Research Database

This paper describes and implements a procedure for estimating the timing interval in any linear econometric model. The procedure is applied to Taylor’s model of staggered contracts using annual averaged price and output data. The fit of the version of Taylor’s model with serially uncorrelated disturbances improves as the timing interval of the model is reduced.

Different conclusions about the effects of open market operations are reached even among economists using full employment and rational expectations models. I show that these differences can be attributed to different assumptions regarding the concept of the deficit that is held fixed for an open market operation, the diversity among agents, and the features generating money demand. With regard to those features, I argue that plausible ways of explaining the holding of low-return money preclude the kind of perfect credit markets needed to obtain Ricardian equivalence.

This paper studies an environment in which the investment opportunities of agents are private information and shows that financial intermediaries arise endogenously within that environment. It establishes that financial intermediaries are part of an efficient arrangement in the sense that they are needed to support the authors’ private information core allocations. These intermediaries, which are coalitions of agents, exhibit the following characteristics in equilibrium: they borrow from and lend to large groups of agents; they produce information about investment projects; and they issue claims that have different state contingent payoffs than claims issued by ultimate borrowers.

Recent developments in monetary economics stress the nature of monetary injections, emphasizing that these have implications for the relationship between money and prices. In constrast, traditional approaches posit stable money demand functions that are independent of how money is injected. The former approach implies that certain proportionality relations between money and prices need not obtain. This permits the two approaches to be empirically distinguished, but only if an appropriate "experiment" is conducted. The colonial period is one such experiment. Colonial evidence suggests that the nature of injections is crucial to the effect on prices of changes in the money supply.

A model of a "real" business cycle is produced in which labor market participants possess private information. A class of economies is considered in which interesting cycles cannot arise without private information. A methodology adapted from Kydland and Prescott (1982) is then employed to show that models based on private information can empirically confront salient features of postwar U.S. business cycles. Moreover, this can be done in a way which is consistent with existing microeconomic evidence on wages and labor supply. Finally, it is shown that the important features of the model related to private information are fairly general.

Methods are presented for solving a certain class of rational expectations models, principally those that arise from dynamic games. The methods allow for numerical solution using spectral factorization algorithms, and estimation of these models using maximum likelihood techniques.

This paper characterizes the behavior of investment expenditures, optimal capital stocks, and real interest rates in the time-to-build model of investment. These results are used to show that the delivery lag model of investment fails to account for time lags in investment when constructing the cost of capital variable and hence, misspecifies the effects of interest rates on investment expenditures. Second, this paper derives equilibrium pricing relationships involving the prices of existing capital and uses these relationships to obtain simple tests of the underlying investment technology. Despite the widespread use of 'q' in the empirical investment literature, it is shown that the relationship between current investment and an appropriately defined measure of Tobin's 'q' contains no such testable implications. Finally, it is shown that the practice of using stock market data to measure the price of existing capital is invalid when time lags exist in the investment process.

A popular method of investigating the market effects of multibank holding company (MBHC) affiliation involves regression of banks' local market share on a dummy variable for MBHC affiliation. The usefulness of this procedure is called into question by means of a theoretical counterexample.

This paper constructs a model with two structural equations: the Government budget constraint and a linear version of Cagan’s portfolio balance equation. The model contains a continuum of equilibria with “sunspot equilibria.” Closed forms for the solutions are found. Even though there is a continuum of equilibria, the model is overidentified econometrically, so that the model restricts time series data on price levels and currency stocks. We describe how the free parameters of the model can be estimated, including some parameters that serve to index particular members of the continuum of equilibria. The sunspot equilibria hold out some promise of explaining anomalies in the observed behavior of inflation and real balances during hyperinflations.

This paper presents maximum likelihood estimates of a real business cycle model very similar to one Kydland and Prescott [1982] suggested. The results of the paper conflict with Kydland and Prescott’s. The model leaves unexplained much of the variance of two key investment series, namely, structures and equipment. Also, much of the variation in the differences of per capita hours can be generated assuming that past leisure choices do not affect current utility.

Recent developments in the theory of economies with private information permit a re-examination of the issues raised in the "real bills-quantity theory" debate. A model is developed here in which there are banks, in which fiat money is present, and in which agents possess private information. Two regulatory regimes are then considered. In the first, banks are essentially unregulated. In the second, banks face 100 percent reserve requirements. Issues related to existence and optimality of equilibrium are addressed, and problems with existence are given an interpretation in terms of the "stability" of the banking system. Existence (stability) problems which arise under laissez-faire banking can be rectified by a 100 percent reserve requirement. However, unless there is private information regarding access to investment opportunities, there are typically better ways to accomplish this. Finally, it is shown that even in the presence of 100 percent reserve requirements banks are not simply "money warehouses." Bank deposits and money bear different (real) return streams, even under 100 percent reserves.

In an overlapping generations model with borrowing and lending, uncertainty, and asymmetric information, fiat money may be essential to the existence of a competitive equilibrium. It may also serve to enhance the information of economic agents in a well-defined sense. In addition, the model presented provides suggestions about why the presence of valued fiat currency is essential to existence of equilibrium, even though in equilibrium perfect substitutes for money may exist.