Research Database

A traditional explanation for why sovereign countries repay debt is that they want to keep a good reputation so they can easily borrow more. This explanation does not hold if a country has access to an adequate means of savings regardless of the country's past actions. With such access, a country gets only transient benefits from maintaining a good relationship with bankers, and such benefits cannot support borrowing. However, if a country is involved in a myriad of trust relationships, the country's reputation can spill over to a nondebt relationship which has enduring benefits. Such a spillover can allow a country's reputation to support a large amount of borrowing.

This paper estimates the expectations of older male workers in the form of a 130 million element Markov transition probability matrix specifying the joint stochastic process for workers’ income, health, martial and employment status, conditioned on workers’ decisions about labor force participation and collection of Social Security benefits. The estimated transition matrix will be used in subsequent work to estimate the unknown parameters of workers’ utility functions under the assumption that their behavior is governed by the solution to a dynamic programming model. The paper also discusses some of the problems involved in constructing good measures of workers’ states and decisions.

In this paper, we describe and analyze the basic structure of the applied general equilibrium (AGE) models used to assess the effects of government trade policies. Once we have constructed the basic model, we extend it to cover features such as increasing returns to scale, imperfect competition, and differentiated products, following the AGE modeling trend of the past 10 years. We then compare a static AGE model's predictions with the actual data on how Spain was affected by entering the European Community and find that, when exogenous effects are included, a static AGE model's predictions are fairly accurate.