Research Database

In this article, I suggest that incomplete markets and transaction costs are crucial for explaining the high equity premium and the low risk-free rate. I first demonstrate the failure of the complete frictionless markets model in explaining these return puzzles and then show how introducing incomplete markets and transaction costs can lead to success. Additionally, I explain how these features lead to predictions concerning individual consumptions, wealths, portfolios, and asset market transactions that are in better agreement with the facts than the predictions of the complete frictionless markets model.

We incorporate nominal wage contracts and government into a quantitative general equilibrium framework. Thus, our model includes three types of shocks: a fiscal shock, a monetary shock, and a technology shock. We show that it is possible in this type of environment to generate a low correlation between hours worked and the return to working, a moderately negative correlation between output and aggregate prices and a moderately positive correlation between the real wage rate and output. In sharp contrast with RBC models with indivisible labor, wage contracts magnify mainly the effect of monetary shocks on the volatility of hours worked. An attractive feature of the contracting model is that it avoids a trade-off that RBC models have to face in their predictive capacity when additional features are incorporated to them.

One critical aspect of economic development is that productivity growth and a rising standard of living are realized through more roundabout methods of production and increasing specialization of intermediate inputs and producer services. We use an extended version of the Judd-Grossman-Helpman model of dynamic monopolistic competition to show that an economy that inherits a small range of specialized inputs can be trapped into a lower stage of development. The limited availability of specialized inputs forces the final goods producers to use a labor intensive technology, which in turns implies a small inducement to introduce new intermediate products. The start-up costs, which make the intermediate goods producers subject to dynamic increasing returns, and pecuniary externalities that result from the factor substitution in the final goods sector, play essential roles in the model.

This article analyzes some of the potential effects of increased international financial integration within a simple two-country model. In the model, the article considers a switch in the menu of internationally traded financial securities from bonds to complete contingent claims and examines the impact of this switch on the stochastic properties, including the cross-country correlations, of standard macroeconomic aggregates like output, consumption, and labor effort, as well as the trade balance.

Why did states agree to a U.S. Constitution that prohibits them from issuing their own money? This article argues that two common answers to this question—a fear of inflation and a desire to control what money qualifies as legal tender—do not fit the facts. The article proposes a better answer: a desire to form a viable monetary union that both eliminates the variability of exchange rates between various forms of money and avoids the seigniorage problem that otherwise occurs in a fixed exchange rate system. Supporting evidence is offered from three periods of U.S. history: the colonial period (1690–1776), the Revolutionary War (1776–83), and the Confederation period (1783–89).

In recent years, monopolistic competition models have frequently been applied in macroeconomics, international and interregional economics, and economic growth and development. In this paper, I present a highly selective review in this area, with special emphasis on the complementarity and its role of generating multiplier processes, agglomeration, underdevelopment traps, regional disparities, and sustainable growth, or more generally, what Myrdal (1957) called the “principle of circular and cumulative causation.”

This article reviews recent work comparing properties of international business cycles with those of dynamic general equilibrium models. Two discrepancies between theory and data are described. One concerns the correlation across countries of fluctuations in consumption, output, and productivity: in the data, the output correlation is generally the largest; in theoretical economies, however, for a wide range of parameter values, the consumption correlation is the largest. The other discrepancy concerns relative price movements: the standard deviation of the terms of trade is considerably larger in the data than in theoretical economies. Also described here are several changes in theoretical structure that researchers have attempted, without success, to bring the theory and the data closer together.

In this paper, we present a model where individuals accumulate human capital through the formal schooling. To take into account the large involvement of the public sector in education we introduce a government which collects taxes from households and provides inputs to the learning technology. In our model the public expenditures on schools and growth rates are determined endogenously. Under plausible restrictions on the parameters of our model, we show that the predictions of our model qualitatively match the observations on per capita income, years of schooling, public expenditures on education and student-teacher ratios.

A pairwise random matching game is considered to identify the social environments that give rise to the social custom and fashion cycles. The game, played by Conformists and Nonconformists, can generate a variety of socially stable behavior patterns. In the path-dependence case, Conformists set the social custom and Nonconformists revolt against it; what action becomes the custom is determined by “history.” In the limit cycle case, Nonconformists become fashion leaders and switch their actions periodically, while Conformists follow with delay. The outcome depends on the relative share of Conformists to Nonconformists as well as their matching patterns.