Creator: Kocherlakota, Narayana Rao, 1963- and Wallace, Neil Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 578 Abstract:
We study a random-matching, absence-of-double-coincidence environment in which people cannot precommit and in which there are two imperfect ways of keeping track of what other people have done in the past: money and a public record of all past actions that is updated with an average lag. We study how the magnitude of that lag affects the allocations that are optimal from among allocations that are stationary and feasible and that satisfy incentive constraints which arise from the absence of commitment and the imperfect ways of keeping track of what others have done in the past.
Creator: Cole, Harold Linh, 1957- and Ohanian, Lee E. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 579 Abstract:
In the postwar period velocity has risen so sharply in the U.S. that the ratio of money to nominal output has fallen by a factor of three. We analyze the implications of shrinking money for the real effects of a monetary shock in two classes of equilibrium monetary business cycle models: limited participation (liquidity) models and predetermined (sticky) price models. We show that the liquidity model predicts that a rise in velocity leads to a substantial reduction in the real effects of a monetary shock. In sharp contrast, we show that the real effects of a monetary shock in the sticky price model are largely invariant to changes in velocity. We provide evidence that suggests that the real effects of monetary shocks have fallen over the postwar period.
Creator: Cole, Harold Linh, 1957- and Kehoe, Patrick J. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 580 Abstract:
Some economists argue that as long as governments can earn the market rate of return by saving abroad, standard reputation models cannot support debt. We argue that these standard reputation models are partial in the sense that actions of agents in one arena affect reputation in that arena only. We develop a general model of reputation in which if a government is viewed as untrustworthy in one relationship, this government will be viewed as untrustworthy in other relationships. We show that our general model of reputation can support large amounts of debt.
Creator: Wallace, Neil and de O. Cavalcanti, Ricardo Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 581 Abstract:
A random-matching model (of money) is formulated in which there is complete public knowledge of the trading histories of a subset of the population, called banks, and no public knowledge of the trading histories of the complement of that subset, called nonbanks. Each person, whether a banker or a non banker, is assumed to have the technological capability to create indivisible, distinct and durable objects called notes. If outside money is indivisible and sufficiently scarce, then an optimal mechanism is shown to have note issue and destruction (redemption) by banks.
Creator: Chari, V. V., Jones, Larry E., and Marimon, Ramon, 1953- Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 582 Abstract:
In U.S. elections, voters often vote for candidates from different parties for president and Congress. Voters also express dissatisfaction with the performance of Congress as a whole and satisfaction with their own representative. We develop a model of split-ticket voting in which government spending is financed by uniform taxes but the benefits from this spending are concentrated. While the model generates split-ticket voting, overall spending is too high only if the president’s powers are limited. Overall spending is too high in a parliamentary system, and our model can be used as the basis of an argument for term limits.
Subject (JEL): H40 - Publicly Provided Goods: General, H30 - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: General, and H00 - Public Economics: General
Creator: Cole, Harold Linh, 1957- and Kocherlakota, Narayana Rao, 1963- Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 583 Abstract:
We consider the large class of dynamic games in which each player’s actions are unobservable to the other players, and each player’s actions can influence a state variable that is unobservable to the other players. We develop an algorithm that solves for the subset of sequential equilibria in which equilibrium strategies are Markov in the privately observed state.
Subject (JEL): C63 - Computational Techniques; Simulation Modeling and C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Creator: Boyd, John H., Chang, Chun, and Smith, Bruce D. (Bruce David), 1954-2002 Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 585 Abstract:
Many claims have been made about the potential benefits and the potential costs of adopting a system of universal banking in the United States. We evaluate these claims using a model where there is a moral hazard problem between banks and "borrowers," a moral hazard problem between banks and a deposit insurer, and a costly state verification problem. Under conditions we describe, allowing banks to take equity positions in firms strengthens their ability to extract surplus, and exacerbates problems of moral hazard. The incentives of universal banks to take equity positions will often be strongest when these problems are most severe.
Creator: Braun, R. Anton, Todd, Richard M., and Wallace, Neil Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 586 Abstract:
The distinguishing feature of natural-catastrophe risk is claimed to be aggregate risk. Because such risk is encompassed in the general competitive model, it seems to pose no new theoretical challenge. However, that model has markets contingent on exogenous events, while the actual economy seems to be developing mainly markets contingent on the level of total damage. In the context of a model with aggregate risk and endogenous total damage, a notion of competitive markets contingent on total damage is formulated. That notion implies that such markets achieve the same (efficient) risk sharing as markets contingent on exogenous events.
Creator: Velde, François R. and Weber, Warren E. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 588 Abstract:
Bimetallism has been the subject of considerable debate: Was it a viable monetary system? Was it a desirable system? In our model, the (exogenous and stochastic) amount of each metal can be split between monetary uses to satisfy a cash-in-advance constraint, and nonmonetary uses in which the stock of uncoined metal yields utility. The ratio of the monies in the cash-in-advance constraint is endogenous. Bimetallism is feasible: we find a continuum of steady states (in the certainty case) indexed by the constant exchange rate of the monies; we also prove existence for a range of fixed exchange rates in the stochastic version. Bimetallism does not appear desirable on a welfare basis: among steady states, we prove that welfare under monometallism is higher than under any bimetallic equilibrium. We compute welfare and the variance of the price level under a variety of regimes (bimetallism, monometallism with and without trade money) and find that bimetallism can significantly stabilize the price level, depending on the covariance between the shocks to the supplies of metals.
Creator: Chari, V. V. and Kehoe, Patrick J. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 589 Abstract:
We show that the desirability of fiscal constraints in monetary unions depends critically on the extent of commitment of the monetary authority. If the monetary authority can commit to its policies, fiscal constraints can only impose costs. If the monetary authority cannot commit, there is a free-rider problem in fiscal policy, and fiscal constraints may be desirable.
Keyword: Free riding problem, Growth and stability pact, International cooperation, and Time inconsistency Subject (JEL): E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies, F33 - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions, E42 - Monetary Systems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System; Payment Systems, F31 - Foreign Exchange, and F36 - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration