Research Database

This paper explains why the risky notes of banks established during the Free Banking Era (1837–63) were demanded even when relatively safe specie (gold and silver coin) was an alternative. Free bank notes were demanded because they were priced to reflect the expected value of their backing. The empirical evidence supports this explanation. Specifically, in New York, Wisconsin, and Indiana the expected value of backing was sufficient for free bank notes to circulate at par, which they did. In Minnesota the backing for notes was very poor: they exchanged well below par, being treated as small-denomination securities.

This paper shows how the cross-equation restrictions implied by dynamic rational expectations models can be used to resolve the aliasing identification problem. Using a continuous time, linear-quadratic optimization environment, this paper describes how the resulting restrictions are sufficient to identify the parameters of the underlying continuous time process when it is known that the true continuous time process has a rational spectral density matrix.

This paper surveys recent issues in macroeconomics from the viewpoint of dynamic economic theory. The need to look beyond demand and supply curves and the insights that come from doing so are emphasized. Examples of issues in debt management and fiscal policy are analyzed.

Commodity money is modeled as one or two of the capital goods in a one-consumption good and one or two capital-good, overlapping generations model. Among the topics addressed using versions of the model are (i) the nature of the inefficiency of commodity money; (ii) the validity of quantity-theory predictions for commodity money systems; (iii) the circumstances under which one commodity emerges naturally as the commodity money; (iv) the role of inside money (money backed by private debt) in commodity money systems; and (v) the circumstances under which a government can choose the commodity to serve as the commodity money.

No abstract available.

An examination of the behavior of stock returns around quarterly earnings announcement dates finds a seasonal pattern: small firms show large positive abnormal returns and a sizable increase in the variability of returns around these dates. Only part of the large abnormal returns can be accounted for by the fact that firms with good news tend to announce early. Large firms show no abnormal returns around announcement dates and a much smaller increase in variability.

According to the folklore of economics, game theory has failed. This paper argues that that is an incorrect interpretation of the game theory literature. When faced with a well-posed problem, game theory provides a solution. When faced with an ill-posed problem, game theory fails to provide a solution. This is, indeed, the best one can hope for from a method of analysis! Further, some suggestions are made for facing game theory with well-posed economic problems.

This paper presents a two-country overlapping generations model in which financial intermediation arises endogenously as an incentive-compatible means of economizing on monitoring costs. Because of the existence of transactions costs, money markets in the two countries are segmented and investors have differential access to international credit markets. The model is used to generate predictions about the role of international intermediation in economic development and to examine the nature of business cycle phenomena across alternative exchange rate regimes. Disturbances are propagated by a credit allocation mechanism, which also lends a novel flavor to the model’s long-run properties.

This paper illustrates the application of observable index models to the problem of macroeconomic forecasting. In this context, a Bayesian prior is used to describe a class of models which impose the index structure with more or less weight. An out-of-sample forecasting experiment is used to measure the possible benefits of this approach. In addition, impulse response functions and the decomposition of forecast variance are analyzed to suggest a possible separation of real and nominal shocks into separate channels.

Long-term contracts are explained as equilibrium strategies of supergames. In the specific coherent general equilibrium model provided, limited mobility of labor, in the form of a fixed cost of moving, generates long-term contracts.