Research Database

This paper develops a model of the choice between bank and market finance by entrepreneurial firms that differ in the value of their net worth. The monitoring associated with bank finance ameliorates a moral hazard problem between the entrepreneurs and their lenders. The model is used to analyze the different strands of the credit view of the transmission of monetary policy. In particular, we derive the empirical implications of a broad credit channel, and compare them to those obtained when the model is extended to incorporate some elements of the bank lending channel.

This note develops a framework for thinking about the following question: What is the maximum amount of consumption that a utilitarian welfare function would be willing to trade off to avoid the deaths associated with COVID-19? The answer depends crucially on the mortality rate associated with the coronavirus. If the mortality rate averages 0.81%, as projected in one prominent study, our answer is 41% of one year’s consumption. If the mortality rate instead averages 0.44% across age groups, as suggested by a recent seroprevalence study, our answer is 28%.

This paper, originally published in the spring 1983 Quarterly Review, explains why flat-rate deposit insurance gives financial intermediaries an incentive to take on too much risk. It also discusses the purposes of deposit insurance and some ways reforms might serve those purposes. Three possible reforms are discussed: abolishing the insurance and requiring depository institutions to either hold safe assets or mark to market, reducing the deposit ceilings for insurance, and risk-adjusting the insurance premia.

In Scott Freeman’s (1996) model, payment system arrangements based on intermediated debt that is settled with money achieve higher welfare than does direct money payment. In a simplified version of Freeman’s model, welfare can be further improved and efficiency achieved by a monetary authority participating in a secondary market for debt or by a private intermediary using a common clearinghouse device. The analysis clarifies that ordinary private agents can assume the role of central bank or clearinghouse; no artificial agent, posited solely to play that role and endowed with special capabilities for it, is necessary. The institutional features required for a central bank or a clearinghouse to achieve efficiency, particularly features related to central bank independence, are discussed informally.

I show that the “indivisible labor” models of Diamond and Mirrlees (1978, 1986), Hansen (1985), Rogerson (1988), Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) and many others are, when aggregated across persons with the same marginal utility of income, equivalent to the divisible labor model of Lucas and Rapping (1969); any data on aggregate hours and earnings generated by the divisible (indivisible) model can be generated by some parameterization of the indivisible (divisible) model. The same is true when “macro” data are obtained by aggregating over time and across people. This equivalence means that the indivisibility of labor per se does not have implications for macroeconomics. Nor does indivisibility have “aggregate” normative implications.