Research Database

We investigate ex-ante efficient contracts in an environment in which implementation is costless. In this environment, standard debt contracts will typically not be optimal. Optimal contracts may involve defaults, even in states in which the borrower is fully able to repay. We then examine the welfare costs of arbitrarily restricting the set of feasible contracts to standard debt contracts. When model parameters are calibrated to realistic values, the welfare loss from exogenously imposing this restriction is extremely small. Thus, if the implementation costs are actually nontrivial (as seems likely), standard debt contracts will be (very close to) optimal.

We find that precautionary saving accounts for only a modest (less than 3 percentage point) increase in the aggregate saving rate, at least for moderate and empirically plausible parameter values. This finding is based on a quantitative analysis of a reasonably parameterized version of the standard growth model modified to include a large number of agents who receive uninsured idiosyncratic labor endowment shocks. In contrast to representative agent models, asset trading is quite important to individuals. The model can also account qualitatively for the positive skewness of wealth and income distributions, and significantly greater wealth inequality compared to income inequality.

Thinking regarding the privatization of state industries and enterprises in the former Comecon countries has tended to focus on the efficiency gains that would occur in the privatized sector. Based on the comparatively good performance and the rather rigid configuration of Comecon production institutions, the scope for such productivity gains seems small. Rather, productivity and innovation in the post-Comecon economies are likely to depend greatly on the emergence of new, initially small, entrepreneurial firms. The extent and form of privatization may affect these firms' prospects for success. How the privatized-firm and entrepreneurial sector will interact depends on public-finance considerations as well as on considerations of industrial organization.

In this paper, we build a model of the transition following large-scale economic reforms that predicts both a substantial drop in output and a prolonged pause in physical investment as the initial phase of the optimal transition following the reform. We model reform as a change in policy which induces agents to close existing enterprises using old technologies of production and to open up new enterprises adopting new technologies of production. The central idea of our paper is that it is costly to close old enterprises and open new enterprises because, in doing so, information capital built up about old enterprises is lost and time must pass before information capital about new enterprises can be acquired. Thus, an acceleration of the pace of industry evolution leads in the short run to a net loss of information capital, a drop in productivity, a recession, and a fall in physical investment. We calibrate our model of industry evolution, information capital, and transition to match micro data on industry evolution in the United States and macro data from the United States, Japan, and the former communist countries of Europe. We find that the loss of information capital that accompanies a major acceleration in the pace of industry evolution in an economy leads initially to a decade of recession and a five year pause in physical investment before the benefits of reform are realized.

This study describes recent attempts to solve what Lucas has called the "problem of economic development"—the problem of accounting for the great disparity in per-capita output across countries. The study examines a number of economic development theories, including the neoclassical theory of growth, which relies on cross-country differences in physical capital per person to explain the disparity, and newer theories, which stress cross-country differences in human capital, or education. It is argued that these models cannot account for observed per-capita output diversity. More promising theories are those that stress differences in incentives for entrepreneurs to create businesses (i.e., business capital) and adopt new technologies.

Economists make extensive use of two separate descriptions of private saving behavior: the life-cycle (or overlapping generations) model, and models with intergenerational altruism. Analysis of the two frameworks is quite different, as are many of the long-run policy implications. This paper looks at evidence, at the microeconomic level, for and against altruism as a principal determinant of private wealth holdings. The database is new: this paper uses a sample of annuitants in the TIAA-CREF retirement system. We employ a combination of qualitative and quantitative information. Results are: (i) one-half or more of the sample appears altruistically motivated. And (ii) saving for intentional bequests—amounting to about $350,000–$400,000 per family (at retirement) for about half the sample—seems to account for about 25 percent of average lifetime net worth for the whole group. If the definition of parental transfers is broadened to include spending on higher education for children and gifts (rather than just estates), the contribution of intentional transfers to lifetime average net worth climbs to 35–40 percent—in our sample.

We introduce procyclical labor and capital utilization, as well as costs of rapidly increasing employment, into a business-cycle model. Plausible variations in factor utilization enable us to explain observed variability of real GNP with considerably smaller economy-wide disturbances. The costs of adjustment create very interesting and realistic lead and lag relationships: Employment does not peak until a full quarter after output; workweeks, effort, capital utilization, and productivity all sharply lead the business cycle.