Creator: Green, Edward J. and Weber, Warren E. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 571 Abstract:
A current U.S. policy is to introduce a new style of currency that is harder to counterfeit, but not immediately to withdraw from circulation all of the old-style currency. This policy is analyzed in a random-matching model of money, and its potential to decrease counterfeiting in the long run is shown. For various parameters of the model, three types of equilibria are found to occur. In only one does counterfeiting continue at its initial high level. In the other two, both genuine and counterfeit old-style money go out of circulation—immediately in one and gradually in the other. There are objectives and expectations that can reasonably be imputed to policymakers, under which the policy that they have chosen can make sense.
Creator: Boyd, John H. and Graham, Stanley L. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 572 Abstract:
We don’t really know why the U.S. banking industry is consolidating rapidly, as it has been doing for the last decade or so. After a large number of studies on the topic including this one, what seems clear is that consolidation is not producing significant efficiencies — at least not on average. Other dimensions of the consolidation trend — such as its heavy concentration in large banks — are just as poorly understood. Given this ignorance as to the “why” of consolidation, it is extremely risky to predict its future effects. Based on past experience and data, at least, we can conclude the following.
Keyword: Large bank, Small bank, Banking industry, Total asset, and Bank market
Creator: Boyd, John H., Levine, Ross, and Smith, Bruce D. (Bruce David), 1954-2002 Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 573 Description:
Cover page issue number is "573D".
Creator: Smith, Bruce D. (Bruce David), 1954-2002 and Wang, Cheng Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 574 Abstract:
We consider the problem of an insurer who enters into a repeated relationship with a set of risk averse agents in the presence of ex post verification costs. The insurer wishes to minimize the expected cost of providing these agents a certain expected utility level. We characterize the optimal contract between the insurer and the insured agents. We then apply the analysis to the provision of deposit insurance. Our results suggest—in a deposit insurance context—that it may be optimal to utilize the discount window early on, and to make deposit insurance payments only later, or not at all.
Keyword: Deposit insurance and Bank supervision Subject (JEL): G20 - Financial Institutions and Services: General and E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies
Creator: Braun, R. Anton and Evans, Charles, 1958- Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 575 Abstract:
In aggregate unadjusted data, measured Solow residuals exhibit large seasonal variations. Total Factor Productivity grows rapidly in the fourth quarter at an annual rate of 16 percent and regresses sharply in the first quarter at an annual rate of –24 percent. This paper considers two potential explanations for the measured seasonal variation in the Solow residual: labor hoarding and increasing returns to scale. Using a specification that allows for no exogenous seasonal variation in technology and a single seasonal demand shift in the fourth quarter, we ask the following question: How much of the total seasonal variation in the measured Solow residual can be explained by Christmas? The answer to this question is surprising. With increasing returns and time varying labor effort, Christmas is sufficient to explain the seasonal variation in the Solow residual, consumption, average productivity, and output in all four quarters. Our analysis of seasonally unadjusted data uncovers important roles for labor hoarding and increasing returns which are difficult to identify in adjusted data.
Creator: Green, Edward J. and Lin, Ping Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 576 Abstract:
In a finite-trader version of the Diamond-Dybvig (1983) model, the symmetric, ex-ante efficient allocation is implementable by a direct mechanism (i.e., each trader announces the type of his own ex-post preference) in which truthful revelation is the strictly dominant strategy for each trader. When the model is modified by formalizing the sequential-service constraint (cf. Wallace, 1988), the truth-telling equilibrium implements the symmetric, ex-ante efficient allocation with respect to iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies.
Keyword: Implementation, Financial intermediation, and Bank run Subject (JEL): G21 - Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages and D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Creator: Cole, Harold Linh, 1957- and Kocherlakota, Narayana Rao, 1963- Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 577 Abstract:
We consider a simple environment in which individuals receive income shocks that are unobservable to others and can privately store resources. We show that this ability to privately store can undercut the ability to shift resources across individuals to the extent that the efficient allocation only involves consumption smoothing over time, as opposed to insurance (consumption smoothing over states) if the rate of return on savings is not too far below the rate of time preference, or, alternatively, if the worst possible outcome is sufficiently dire. We also show that unlike environments without unobservable storage, the symmetric efficient allocation is decentralizable through a competitive asset market in which individuals trade risk-free bonds among themselves.
Creator: Kocherlakota, Narayana Rao, 1963- and Wallace, Neil Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 578 Abstract:
We study a random-matching, absence-of-double-coincidence environment in which people cannot precommit and in which there are two imperfect ways of keeping track of what other people have done in the past: money and a public record of all past actions that is updated with an average lag. We study how the magnitude of that lag affects the allocations that are optimal from among allocations that are stationary and feasible and that satisfy incentive constraints which arise from the absence of commitment and the imperfect ways of keeping track of what others have done in the past.
Creator: Cole, Harold Linh, 1957- and Ohanian, Lee E. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 579 Abstract:
In the postwar period velocity has risen so sharply in the U.S. that the ratio of money to nominal output has fallen by a factor of three. We analyze the implications of shrinking money for the real effects of a monetary shock in two classes of equilibrium monetary business cycle models: limited participation (liquidity) models and predetermined (sticky) price models. We show that the liquidity model predicts that a rise in velocity leads to a substantial reduction in the real effects of a monetary shock. In sharp contrast, we show that the real effects of a monetary shock in the sticky price model are largely invariant to changes in velocity. We provide evidence that suggests that the real effects of monetary shocks have fallen over the postwar period.
Creator: Cole, Harold Linh, 1957- and Kehoe, Patrick J. Series: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department) Number: 580 Abstract:
Some economists argue that as long as governments can earn the market rate of return by saving abroad, standard reputation models cannot support debt. We argue that these standard reputation models are partial in the sense that actions of agents in one arena affect reputation in that arena only. We develop a general model of reputation in which if a government is viewed as untrustworthy in one relationship, this government will be viewed as untrustworthy in other relationships. We show that our general model of reputation can support large amounts of debt.