Research Database

As of 2022, the share of U.S. income accruing to labor is at its lowest level since the Great Depression. Updating previous studies with more recent observations, I document the continuing decline of the labor share for the United States, other countries, and various industries. I discuss how changes in technology and product, labor, and capital markets affect the trend of the labor share. I also examine its relationship with other macroeconomic trends, such as rising markups, higher concentration of economic activity, and globalization. I conclude by offering some perspectives on the economic and policy implications of the labor share decline.

The extent to which households can self-insure and the government can help them to do so depends on the wage risk that they face and their family structure. We study wage risk in the UK and show that the persistence and riskiness of wages depends on one's age and position in the wage distribution. We also calibrate a model of couples and singles with two alternative processes for wages: a canonical one and a flexible one that allows for the much richer dynamics that we document in the data. We use our model to show that allowing for rich wage dynamics is important to properly evaluate the effects of benefit reform: relative to the richer process, the canonical process underestimates wage persistence for women and generates a more important role for in-work benefits relative to income support. The optimal benefit configuration under the richer wage process, instead, is similar to that in place in the benchmark UK economy before the Universal Credit reform. The Universal Credit reform generates additional welfare gains by introducing an income disregard for families with children. While families with children are better off, households without children, and particularly single women, are worse off.

Low-skilled immigrants indirectly affect public finances through their effect on native wages & labor supply. We operationalize this general-equilibrium effect in the workhorse labor market model with heterogeneous workers and intensive and extensive labor supply margins. We derive a closed-form expression for this effect in terms of estimable statistics. We extend the analysis to various alternative specifications of the labor market and production that have been emphasized in the immigration literature. Empirical quantifications for the U.S. reveal that the indirect fiscal benefit of one low-skilled immigrant lies between $770 and $2,100 annually. The indirect fiscal benefit may outweigh the negative direct fiscal effect that has previously been documented. This challenges the perception of low-skilled immigration as a fiscal burden.

Emerging markets have experienced large human and economic costs from COVID-19, and their tight fiscal space has limited the support extended to their citizens. We study the impact of an epidemic on economic and health outcomes by integrating epidemiological dynamics into a sovereign default model. The sovereign’s option to default tightens fiscal space and results in an epidemic with limited mitigation and depressed consumption. A quantitative analysis of our model accounts well for the dynamics of fatalities, social distancing, consumption, sovereign debt, and spreads in Latin America. We find that because of default risk, the welfare cost of the pandemic is about a third higher than it is in a version of the model with perfect financial markets. We study debt relief programs and find a compelling case for their implementation. These programs deliver large social gains, improving health and economic outcomes for the country at no cost to international lenders or financial institutions.

Houses are the most important asset on American households’ balance sheets, rendering the U.S. economy sensitive to house prices. There is a consensus that credit conditions affect house prices, but to what extent remains controversial, as an expansion in credit supply often coincides with changes in house price expectations. To address this longstanding question, we rely on novel microdata on the universe of mortgages guaranteed under the Veterans Administration (VA) loan program. We use the expansion of eligibility of veterans for the VA loan program following the Gulf War to estimate a long-lived effect of credit supply on house prices. We then exploit the segmentation of the conventional mortgage market from program eligibility to link this sustained house price growth to developments in the initially unaffected segment of the credit market. We uncover a net increase in credit for all other residential mortgage applicants that aligns closely with the evolution of house price growth, which supports the view that credit-induced house price shocks are amplified by beliefs.

Are labor markets in higher-income countries more meritocratic, in the sense that worker-job matching is based on skills rather than idiosyncratic attributes unrelated to productivity? If so, why? And what are the aggregate consequences? Using internationally comparable data on worker skills and job skill requirements of over 120,000 individuals across 28 countries, we document that workers’ skills better match their jobs’ skill requirements in higher-income countries. To quantify the role of worker-job matching in development accounting, we build an equilibrium matching model that allows for cross-country differences in three fundamentals: (i) the endowments of multidimensional worker skills and job skill requirements, which determine match feasibility; (ii) technology, which determines the returns to matching; and (iii) idiosyncratic matching frictions, which capture the role of nonproductive worker and job traits in the matching process. The estimated model delivers two key insights. First, improvements in worker-job matching due to reduced matching frictions account for only a small share of cross-country income differences. Second, however, improved worker-job matching is crucial for unlocking the gains from economic development generated by adopting frontier endowments and technology.

Labor protection policies in the 1950s and 1960s helped many low- and middle-wage white workers in the United States achieve the American Dream. This coincided with historically low levels of inequality across income deciles. After the Civil Rights Act of 1964, policies that had previously helped build the white middle class reversed, especially in states with a larger Black population. Calibrating a labor search model to match minimum wages, unemployment benefits, and bargaining power before and after the Civil Rights Act, I find declining labor protections explain half of the rise in 90/10 wage inequality since the 1960s.

A prominent explanation for why trade is not free is politicians’ desire to protect some of their constituents at the expense of others. In this paper we develop a methodology that can be used to reveal the welfare weights that a nation’s import tariffs implicitly place on different groups of society. Applied in the context of the United States in 2017, this method implies that redistributive trade protection accounts for a significant fraction of US tariff variation and causes large monetary transfers between US individuals, mostly driven by differences in welfare weights across sectors of employment. Perhaps surprisingly, differences in welfare weights across US states play a much smaller role.

We document that the protracted decline in the labor share has been accompanied by a decline in the tightness rate defined as the number of vacancies per job seekers. We argue that these two trends are related. When vacancies and job seekers are complements in the matching process, a decline in the tightness rate reduces workers’ fundamental bargaining power as defined by Hosios (1990), which in turn reduces the labor share of income. We calibrate a search and matching model extended to allow for an endogenous determination of bargaining power. The model can rationalize the common trends in the labor shares and tightness. According to the model, workers’ bargaining power declined by about 15 percent during the 1980–2007 period.

We introduce dynamic incentive contracts into a model of inflation and unemployment dynamics. Our main result is that wage cyclicality from incentives neither affects the slope of the Phillips curve for prices nor dampens unemployment dynamics. The impulse response of unemployment in economies with flexible, procyclical incentive pay is first-order equivalent to that of economies with rigid wages. Likewise, the slope of the Phillips curve is the same in both economies. This equivalence is due to effort fluctuations, which render effective marginal costs rigid even if wages are flexible. Our calibrated model suggests that 46% of the wage cyclicality in the data arises from incentives, with the remainder attributable to bargaining and outside options. A standard model without incentives calibrated to weakly procyclical wages matches the impulse response of unemployment in our incentive pay model calibrated to strongly procyclical wages.