Research Database

The way many dictators have been deposed in the 20th century resembles the way a parliamentary form of government emerged in 13th-century England. This medieval example is worth examining because the features that led to its political reform are particularly clear. Despite what many think, that reform cannot be understood simply as a shift in military power from ruler to subjects. Rather, understanding the reform requires understanding that the English king had recently acquired private information crucial to his subjects. Such private information became important after England lost Normandy to France, just before the king issued the Magna Carta (and publicly agreed to consult his subjects before taxing them). Under circumstances like these—when a threat to a society arises and significant private information about the threat develops—the society may need an arrangement for communication like parliament in order to attain economic efficiency.

This study establishes several facts about medieval monetary debasements: they were followed by unusually large minting volumes and by increased seigniorage; old and new coins circulated concurrently; and, at least some of the time, coins were valued by weight. These facts constitute a puzzle because debasements provide no additional inducements to bring coins to the mint. On theoretical and empirical grounds, the authors reject explanations based on by-tale circulation, nominal contracts, and sluggish price adjustment. They conclude that debasements pose a challenge to monetary economics.

This paper studies the time series and cross-sectional behavior of tariffs during the prewar period in a manner that recognizes their dual role: as an instrument of commercial policy and as an important source of government revenue. The fact that these objectives may be reinforcing or conflicting has made a critical difference in the choice of tariff rates across commodities and over time. Another interesting feature of prewar tariffs is that most import duties were specific, charging a nominal amount of domestic currency per physical unit imported. Existing historical accounts focus on dates of legislative change and miss the cyclical variation in tariff rates that results from the impact of changing prices on the real value of specific duties. These price effects are quantitatively important during the 1900 to 1940 period. For example, the Fordney-McCumber Act of 1922 which has been interpreted as very protectionist simply corrected the erosion of real tariff rates occurring during the inflation of World War I. The opposite is true of the infamous Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act; the deflation of the 1930s added considerably to the legislated increases. The implications of these findings for modelling the role of Smoot-Hawley in the Great Depression is also discussed.

This study argues that the delegation of monetary policy control by one country to another can reduce inflation in the delegating country. Hyperinflation is common in a divided society, one in which special interest groups can pressure a weak central government to issue money to finance their own demands while neglecting the country’s overall welfare. A commitment device like dollarization or a currency board, which gives control of the divided country’s money supply to another country, can eliminate this inflation bias. This is illustrated by Argentina’s experience with inflation and a currency board which, in effect, gave control of Argentina’s money supply to the United States. This argument is made precise using a two-country overlapping generations model to study the effects of delegation. The study also finds that a dollarization treaty between the two countries can be welfare-improving for both.

This paper presents a simple model of search and matching between consumers and firms. The firm size distribution has a Pareto-like right tail if the population of consumers grows at a positive rate and the mean rate at which incumbent firms gain customers is also positive. This happens in equilibrium when entry is sufficiently costly. As entry costs grow without bound, the size distribution approaches Zipf’s law. The slow rate at which the right tail of the size distribution decays and the 10% annual gross entry rate of new firms observed in the data suggest that more than a third of all consumers must switch from one firm to another during a given year. A substantially lower consumer switching rate can be inferred only if part of the observed firm entry rate is attributed to factors outside the model. The realized growth rates of large firms in the model are too smooth.

To illustrate the use of social accounting matrices (SAMs) in applied general equilibrium (GE) modeling, we use an aggregated SAM for the Spanish economy to calibrate a simple applied GE model. The idea is to construct artificial people—households, government, and a foreign sector—who make the same transactions in the equilibrium of the model economy as do their counterparts in the data. This calibration procedure can be augmented, or partially substituted for, by statistical estimation of key parameters. We show the usefulness of such a model by presenting the results of a comparative exercise that mimics the policy changes that took place in Spain during its 1986 integration into the European Community. Sub-sequent data shows the model results to be remarkably accurate, especially if we account for other major shocks affected the Spanish economy in 1986.

Why do some sellers set nominal prices that apparently do not respond to changes in the aggregate price level? In many models, prices are sticky by assumption; here it is a result. We use search theory, with two consequences: prices are set in dollars, since money is the medium of exchange; and equilibrium implies a nondegenerate price distribution. When the money supply increases, some sellers may keep prices constant, earning less per unit but making it up on volume, so profit stays constant. The calibrated model matches price-change data well. But, in contrast with other sticky-price models, money is neutral.

This paper puts forward a method for improving the forecasting accuracy of an existing macroeconometric model without changing its policy response characteristics. The procedure is an extension and formalization of the practice of additive adjustments currently used by most forecasters. The method should be of special interest to forecasters who use models built by other investigators because it does not involve reestimation of the original model and uses only information routinely included in the documentation available to model users. The paper ends with a demonstration of the prediction improvement realized by application of this method to a version of the MIT-Penn-SSRC (MPS) model.

Current approaches to monetary theory and policy owe much to the "quantity theory of money." However, recent theoretical developments suggest that the manner in which money is introduced is more important, even for price level movements, than the quantity of money. Colonial American experience provides a laboratory for discriminating between these views. It is shown here that the nature of backing, rather than the quantity of money, determined its value. Large secular inflations were ended by changing the nature of backing despite the continuance of large note issues (and despite the absence of a metallic standard). Extremely large note issues and note withdrawals are shown not to have produced inflation (currency depreciation) or deflation (currency appreciation).