Research Database

This paper develops the Kiyotaki-Wright model of monetary general equilibrium in which trade is bilateral and enforced by requiring that transactions be quid pro quo, and studies which goods are chosen, and under what conditions, as media of exchange. We prove the existence of a rational expectations equilibrium in which agents' expectations concerning trading opportunities are realized in the present and all future periods. We also show that, exceptional cases aside, no rational expectations barter equilibrium exists; that an equilibrium generally supports multiple money goods; and that a fiat money (i.e., a good that is produced, has minimum storage costs, but is not consumed) cannot be traded in rational expectations equilibrium.

This paper develops a model of firm location where communities differ by exogenous endowments of a factor of production. Firms choose to locate based on local subsidies to production. Community and firm optimal strategies are then examined. Through the introduction of information asymmetries about the communities' endowments, equilibrium bidding strategies for communities are found. The results show that auction institutions used by firms may in fact be signaling on the part of communities. These results also indicate that community bids reveal information, and restrictions on this bidding may do more harm than good.

We propose a model in which an unanticipated reduction in the money supply leads to a contemporaneous increase in inventories followed by periods with lower output. This persistent real effect does not require price-rigidity or real shocks and confusion. It is obtained in a model in which markets are cleared and agents are price-takers.