Research Database

Between 1913 and 1929, real GDP per person in the UK fell 1 percent, while this same measure of economic activity rose about 25 percent in the rest of the world. Why was Britain so depressed in a decade of strong economic activity around the world? This paper argues that the standard explanations of contractionary monetary shocks and an overvalued nominal exchange rate are not the prime suspects for killing the British economy. Rather, we argue that large, negative sectoral shocks, coupled with generous unemployment benefits and housing subsidies, are the primary causes of this long and deep depression.

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U.S. stock prices have increased much faster than gross domestic product GDP) in the postwar period. Between 1962 and 2000, corporate equity value relative to GDP nearly doubled. In this paper, we determine what standard growth theory says the equity value should be in 1962 and 2000, the two years for which our steady-state assumption is a reasonable one. We find that the actual valuations were close to the theoretical predictions in both years. The reason for the large run-up in equity value relative to GDP is that the average tax rate on dividends fell dramatically between 1962 and 2000. We also find that, given legal constraints that effectively prohibited the holding of stocks as reserves for pension plans, there is no equity premium puzzle in the postwar period. The average returns on debt and equity are as theory predicts.

Banks have historically provided mutual insurance against asset risk, where the insurance arrangement itself was characterized by limited enforcement. This paper shows that a non-trivial interaction between asset and liquidity risk plays a crucial role in shaping optimal banking arrangements in the presence of limited enforcement. We find that liquidity shocks are essential for the provision of insurance against asset shocks, as they mitigate interbank enforcement problems. These enforcement problems generate endogenous aggregate uncertainty as investment allocations depend upon the joint distribution of shocks. Paradoxically, a negative correlation between liquidity and asset shocks ameliorates enforcement limitations and facilitates interbank cooperation.

There are two striking aspects of the recovery from the Great Depression in the United States: the recovery was very weak and real wages in several sectors rose significantly above trend. These data contrast sharply with neoclassical theory, which predicts a strong recovery with low real wages. We evaluate the contribution of New Deal cartelization policies designed to limit competition and increase labor bargaining power to the persistence of the Depression. We develop a model of the bargaining process between labor and firms that occurred with these policies, and embed that model within a multi-sector dynamic general equilibrium model. We find that New Deal cartelization policies are an important factor in accounting for the post-1933 Depression. We also find that the key depressing element of New Deal policies was not collusion per se, but rather the link between paying high wages and collusion.

We analyze the optimal design of monetary rules. We suppose there is an agreed upon social welfare function that depends on the randomly fluctuating state of the economy and that the monetary authority has private information about that state. We suppose the government can constrain the policies of the monetary authority by legislating a rule. In general, well-designed rules trade-off the need to constrain policymakers from the standard time consistency problem arising from the temptation for unexpected inflation with the desire to give them flexibility to react to their private information. Surprisingly, we show that for a wide variety of circumstances the optimal rule gives the monetary authority no flexibility. This rule can be interpreted as a strict inflation targeting rule where the target is a prespecified function of publicly observed data. In this sense, optimal monetary policy is transparent.

This study argues that the delegation of monetary policy control by one country to another can reduce inflation in the delegating country. Hyperinflation is common in a divided society, one in which special interest groups can pressure a weak central government to issue money to finance their own demands while neglecting the country’s overall welfare. A commitment device like dollarization or a currency board, which gives control of the divided country’s money supply to another country, can eliminate this inflation bias. This is illustrated by Argentina’s experience with inflation and a currency board which, in effect, gave control of Argentina’s money supply to the United States. This argument is made precise using a two-country overlapping generations model to study the effects of delegation. The study also finds that a dollarization treaty between the two countries can be welfare-improving for both.

This study argues that strong evidence contradicting the traditional assumption of time-consistent preferences is not available. The study builds and analyzes the implications of a deterministic general equilibrium model and compares them to data from the U.S. asset market. The model implies that (1) because of dynamic arbitrage, the prices of retradable assets cannot reveal whether preferences are time-inconsistent; but (2) the prices of commitment assets, investments which must be held for their lifetime, can. These prices will be higher than the present values of their future payoffs only when preferences are time-inconsistent. And (3) when preferences are time-inconsistent, people will not hold both retradable and commitment assets. Empirical observations on two examples of commitment assets—education and individual retirement accounts—are not consistent with these model implications.

Evidence of the statistical significance of profits in Q regressions remains one of the principal findings in the empirical investment literature. This result is frequently taken to support the view that capital market imperfections are an important element for understanding investment. This paper challenges that conclusion. We argue that allowing the profit function at the firm level to be strictly concave, reflecting, for example, market power, is sufficient to replicate the Q theory based regression results in which profits are a significant factor determining investment. To be clear, our ability to replicate the existing results does not require the specification of any capital market imperfections. Thus the friction that explains the statistical significance of profits could be market power by sellers rather than capital market imperfections.

In this paper, we consider an environment in which agents’ productivities are private information, potentially multi-dimensional, and follow arbitrary stochastic processes. We allow for arbitrary incentive-compatible and physically feasible tax schemes. We prove that it is typically Pareto optimal to have positive capital taxes. As well, we prove that in any given period, it is Pareto optimal to tax consumption goods at a uniform rate.