tax rate structure to a discrete rate structure characterized by two regions of flat tax rates of 15 and 28 percent. For a wide range of parameter values, we find that there is no sequence of lump-sum transfers that the (model) government can feasibly implement to make the shift from the linear to the discrete structure Pareto-improving. We conclude that the worldwide trend toward replacing rate structures having many small steps between tax rates with structures characterized by just a few large jumps is not easily accounted for by efficiency arguments. In the process of our analysis, we introduce a simple algorithm for solving dynamic fiscal policy models that include “kinks” in individual budget surfaces due to discrete tax codes. In addition to providing a relatively straightforward way of extending Auerbach-Kotlikoff-type models to this class of problems, our approach has the side benefit of facilitating the interpretation of our results.

This paper investigates interest rate determination and evolutions of nominal and real variables in alternative monetary, general equilibrium models. Three approaches to characterizing monetary transactions services are utilized: a cash-in-advance approach, in which agents face cash constraints on goods purchases; a transaction-cost approach, in which goods are sacrificed in transactions; and a shopping-time approach, in which leisure is sacrificed in transactions. Models which employ these approaches are used to examine liquidity effects of monetary innovations on interest rates and real activity.

The standard real business cycle model fails to adequately account for two facts found in the U.S. data: the fact that hours worked fluctuate considerably more than productivity and the fact that the correlation between hours worked and productivity is close to zero. In this paper, in a unified framework, the authors describe and analyze four extensions of the standard model, by introducing nonseparable leisure, indivisible labor, government spending, and household production.

This paper develops a dynamic continuous-time model in which international risk sharing can yield substantial welfare gains through its positive effect on expected consumption growth. The mechanism linking global diversification to growth is an attendant world portfolio shift from safe, but low-yield, capital into riskier, high-yield capital. The presence of these two types of capital is meant to capture the idea that growth depends on the availability of an ever-increasing array of specialized, hence inherently risky, production inputs. A partial calibration exercise based on Penn World Table consumption data implies steady-state welfare gains from global financial integration that for some regions amount to several times initial wealth.

The U.S. Treasury could raise more revenue if it changed the way it auctions its debt. Under the current procedure, all bidders whose competitive bids for Treasury securities are accepted pay the prices they bid; different winning bidders, that is, pay different prices. Instead, economic theory says, all winning bidders should all pay the same price—that of the highest bid not accepted, or the price that just clears the market. This procedural change would increase the revenue that Treasury auctions raise primarily because it would decrease the amount of resources that bidders would spend collecting information about what other bidders are likely to do. It would also reduce the incentives for traders to attempt to manipulate the securities market.

Inspired by the current European developments, we study equilibrium fiscal policy under alternative constitutional arrangements in a “federation” of countries. There are two levels of government: local and federal. Local policy redistributes across individuals and affects the probability of aggregate shocks, while federal policy shares international risk. Policies are chosen under majority rule. There is a moral hazard problem: federal risk-sharing can induce the local governments to enact policies that increase local risk. We investigate this incentive problem under alternative fiscal constitutions. In particular, we contrast a vertically ordered system like the EC with a horizontally ordered federal system like the US. These alternative arrangements are not neutral, in the sense that they create different incentives for policymakers and voters, and give rise to different political equilibria. A general conclusion is that, centralization of functions and power can be welfare improving under appropriate institutions. However, this conclusion only applies to the moral hazard problem and a federation where the countries are not too dissimilar.

This paper documents several advantages associated with using state level consumption data to examine consumption behavior and especially to estimate the Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution (IES). In contrast to the results of Hall (1988) and Campbell and Mankiw (1989), we provide substantial evidence indicating that the IES is significantly different from zero and probably close to one. Since the overidentifying restrictions of the standard Euler equation are generally rejected, we use these data to explore the nature of these rejections and evaluate an alternative specification of consumer behavior proposed by Campbell and Mankiw (1987, 1989, 1990). We take special care of examining the robustness of our results with respect to problems caused by the mismeasurement of the interest rate. In particular, we identify a common time component in expected consumption growth across states which, under the specifications of the theory, should reflect real interest rate movements. We find that the common time component closely matches the expected real return on Treasury bills as should be expected if the IES is different from zero and if the T-bill rate is an appropriate measure of interest rates.

We provide a new interpretation of the statistical relation between the trade balance and the terms of trade. This relation includes the J-curve, the tendency for trade balances to be negatively correlated with contemporaneous movements in the terms of trade, positively correlated with lagged movements. We document this property in international data and show that it arises, as well, in a two-country stochastic growth model. In the model trade dynamics result, in large part, from fluctuations in investment. A favorable productivity shock in the domestic economy leads to an increase in domestic output, a decrease in its relative price, and a rise in the terms of trade. The increase in domestic productivity also leads to a temporary investment boom. This boom results in an initial trade deficit, followed by future surpluses, and thus a J-curve. We also use the model to provide a new perspective on earlier theories of trade and price dynamics.

