Research Database

"Summary of Recommendations: . . . Repeal present control by the System over interest rates that member banks may pay on time deposits and present prohibition of interest payments by member banks on demand deposits." Milton Friedman (1960, p. 100) "I conclude that the over-all monetary effects of ceiling regulations are small and easy to neutralize by traditional monetary controls. The allocative and distributive effects are, however, unfortunate. The root of the policy was an exaggerated and largely unnecessary concern for the technical solvency of savings and loan associations." James Tobin (1970, p. 5) The regulation of deposit interest rates has received little support from economists. The same is true for the original rationale for such regulation: that bank competition for deposits generates inherent "instability" in the banking system. This paper develops an "adverse selection" model of banking in which this rationale is correct. Moreover, in this model instability in the banking system can arise despite the presence of a "lender of last resort," and despite the absence of any need for "deposit insurance." However, in the world described, the regulation of deposit interest rates is shown to be an appropriate response to "instability" in the banking system. Finally, it is argued that "adverse selection" models of deposit interest rate determination can confront a number of observed phenomena that are not readily explained in other contexts.

We show that some classes of sterilized interventions have no effect on equilibrium prices or quantities. The proof does not depend on complete markets, infinitely-lived agents, Ricardian equivalence, monetary neutrality, or the law of one price. Moreover, regressions of exchange rates or interest differentials on variables measuring the currency composition of the debt may contain no information, in our theoretical economy, about the effectiveness of such interventions. Another class of interventions requires simultaneous changes in monetary and fiscal policy; their effects depend, generally, on the influence of tax distortions, government spending, and money supplies on economic behavior. We suggest that in applying the portfolio balance approach to the study of intervention, lack 01 explicit modeling of these features is a serious flaw.

Different conclusions about the effects of open market operations are reached even among economists using full employment and rational expectations models. I show that these can be attributed to different assumptions regarding (i) the concept of the deficit that is held fixed in the face of an open market operation, (ii) diversity among agents, and (iii) the features generating money demand. With regard to (iii), I argue that plausible ways of explaining the holding of low-return money preclude the kind of perfect credit markets needed to obtain Ricardian equivalence.

Recent developments in monetary economics stress the nature of monetary injections, emphasizing that these have implications for the relationship between money and prices. In constrast, traditional approaches posit stable money demand functions that are independent of how money is injected. The former approach implies that certain proportionality relations between money and prices need not obtain. This permits the two approaches to be empirically distinguished, but only if an appropriate "experiment" is conducted. The colonial period is one such experiment. Colonial evidence suggests that the nature of injections is crucial to the effect on prices of changes in the money supply.

We analyze the incentive for a government to default on its debts in a variant of the Lucas and Stokey (1983) model of optimal taxation. Optimal fiscal policy requires the use of debt to smooth tax distortions over time. Dynamic consistency requires that governments not have an incentive to default on the inherited debt. We consider policy and allocation rules which map the history of the economy into current decisions. A sustainable equilibrium is a sequence of history-contingent functions which satisfy sequential rationality for the government and for private agents. We characterize sustainable equilibrium outcomes when the horizon in finite. We show that, under plausible assumptions, the loss in welfare due to the absence of a commitment technology to honor debts is small.

A model of a "real" business cycle is produced in which labor market participants possess private information. A class of economies is considered in which interesting cycles cannot arise without private information. A methodology adapted from Kydland and Prescott (1982) is then employed to show that models based on private information can empirically confront salient features of postwar U.S. business cycles. Moreover, this can be done in a way which is consistent with existing microeconomic evidence on wages and labor supply. Finally, it is shown that the important features of the model related to private information are fairly general.

A model is presented in which governments can select real expenditure levels which are feasible, hut are sufficiently high that a balanced budget is impossible. Thus governments with large expenditures are committed to inflationary finance schemes. This is the case even though the governments in question have access to lump-sum taxes. In addition, the model can explain why poorer countries tend to make heavier use of the inflation tax than do wealthier countries, and can account for the existence of country-specific fiat monies.

