Research Database

A simple model of backed money without a store of value function is presented, discussed, and defended. The function of money in the model is to replace complex contingent contracts traded on a centralized exchange with simple trades in decentralized markets.

We revisit the question of how capital should be taxed, arguing that if governments are allowed to use the kinds of tax instruments widely used in practice, for preferences that are standard in the macroeconomic literature, the optimal approach is to never distort capital accumulation. We show that the results in the literature that lead to the presumption that capital ought to be taxed for some time arise because of the initial confiscation of wealth and because the tax system is restricted.

We present a model of vintage human capital. The economy exhibits exogenous deterministic technological change. Technology requires skills that are specific to the vintage. A stationary competitive equilibrium is defined and shown to exist and be unique, as well as Pareto optimal. The stationary equilibrium is characterized by an endogenous distribution of skilled workers across vintages. The distribution is shown to be single peaked and there is diffusion of technology in the sense that there is a lag between the time when a technology appears and the peak of its usage. An increase in the rate of exogenous technological change shifts the distribution of human capital to more recent vintages and increases the relative wage of the unskilled workers in each vintage.

This study examines the shape of an optimal income tax schedule in a monetary economy. In equilibrium, money’s role is to allocate resources across generations, while a tax-transfer scheme serves as a form of social insurance. It is found that the optimal real income tax with money can be progressive.