Research Database

This article develops a simple model that captures a concern for relative standing, or status. This concern is instrumental, in the sense that individuals do not get utility directly from their relative standing, but, rather, the concern is induced because their relative standing affects their consumption of standard commodities. The article investigates the consequences of a concern for relative wealth in models in which individuals are making labor/leisure decisions. The analysis shows how individuals' decisions are affected by the aggregate income distribution and how the concern for relative wealth can generate behavior that can be interpreted as conspicuous consumption when wealth is not directly observable.

This essay, written around 1779, challenges the simple quantity theory of money. From the perspective of the paper money issued to pay for America’s Revolutionary War—bills of credit, or continentals—the essay rejects the idea that the value of money is determined by the number of pieces of paper issued. That idea ignores the fact that an individual nation is just a small part of the world economy. More relevant than quantity, the essay argues, are two other features: the date the government promises to exchange the pieces of paper for specie and the credibility of that promise.

This paper empirically investigates the restrictions embodied in a popular dynamic monetary model for the cross relations between consumption, money holdings, inflation and assets’ returns using quarterly data for the high-inflation economy in Israel, 1970–1988. The model considered includes money in agents’ utility function. A set of the estimated parameters is used in the analysis to assess the model’s quantitative implications for seigniorage and for the welfare costs of inflation. The estimates are found to account well for the observed stability over time of seigniorage in Israel and imply sizeable welfare costs of inflation.

We provide a new interpretation of the statistical relation between the trade balance and the terms of trade. This relation includes the J-curve, the tendency for trade balances to be negatively correlated with contemporaneous movements in the terms of trade, positively correlated with lagged movements. We document this property in international data and show that it arises, as well, in a two-country stochastic growth model. In the model trade dynamics result, in large part, from fluctuations in investment. A favorable productivity shock in the domestic economy leads to an increase in domestic output, a decrease in its relative price, and a rise in the terms of trade. The increase in domestic productivity also leads to a temporary investment boom. This boom results in an initial trade deficit, followed by future surpluses, and thus a J-curve. We also use the model to provide a new perspective on earlier theories of trade and price dynamics.

This article describes changes in the number of average weekly hours of market work per person in the United States since World War II. Overall, this number has been roughly constant; for various groups, however, it has shifted dramatically—from males to females, from older people to younger people, and from single- to married-person households. The article provides a unique look at how the lifetime pattern of work hours has changed since 1950 for different demographic groups. The article also documents several factors that may be related to the changes in hours worked: simultaneous changes in Social Security benefits, fertility rates, and family structure. The data presented are based on those collected by the U.S. Bureau of the Census during the 1950–90 decennial censuses.

This article develops a model which shows that bank deposit contracts can provide allocations superior to those of exchange markets, offering an explanation of how banks subject to runs can attract deposits. Investors face privately observed risks which lead to a demand for liquidity. Traditional demand deposit contracts which provide liquidity have multiple equilibria, one of which is a bank run. Bank runs in the model cause real economic damage, rather than simply reflecting other problems. Contracts which can prevent runs are studied, and the analysis shows that there are circumstances when government provision of deposit insurance can produce superior contracts.

This article argues that the poor performance of the U.S. banking industry in the 1980s was due mainly to the risk-taking of the largest banks, which was encouraged by the U.S. government's too-big-to-fail policy. The article documents the recent trend toward riskier bank portfolios and the corresponding decline in bank profitability. A breakdown of the data by location and by asset size reveals that bank problems were concentrated in areas with troubled industries (oil, real estate, and agriculture) and among banks with the largest assets. In a statistical study controlling for location, asset size remains a significant factor in bank performance. The article concludes with a rough quantitative estimate of the cost to the industry of the poor performance of large banks.

This paper evaluates Hayashi's conjecture that Japan's postwar saving experience can be accounted for by the neoclassical model of economic growth as that country's efforts to reconstruct its capital stock that was severely damaged in World War II. I call this the reconstruction hypothesis. I take a simplified version of a standard neoclassical growth model that is in widespread use in macroeconomics and simulate its response to capital destruction. The saving rate path implied by the model differs significantly from the path taken by actual Japanese postwar saving data. I discuss several model modifications which would reconcile the reconstruction hypothesis with Japan's postwar saving experience. For the reconstruction hypothesis to be credible requires independent evidence on the empirical plausibility of the model modifications. It is left to future research to determine whether that evidence exists.

This article describes the current state of economic theory intended to explain the unequal distribution of wealth among U.S. households. The models reviewed are heterogeneous agent versions of standard neoclassical growth models with uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks to earnings. The models endogenously generate differences in asset holdings as a result of the household's desire to smooth consumption while earnings fluctuate. Both of the dominant types of models—dynastic and life cycle models—reproduce the U.S. wealth distribution poorly. The article describes several features recently proposed as additions to the theory based on changes in earnings, including business ownership, higher rates of return on high asset levels, random capital gains, government programs to guarantee a minimum level of consumption, and changes in health and marital status. None of these features has been fully analyzed yet, but they all seem to have potential to move the models in the right direction.

The paper employs three different types of identifying restrictions to calculate the impulse responses for the trivariate series composed of the U.S. unemployment level, real GNP and the money stock. The first two are the zero restrictions, arising from the assumption of the delayed information pattern available in forming a money reaction function. The third assumes a particular simplified structural model. The paper shows that the impulse response patterns are generally insensitive to these alternative specifications. Similar exercises are carried out for the bivariate series composed of the U.S. and the unemployment level.

Does the extent of competitive pressure industries face influence their productivity? We study a natural experiment conducted in the iron ore industry as a result of the collapse in world steel production in the early 1980s. For iron ore producers, whose only market is the steel industry, this collapse was an exogenous shock. The drop in steel production differed dramatically by region: it fell by about a third in the Atlantic Basin but only very little in the Pacific Basin. Given that the cost of transporting iron ore is very high relative to its mine value, Atlantic iron ore producers faced a much greater increase in competitive pressure than did Pacific iron ore producers. In response to the crisis, most Atlantic iron ore producers doubled their labor productivity; Pacific iron ore producers experienced few productivity gains.