This paper takes up Bayesian inference in a general trend stationary model for macroeconomic time series with independent Student-t disturbances. The model is linear in the data, but nonlinear in parameters. An informative but nonconjugate family of prior distributions for the parameters is introduced, indexed by a single parameter which can be readily elicited. The main technical contribution is the construction of posterior moments, densities, and odds ratios using a six-step Gibbs sampler. Mappings from the index parameter of the family of prior distribution to posterior moments, densities, and odds ratios are developed for several of the Nelson-Plosser time series. These mappings show that the posterior distribution is not even approximately Gaussian, and indicate the sensitivity of the posterior odds ratio in favor of difference stationarity to the choice of the prior distribution.

For at least the next two years, the U.S. economy will grow more slowly than it has on average since World War II. This is the forecast of a Bayesian vector autoregression model developed and used by researchers at the Minneapolis Federal Reserve Bank. The model's previous forecast—of a very weak start to the 1991–92 recovery—was remarkably accurate. Both forecasts are supported by evidence on long-term problems among consumers, in the commercial real estate industry, and at all levels of government. These problems will most likely constrain economic growth for years, although short spurts of strength could appear anytime, due to unpredictable special factors.

We argue that changes in the life insurance industry have created a nontrivial moral hazard. We document the industry's shift from sales of life insurance to sales of mainly rate-of-return oriented investments like single premium deferred annuities (SPDAs) and guaranteed investment contracts (GICs). We describe the system of explicit and implicit guarantees that state governments and the industry provide to SPDA and GIC investors. We argue that these guarantees create moral hazards that have contributed to insurance company failures and misallocation of resources. We summarize reformers' proposals to enhance both the explicit guarantees and the regulation of insurance companies and argue that maintaining the degree of regulatory tightness required for such proposals to succeed will be difficult. We suggest an alternative: eliminate guarantees of SPDAs, GICs, and similar products (and possibly promote full disclosure practices and earmarked investments like variable annuities).

This paper describes an algorithm that takes advantage of parallel computing to solve discrete-time recursive systems that have an endogenous state variable.

During the 1882–1914 period, U.S. national banks could issue circulating notes backed by specified government securities. Earlier attempts to explain yields on those securities by costs of note issue discovered a paradox: yields were too high. We point out two previously ignored sources of costs: idle notes and note redemptions that were highly variable, thereby exacerbating the problem of managing reserves. We present data on idle notes and estimate, from partial data on redemptions, the uncertainty due to redemptions. We also present a semiannual time series of an upper bound on the average additional return on equity a national bank would earn by fully using its note issue privilege. Since the median of this series is 0.5 percent and since this upper bound does not include the average costs stemming from the exacerbated reserve management problem, we conclude that the specified government securities did not have paradoxically high yields.

This paper presents new empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that positive money supply shocks drive short-term interest rates down. We then present a quantitative, general equilibrium model which is consistent with this hypothesis. The two key features of our model are that (i) money shocks have a heterogeneous impact on agents and (ii) ex post inflexibilities in production give rise to a very low short-run interest elasticity of money demand. Together, these imply that, in our model, a positive money supply shock generates a large drop in the interest rate comparable in magnitude to what we find in the data. In sharp contrast to sticky nominal wage models, our model implies that positive money supply shocks lead to increases in the real wage. We report evidence that this is consistent with the U.S. data. Finally, we show that our model can rationalize a version of the Real Bills Doctrine in which the monetary authority accommodates technology shocks, thereby smoothing interest rates.

We examine nominal and real exchange rates, interest rates, prices, and evolutions of real variables in a two-country, monetary general-equilibrium model that includes a financial sector and shocks to technologies and money growth rates. Qualitative properties of the model are provided and moment predictions from a calibrated version of the model are compared to moments of time series drawn from actual economies. We focus on international monetary shock transmissions, and effects of monetary innovations on nominal and real exchange rates and nominal interest rates.

We study the effect on the growth of an economy of alternative financing opportunities in a stochastic growth model with incentive constraints. Efficient accumulation mechanisms are designed and computed for economies that differ in their incentive structure. We show that when borrowing is subject to information constraints, there is a computable efficient transfer mechanism that does not affect capital accumulation and investment patterns, even though consumption patterns and the distribution of wealth are affected. In contrast, enforcement constraints can severely reduce the outside financing opportunities and affect investment patterns and economic growth. We adapt numerical algorithms for obtaining numerical solutions of these models.

A real business cycle model with heterogeneous agents is parameterized, calibrated, and simulated to see if it can account for some stylized facts characterizing postwar U.S. business cycle fluctuations, such as the countercyclical movement of labor’s share of income, and the acyclical behavior of real wages. There are two types of agents in the model, workers and entrepreneurs, who participate on an economy-wide market for contingent claims. On this market workers purchase insurance from entrepreneurs, through optimal labor contracts, against losses in income due to business cycle fluctuations. The model is used to study the allocation of risk and the distribution of income over the business cycle.

