Research Database

We present a simple open economy framework to study the transmission channels of monetary and macroprudential policies and evaluate the implications for international spillovers and global welfare. Using an analytical decomposition, we first identify three transmission channels: intertemporal substitution, expenditure switching, and aggregate income. Quantitatively, expenditure switching plays a prominent role for monetary policy, while macroprudential policy operates almost entirely through intertemporal substitution. Turning to the normative analysis, we show that the risk of a liquidity trap generates a monetary policy tradeoff between stabilizing output today and reducing capital flows to lower the likelihood of a future recession. However, leaning against the wind is not necessarily optimal, even in the absence of capital controls. Finally, we argue that contrary to emerging policy concerns, capital controls are not beggar-thy-neighbor and can enhance global macroeconomic stability.

We review methods used to numerically compute optimal Mirrleesian tax and transfer schedules in heterogeneous agent economies. We show that the coarseness of the productivity grid, while a technical detail in terms of theory, is critical for delivering quantitative policy prescriptions. Existing methods are reliable only when a very fine grid is used. The problem is acute for computational approaches that use a version of the Diamond-Saez implicit optimal tax formula. If using a very fine grid for productivity is impractical, then optimizing within a flexible parametric class is preferable to the non-parametric Mirrleesian approach.

This paper studies lockdown policy in a dynamic economy without government commitment. Lockdown imposes a cap on labor supply, which improves health prospects at the cost of economic output and consumption. A government would like to commit to the extent of future lockdowns in order to guarantee an economic outlook that supports efficient levels of investment into intermediate inputs. However, such a commitment is not credible, since investments are sunk at the time when the government chooses a lockdown. As a result, lockdown under lack of commitment deviates from the optimal policy. Rules that limit a government’s lockdown discretion can improve social welfare, even in the presence of noncontractible information. Quantitatively, lack of commitment causes lockdown to be significantly more severe than is socially optimal. The output and consumption loss due to lack of commitment is greater for higher intermediate input shares, higher discount rates, higher values of life, higher disease transmission rates at and outside of work, and longer vaccine arrival times.

We revisit the estimation of the welfare costs of inflation originating from lack of liquidity satiation. We use data for the United States and several other developed countries. Our computations are heavily influenced by the recent experience of very low, even negative, short-term rates observed in the countries we study. We obtain estimates that range between 0.20% and 1.5% of lifetime consumption for the United States and find even higher values for some European countries.

We develop a theory of exchange rate fluctuations arising from financial institutions’ demand for dollar liquid assets. Financial flows are unpredictable and may leave banks “scrambling for dollars.” Because of settlement frictions in interbank markets, a precautionary demand for dollar reserves emerges and gives rise to an endogenous convenience yield on the dollar. We show that an increase in the dollar funding risk leads to a rise in the convenience yield and an appreciation of the dollar, as banks scramble for dollars. We present empirical evidence on the relationship between exchange rate fluctuations for the G10 currencies and the quantity of dollar liquidity, which is consistent with the theory.

Iovino, La’O and Mascarenhas (forthcoming) ask two important questions regarding the optimal conduct of monetary policy: Should the central bank’s policy depend on information the central bank has that is not available to markets? And should the central bank disclose information that it has but market participants do not? Iovino, La’O and Mascarenhas answer these questions using a simple, stylized model with one-period price stickiness. They show that efficient equilibria can be sustained regardless of whether policy depends on the central bank’s information and regardless of its disclosure policy. We explain the logic behind their irrelevance result and show that if restrictions are imposed on equilibria, then monetary policy should in general depend on the central bank’s information. Finally, we offer some speculative answers to their questions and discuss the sense in which policy is converging towards theory.

We provide a simple framework to study the prudential use of capital controls and currency reserves that have been explored in the recent literature. We cover the role of both pecuniary externalities and aggregate demand externalities. The model features a central policy dilemma for emerging economies facing large capital outflows: the choice between increasing the policy rate to stabilize the exchange rate and decreasing the policy rate to stabilize employment. Ex ante capital controls and reserve accumulation can help mitigate this dilemma. We use our framework to survey the recent literature and provide an overview of recent empirical findings on the use of these policies.

It is well known that monetary and fiscal policy are connected by a common budget constraint. In this paper, we study how this manifests itself in the context of the Eurozone, where that connection links the European Central Bank, the 19 national central banks, the Treasuries of 19 countries, and the European Union. Our goal is twofold. First, we wish to clarify how seigniorage flows from the monetary authority to the budget of each country. Second, we seek to answer the question of how the taxpayers of each country are affected by a default of one of the participants to the union. In answering this question, we analyze the mechanisms that ensure (or do not ensure) that net liabilities across countries stay bounded, and we establish how the answer depends on the liquidity premium that each category of assets commands (cash, excess reserves within the Eurosystem, and government bonds). We find that the official risk-sharing provisions of the policy of quantitative easing (QE), whereby national central banks retain 90% of the risk intrinsic in bonds of their own country, only holds under restrictive assumptions; under plausible scenarios, a significantly larger fraction of the risk is mutualized.

We develop a restart algorithm based on Scarf’s (1973) algorithm for computing approximate Brouwer fixed points. We use the algorithm to compute all of the equilibria of a general equilibrium pure-exchange model with four consumers, four goods, and 15 equilibria. The mathematical result that motivates the algorithm is a fixed-point index theorem that provides a sufficient condition for uniqueness of equilibrium and a necessary condition for multiplicity of equilibria. Examining the structure of the model with 15 equilibria provides us with a method for constructing higher dimensional models with even more equilibria. For example, using our method, we can construct a pure-exchange economy with eight consumers and eight goods that has (at least) 255 equilibria.