Research Database

Three economic environments are reviewed, and in each organizations play an essential role. For an adverse selection insurance economy, we find that when mutual insurance arrangements are permitted an equilibrium necessarily exists and is optimal. This example, and the two others, illustrate the problems that may result from imposing organizational structure on an environment rather than permitting the structure to be determined endogenously.

Doan, Litterman, and Sims have described a method for estimating Bayesian vector autoregressive (BVAR) forecasting models. The method has been successfully applied to the U.S. macroeconomic dataset, which is relatively long and stable. Despite the brevity and volatility of the post-1976 Chilean macroeconomic dataset, this paper shows that a straightforward application of the DLS method to this dataset, with simple modifications to allow for delays in the release of data, also appears to satisfy at least one criterion of relative forecasting accuracy suggested by Doan, Litterman, and Sims. However, the forecast errors of the Chilean BVARs are still large in absolute terms.Also, the model's coefficients change sharply in periods marked by policy shifts, such as the floating of the peso in 1982.

A model of a labor market is developed in which agents possess private information about their marginal products. As a result, involuntary unemployment may arise as a consequence of attempts by firms to create appropriate self-selection incentives. Moreover, employment lotteries may arise for the same reason despite the fact that, in equilibrium, there is no uncertainty in the model. When employment is random, this is both privately and socially desirable. Finally, it is shown that the unemployment that arises is consistent with (a) pro-cyclical aggregate real wages and productivity, (b) employment that fluctuates (at individual and aggregate levels) much more than real wages.

This paper characterizes the behavior of investment expenditures, optimal capital stocks, and real interest rates in the time-to-build model of investment. These results are used to show that the delivery lag model of investment fails to account for time lags in investment when constructing the cost of capital variable and hence, misspecifies the effects of interest rates on investment expenditures. Second, this paper derives equilibrium pricing relationships involving the prices of existing capital and uses these relationships to obtain simple tests of the underlying investment technology. Despite the widespread use of 'q' in the empirical investment literature, it is shown that the relationship between current investment and an appropriately defined measure of Tobin's 'q' contains no such testable implications. Finally, it is shown that the practice of using stock market data to measure the price of existing capital is invalid when time lags exist in the investment process.

The Diamond-Dybvig model of banking (Journal of Political Economy, 1983) is amended by introducing communication barriers - these being implicit in their model and in most explanations of why people hold so-called liquid assets. These barriers imply the sequential-service constraint that Diamond and Dybvig imposed on private intermediation and have other implications: infeasibility of the policy that Diamond and Dybvig identify with deposit insurance and desirability of dependence of the realized return on deposits on the random order of withdrawals.

This paper is about a useful way of taking account of frictions in asset pricing and macroeconomics. I start by noting that complete frictionless markets models have a number of empirical deficiencies. Then I suggest an alternative class of models with incomplete markets and heterogenous agents which can also accommodate a variety of other frictions. These models are quantitatively attractive and computationally feasible and have the potential to overcome many or all of the empirical deficiencies of complete frictionless markets models. The incomplete markets model can also differ significantly from the complete frictionless markets model on some important policy questions.

Empirical studies quantifying the benefits of increased foreign direct investment (FDI) have been unable to provide conclusive evidence of a positive impact on the host country’s economic performance. I show that the lack of robust evidence is not inconsistent with theory, even if the gains to FDI openness are large. Anticipated welfare gains to increased inward FDI should lead to immediate declines in domestic investment and employment and eventual increases. Furthermore, since part of FDI is intangible investment that is expensed from company profits, gross domestic product (GDP) and gross national product (GNP) should decline during periods of abnormally high FDI investment. Using the model of McGrattan and Prescott (2009) and data from the IMF Balance of Payments to parameterize the time paths of FDI openness for each country in the sample, I do not find an economically significant relationship between the amount of inward FDI a country did over the period 1980—2005 and the growth in real GDP predicted by the model. This finding rests crucially on the fact that most of these countries are still in transition to FDI openness.