The neoclassical growth model studied in Kydland and Prescott [1982] is modified to permit the capital utilization rate to vary. The effect of this modification is to increase the amplitude of the aggregate fluctuations predicted by theory as the equilibrium response to technological shocks. If following Solow [1957], the changes in output not accounted for by changes in the labor and tangible capital inputs are interpreted as being the technology shocks, the statistical properties of the fluctuations in the post-war United States economy are close in magintude and nature to those predicted by theory.

Optimal control theory can be combined with the probability structure of a vector autoregression to investigate the tradeoffs available to policymakers. Such an approach obtains results based on a minimal set of assumptions about the economy and the structure of policy actions. This paper takes this approach to analyze the potential effectiveness of countercyclical monetary policy.

This paper examines the limiting behavior of cooperative and noncooperative fiscal policies as countries market power goes to zero. In the first part we provide sufficient conditions for these policies to converge. In the second part we provide examples where these policies diverge. Briefly, we show that if there are unremovable domestic distortions then there can be gains to coordination between countries even when countries have no ability to affect world prices. These results are at variance with the received wisdom in the optimal tariff literature. The key distinction is that we model explicitly the spending decisions of the government while the optimal tariff literature does not.

Arrow-Debreu competitive equilibrium analysis is extended to environments with information sets differing in space as well as in time and with people moving between locations. Equilibrium is shown to exist and to be optimal and the equilibrium price system is characterized. Such environments include many of those studied in the equilibrium search literature.

This paper shows how to derive the family of models in which Cagan’s model of hyperinflation is a rational expectations model. The slope parameter in Cagan’s portfolio balance equation is identified in some of these models and in others it is not—a fact which clarifies results obtained in several recent papers.

A model with private information is constructed that supports conventional arguments for a government monopoly in supplying circulating media of exchange. The model also yields predictions, including rate-of-return dominance of circulating media of exchange, that are consistent with observations from free banking regimes and fiat money regimes. In a laissez faire banking equilibrium, fiat money is not valued, and the resulting allocation is not Pareto optimal. However, if private agents are restricted from issuing circulating notes, there exists an equilibrium with valued fiat money that Pareto dominates the laissez faire equilibrium and is constrained Pareto optimal.

[Please note that the following Greek lettering is improperly transcribed.] If [0,1] is a measure space of agents and X---- a collection of pairwise uncorrelated random variables with common finite mean U and variance a , one would like to establish a law of large numbers () Xdl = U. In this paper we propose to interpret () as a Pettis integral. Using the corresponding Riemann-type version of this integral, we establish (*) and interpret it as an L2-law of large numbers. Intuitively, the main idea is to integrate before drawing an W, thus avoiding well-know measurability problems. We discuss distributional properties of i.i.d. random shocks across the population. We given examples for the economic interpretability of our definition. Finally, we establish a vector-valued version of the law of large numbers for economies.

'Structural unemployment' is said to occur in regions or 'sectors' of the economy as a consequence of technological changes. In this paper we present a model which provides an environment which gives rise to unemployment which could be labelled structural unemployment. There is exogenous technological change and vintage specific human capital. Unemployment arises as workers specialized in a particular technology within a vintage decide to search for a job within their vintage, so that their previously acquired special skills are used, instead of getting employed as unskilled workers in the newest vintage. As the rate of technological change increases, the incentives to reassign specialized workers to their same vintage, inccuring therefore in search costs, becomes less attractive, and in consequence the fraction of specialized workers doing search activities decreases. This provides some rationale for the negative correlation between rates of growth and unemployment observed in the data.

This paper presents a completely worked example applying the frequency domain estimation strategy proposed by Hansen and Sargent [1980, 1981a]. A bivariate, high order continuous time autoregressive moving average model is estimated subject to the restrictions implied by the rational expectations model of the term structure of interest rates. The estimation strategy takes into account the fact that one of the data series are point-in-time observations, while the other are time averaged. Alternative strategies are considered for taking into account nonstationarity in the data. Computing times reported in the paper demonstrate that estimation using the techniques of Hansen and Sargent is inexpensive.

