Research Database

This paper focuses on avoidable moral hazard and offers one explanation for limited insurance markets, for closely held firms, and for seemingly simple as opposed to contingent forms of debt. Agents have random endowments of a consumption good which are such that there are gains to trading contingent claims. But any realization of an endowment is known only by its owner unless a verification cost is borne. Contracts in such a setting are said to be consistent if agents submit to verification and honor claims in accordance with prior agreements. The Pareto optimal consistent contracts which emerge are shown to have familiar characteristics.

Many regional econometric models are estimated under the maintained assumption that certain national variables are exogenous with respect to the regional variables in the models. This exogeneity assumption is testable using time series methods of inference, yet, to my knowledge, no regional model has been so tested. In this paper, I test the national exogeneity assumption included in the specification of a particular regional forecasting model. Such a test is, I believe, a necessary and important step in the construction of any econometric model.

The determination of the mechanism for ordering strategies in a game theoretic conflict is the keystone of economic science, at least insofar as economics is to remain an outgrowth of that (otherwise relatively minor) school of English philosophy, Utilitarianism. A method for the solution of the general game is presented in this paper, and the implications for economic theorizing discussed.