This paper provides an algorithm for computing Markov Perfect Nash Equilibria (Maskin and Tirole, 1988a and b) for dynamic models that allow for heterogeneity among firms and idiosyncratic (or firm specific) sources of uncertainty. It has two purposes. To illustrate the ability of such models to reproduce important aspects of reality, and to provide a tool which, given appropriate parameter estimates, can be used for both descriptive and policy analysis in a setting which allows firms to differ from one another in ways that are consistent with the information in firm level data sets.

We illustrate by computing the policy functions, and simulating the industry structures, generated by a class of dynamic differentiated product models in which the idiosyncratic uncertainty is due to both the random outcomes of each firm's research process, and to an autonomous aggregate demand process. The illustration focuses on comparing the effect of different regulatory and behavioral assumptions on market structure and on welfare for one particular set of parameter values. The results here are of some independent interest and can be read without delving into the technical detail of the computational algorithm.

The last part of the paper begins with an explicit consideration of the computational burden of the algorithm, and then introduces approximation techniques designed to make computation easier. The purpose of this section is to enable us to compute equilibria for industries in which a large number of firms are typically active. Its major result is analytic. We show that if the value function of a given firm is exchangeable in the state vectors of its competitors, then the number of polynomial coefficients one needs for a given order of a polynomial approximation to that function is both independent of the number of firms active in the market, and a relatively small number. This enables us to use the approximation technique to reduce the computational burden of the algorithm dramatically.

Since the primary role of international financial linkages is to facilitate consumption smoothing in the face of country-specific shocks, the degree of international financial integration should play an important role in the international transmission of business cycles. This paper therefore studies the business cycle implications of restricting international trade in financial assets. The key restriction is that domestic residents must hold all risky claims to domestic output, trading only noncontingent bonds on the international asset markets. We find that restricting asset trade may or may not change the business cycle implications of the model relative to complete markets, depending on the parameterization of the stochastic process for productivity. When there are important differences, these stem largely from differential wealth effects. We also find that restricting asset trade can resolve the chief problem inherent in complete markets models, which is their predictions of too-high consumption correlations and too-low output correlations. When technology follows a random walk process, the restricted asset markets model predicts that cross-country output correlations are positive, and cross-country consumption correlations are smaller than the output correlations, as is typically observed in the data.

We study the existence and robustness of expectationally-driven price volatility in experimental overlapping generation economies. Iin the theoretical model under study there exist “pure sunspot” equilibria which can be “learned” if agents use some adaptive learning rules. Our data show the existence of expectationally-driven cycles, but only after subjects have been exposed to a sequence of real shocks and “learned” a real cycle. In this sense, we show evidence of path-dependent price volatility.

We use a simple model to show why previous empirical studies of budget policy effects are flawed. Due to an identification problem, those studies' findings can be shown to be consistent with policies either mattering or not. We argue that this problem is difficult and not likely to be resolved soon.

A quantitative investigation of investment-specific technological change for the U.S. postwar period is undertaken, analyzing both long-term growth and business cycles within the same framework. The premise is that the introduction of new, more efficient capital goods is an important source of productivity change, and an attempt is made to disentangle its effects from the more traditional Hicks-neutral form of technological progress. The balanced growth path for the model is characterized and calibrated to U.S. National Income and Product Account data. The long- and short-run U.S. data are then interpreted through the eyes of this framework. The analysis suggests that investment-specific change accounts for a large part of U.S. growth and is a significant factor in U.S. business cycle fluctuations.

This paper examines a two-country, monetary general-equilibrium model that includes a financial sector, capital mobility, and shocks to technologies and money-growth rates. Capital mobility allows agents in both countries to participate in rewards from relatively favorable shocks realized in either country. Currency exchange facilitates currency-intermediated international trade of consumption and capital goods. Qualitative and quantitative implications of the model for evolutions of variables are investigated. The quantitative analysis is performed by numerically solving and simulating the model. We focus on international monetary shock transmissions, and effects of monetary innovations on interest rates and nominal and real exchange rates.

This essay explains the use of fiat money, or why intrinsically useless objects are accepted as payment in transactions. People accept a particular object as a means of payment because others do: social conventions matter more than the intrinsic characteristics of the object itself. Not everything can become a fiat money, though. If an object is especially costly to hold, for example, it will not be accepted as a means of payment. This explanation of fiat money is illustrated in a simple theoretical economic model.

This paper shows how standard methods can be used to formulate and estimate a dynamic index model for random fields—stochastic processes indexed by time and cross section where the time-series and cross-section dimensions are comparable in magnitude. We use these to study dynamic comovements of sectoral employment in the U.S. economy. The dynamics of employment in sixty sectors is well explained using only two unobservable factors; those factors are also strongly correlated with GNP growth.