This paper examines the quantitative importance of temporal aggregation bias in distorting parameter estimates and hypothesis tests. Our strategy is to consider two empirical examples in which temporal aggregation bias has the potential to account for results which are widely viewed as being anomalous from the perspective of particular economic models. Our first example investigates the possibility that temporal aggregation bias can lead to spurious Granger causality relationships. The quantitative importance of this possibility is examined in the context of Granger causal relations between the growth rates of money and various measures of aggregate output. Our second example investigates the possibility that temporal aggregation bias can account for the slow speeds of adjustment typically obtained with stock adjustment models. The quantitative importance of this possibility is examined in the context of a particular class of continuous and discrete time equilibrium models of inventories and sales. The different models are compared on the basis of the behavioral implications of the estimated values of the structural parameters which we obtain and their overall statistical performance. The empirical results from both examples provide support for the view that temporal aggregation bias can be quantitatively important in the sense of significantly distorting inference.

A model is constructed where banks provide access to a communication technology which facilitates trade. Bank liabilities may coexist with alternative means of payment in equilibrium, and there exist regions of the parameter space where banking dominates the payments system and where physical exchange media dominate. The model is consistent with some observations concerning the role of the banking system in economic development, and with characteristics of banking crises. In particular, in early stages of economic development: 1) rapid output growth is accompanied by an increasing share of banking in transactions activity and 2) there are recurrent banking "panics" where reductions in measured aggregate output coincide with increases in the use of alternative means of payment relative to bank liabilities. In later stages of development, growth slackens off, the share of banking in the payments system stabilizes and the economy is less likely to be subject to banking panics.

We describe a simple environment in which assets of varying qualities may be used for transactions and consumption. The quality of an asset is known to the seller but not the buyer. We show that this feature can generate a negative relationship between the transactions velocities of assets and their rates of return. We also discuss several versions of Gresham's Law which hold in this environment.

Theory typically does not give us reason to believe that economic models ought to be formulated at the same level of time aggregation at which data happen to be available. Nevertheless, this is frequently done when formulating econometric models, with potentially important specification-error implications. This suggests examining the alternatives, one of which is to model in continuous time. The primary difficulty in inferring the parameters of a continuous time model given sampled observations is the “aliasing identification problem.” This paper shows how the restrictions implied by rational expectations sometimes do, and sometimes do not, resolve the problem. This is accomplished very simply in the context of a hypothesis about the term structure of interest rates. The paper confirms and extends results obtained for another example by Hansen and Sargent.

We consider the existence of deterministically cycling steady state equilibria in a class of stationary overlapping generations models with sufficiently long (but, finite) lived agents. Preferences are of the discounted sum of utilities type with a fixed discount rate. Utility functions with large coefficients of relative risk aversion which generate strong income effects (relative to substitution effects) and backward bending offer curves are permitted. Lifetime endowment patterns are quite arbitrary. We show that if agents have a positive discount rate, then as agents1 lifespans get large, short period non-monetary cycles will disappear. Further, constant monetary steady states do not exist and therefore, neither do stationary monetary cycles of any period. We then consider the case where agents have a negative discount rate and show that there are robust examples in which constant monetary steady states as well as stationary monetary cycles (with undiminished amplitude) can occur no matter how long agents live.

Methods are presented for solving a certain class of rational expectations models, principally those that arise from dynamic games. The methods allow for numerical solution using spectral factorization algorithms, and estimation of these models using maximum likelihood techniques.

A two country overlapping generations model is constructed, in which financial intermediation arises endogenously as an incentive compatible means of economizing on monitoring costs. Because of international credit markets. The model is used to generate the existence of transaction costs, money markets in the two countries are segmented and investors have differential access to predictions concerning the role of international intermediation in economic development, and to examine the nature of business cycle phenomena across alternative exchange rate regimes. Disturbances are propagated by a credit allocation mechanism, which also lends a novel flavor to the model's long run properties.

A new approach to market behavior is suggested. This approach has a coherent game theoretic foundaton, addresses such anomalous economic behaviors as strikes, rigid wages and unemployment, regulation of financial markets, depresssion, and nonmarket allocation, and, more generally, provides insights for Finance, Oligopoly Theory, Industrial Organization, and Macroeconomics. The central theme of the approach is that exchange technologies are a basic building block in a model, as are tastes, endowments, and production technologies. Moreover, the key feature of an institution of exchange is that it allows the making of a binding final offer.